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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines three aspects of consumer
behaviour in the British health care market. The UK
health care market is. a mixed public-private system, in
which the private sector provides only a limited
alternative to public provision. Within this market, the
research examines the non-corporate demand for private
health insurance, the demand for private health care by
the insured and the costs to consumers of allocation of
non-urgent care in the NHS by means of waiting list. An
analytical model of demand for health insurance which
explicitly incorporates the limited natures of both the
private sector and the market for health insurance is
developed. This model is investigated by means of
computer simulation and tested by econometric estimation,
using the 1982 General Household Survey as the data base.
A model of the utilisation of health insurance which also
takes into account the limited nature of the private
sector is developed. This model is tested by means of
econometric estimation.	 The costs for consumers of
medical care of waiting lists is the disutility of time
spent waiting for care. The research seeks to estimate
a monetary value of this disutility. We investigate the
nature of the costs of waiting lists for non-urgent
medical care and examine an economic framework for
estimation of the value of these costs. An econometric
model is proposed and is estimated using data collected
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specifically for the research. The data records the
stated intentions of respondents to trade-off money
against time to obtain non-urgent medical treatment and
was collected using 'Stated Preference' methodology.
3
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The concern of this thesis is the behaviour of the
consumer in a health care market in which a private sector
provides a limited set of substitutes for publicly
provided and financed health care. Specifically, the
research addresses two related issues in the British
health care market: the first, the demand for and
utilisation of private health insurance in the UK and the
second, the costs to the consumer of the allocation of
health care in the public sector by waiting list.
The economics of health insurance has been
examined in some depth in health care systems in which the
main source of finance for health care is the private
agent (e.g. Arrow 1963; Phelps 1976; Keeler et al 1977;
Ehrlich and Becker 1972; Nordquist and Wu 1976). In the UK
the extension of private health insurance cover is a
recurrent theme in the periodic debates on the 'future of
the National Health Service' (Maynard 1982; Culyer et al.
1988). Yet surprisingly little research effort has been
spent on positive economic analysis of the UK private
health insurance market. The present work seeks to begin
this analysis. We focuses on the behaviour of the
demander, taking the supply side as given, as to study
both the demand and supply sides of the market would be
4
beyond the scope of the present work. We investigate both
the non-corporate demand for health insurance and the
demand for private health care of the privately insured.
The existence of a private sector and a private
health insurance market alongside the NHS must depend on
the existence of unmet consumer demand for certain types
of health care or consumer dissatisfaction with the care
provided in the state sector. One of the reasons that has
been cited for the demand for private sector medical care
in the UK is the existence of waiting lists in the NHS
(Gillam 1985). The study of the costs of NHS allocation of
non-urgent medical care by waiting list is therefore a
complement to and an extension of our examination of
private health insurance.
An understanding of the current UK health care
market is the starting point for all the research
presented in this thesis. In this introductory chapter we
outline those features which we view as central to the
research. The chapter is divided into three sections.
In the first, we present a brief outline of the nature of
the British health care market and examine the nature and
delivery of medical care in the National Health Service
(NHS), concentrating upon the hospital based sector, and
then move to examine the independent (private) hospital
sector. In the second, we examine one particular feature
of the UK health care market in more detail; the use of
queues and waiting lists to allocate certain types of care
in the NHS.
	 In the final section we outline of the
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organisation of the rest of the work.
	
1.	 THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
	
1.1	 The Public Sector
Public sector contribution to both the finance and
the delivery of health care in the UK is high by
international standards. On the finance side, the public
sector share of all health care expenditure and of medical
care benefits is about 84 and 92 percent respectively
(poullier 1986). This finance is raised through central
government general taxation, from which individuals cannot
'contract out'. The delivery of care is dominated by the
NHS, which was established in 1948 through the
nationalization of the hospital stock and the provision of
primary and specialist care at zero money cost at point of
demand. The much quoted objective was to ensure access to
medical care on the basis of need rather than ability to
pay. Despite the introduction and increased use of user
charges, allocation of medical care by the price mechanism
remains very limited in the NHS. Most care is still
supplied at zero price at point of demand. The quantity
and quality of the medical care delivered is determined to
a large extent by the supplier of care. This supplier
perhaps acts as a perfect agent for the demander or
perhaps also act as his/her own agent. However, all
actions are subject to the constraints of global and local
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NHS budgets.
Lindsay (1980) has argued that provision of a good
by a not-for-profit supplier results in an output with
different attributes from that which would be provided by
a supplier whose aim was to maximise profit. He argues
that in a bureaucracy which provides a service at zero
price, performance cannot be assessed by means of profit.
Other methods of assessment must be sought, and
information must be collected by the organisation for the
express purpose of monitoring output and performance.
Such collection has a cost. Moreover, it is more costly
to collect certain data than others. Lindsay argues that
the relative costs of data collection lead to an
overemphasis of the importance of easily measured
attributes of the good and to an underemphasis of the
importance of more intangible attributes. In response to
these differences in data collection costs, bureaucratic
managers/suppliers alter the nature of the output. In
equilibrium, the output produced has fewer intangible
attributes than that which would be produced by a private
sector supplier. Lindsay argues that in the NHS the
outcome of this process is the undersupply of 'consumer-
orientated' attributes of care, such as information,
reassurance and hotel type facilities, and the oversupply
more easily measured items, such as bed-days per
treatment.
The (fairly scanty) evidence does not wholly
support Lindsay's thesis. Comparison of the output of
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American hospitals with that of the NHS does indicate that
consumer orientated attributes of care are provided to a
higher degree in the American hospitals. But to compare
two different systems in this way is to implicitly assume
that all factors which may affect output, other than the
bureaucratic nature of the organisation, do not differ
between the two health care systems. In comparing
American for-profit hospitals with NHS hospitals this
assumption is clearly not met. In the UK, the providers
of private hospital care stress the provision of
information and hotel facilities in the private sector
(BUPA 1988) and it seems likely these are greater in the
private than the public sector. But the sole study which
compared length of stay in private sector and NHS
hospitals (Williams et al. 1985a) found that lengths of
stay for those procedures which are routinely performed in
the private sector were longer in the private than in the
public sector. These findings suggest that factors other
than the degree of bureaucracy could be determinants of
the attributes of medical care. For example, recent work
in the North American market suggests the method of
payment is important in determining output. It is argued,
for example, that the introduction of Preferred Provider
Organizations, which do not change the structure of
provision, but alter the method of payment for care, will
change the output from that supplied by providers
reimbursed by third party insurance (Culyer et al. 1988).
In the UK context, Maynard (1988) has argued that the
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length of stay in the UK private sector is due, not to the
presence or absence of bureaucratic structures or priced
output, but to the use of third party reimbursement
methods of insurance. However, while the nature of NHS
output may or may not be due to bureaucratic organisation,
qualitative evidence, such as the current concern with
consumerism in the NHS, does suggest that the NHS is
viewed as providing fewer consumer orientated attributes
than that desired by some potential consumers. But
perhaps the main source of concern or discontent is not
the type of care provided in the NHS, but the wait
associated with receipt of this care.
In any market in which separation of the payment
for and the receipt of the good occurs, excess demand is
likely to arise (Barr 1987). In the absence of a money
price in the NHS, health care provision must be rationed
between demanders if the global ceiling on expenditure is
not to be exceeded. Rationing takes several forms. It
may be explicit (e.g. RAW?) or may be implicit, it may
take effect through restrictions on the quantity or
reductions in the quality of the care provided. The most
obvious form of rationing in the NHS is the use of queues
as a mechanism for allocation of care. We return to an
analysis of the effect of allocation by queue below, but
before this we turn to an examination of the key features
of the private sector in the UK health care system.
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1.2	 The Private Sector
In terms of total expenditure the private sector
in the UK is dwarfed by the NHS. Gross expenditure on
acute health care provided in the private sector has been
estimated at 700 to 750 million pounds in 1987, while the
NHS budget in that year was approximately 20 billion
pounds (Maynard 1988). However, this absolute size
comparison masks the contribution of the private sector to
the provision of specific types of care. The private
sector has traditionally concentrated upon the
of facilities for acute non-emergency, mainly
care (sometimes referred to as 'cold surgery').
et al (1985b) estimated that private sector
accounted for approximately 13 per cent of all
provision
surgical
Williams
activity
domestic
inpatient surgery in 1981, this proportion rising to 26
percent of certain types of surgery and 20 percent of all
surgery in London and the South East. In the 1980s there
has been some expansion in the private sector out of the
traditional areas of cold surgery into more complex
surgery and specialisms such as treatment for
infertility. However, to date this expansion has been
relatively minor, and in 1987 fewer than 20 types of
common surgical procedure accounted for about 70 percent
of private sector expenditure on acute care (Maynard
1988).
In the 1980s the private sector has also moved
into the provision of private nursing home care for the
10
elderly and handicapped. However, as such care is
explicitly excluded from the cover provided by private
health insurance contracts, we exclude this type of
private sector provision from any of our discussion and
analysis.
The small size of the public sector perhaps also
masks the extent of the interaction between the two
sectors. To a large extent, the activities of the private
sector are determined by those of the NHS. On the demand
side, the gap between the type of care demanded and the
nature of the care provided in the public sector creates a
demand for private sector care. The private acute health
care providers have not sought to replicate NHS provision
on a smaller scale, but provide facilities for treatment
for a more limited set of states of ill-health. The
private sector has concentrated its efforts upon those
services for which there is explicit, in the form of
waiting lists, or implicit, in the form of provision of
care with fewer 'consumer-orientated' attributes,
rationing in NHS care.
On the supply side, the labour employed in the
private sector is either concurrently employed in the
public sector (consultants and perhaps some nursing staff)
or is generally trained in the public sector. NHS
contracts have permitted consultants to undertake private
practice alongside their NHS work, initially largely
within NHS facilities (NHS paybeds), but more recently
mostly in independent private sector facilities. Maynard
11
(1982) has argued that changes in NHS policy have
encouraged the growth of the independent private sector.
He singled out two policies as of particular importance;
the first, the attempt to phase out NHS pay beds in 1976
(the 1976 Health Services Act) and the second, the
introduction of new contractual arrangements for NHS
consultants in 1981. Maynard argues the effect of the
first was to stimulate the construction of private sector
hospitals. The effect of the second was to increase the
potential supply of consultant labour to the private
sector. Specialists in the NHS have been permitted since
1948 to work in the private sector, thus many consultants
have worked concurrently in both sectors. The 1981 changes
permitted NHS consultants to undertake more private sector
work whilst remaining employed by the NHS, but
simultaneously reduced the incentives for full-time NHS
work.
Demand for private sector care is not only a
function of a desire for care with different attributes,
but also of ability to pay. The importance of income is
reflected in the geographical distribution of private
sector facilities. Approximately 30 percent of private
sector care in 1981 was provided in NHS pay beds. The
remainder was provided in private facilities, over 50
percent of which are located in the South East of England
(Association of Independent Hospitals 1985). Over half
the beds in these hospitals are owned by for-profit
suppliers, the rest provided by charitable entities
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(referred to as 'not-for-profit' in the health
literature). Medical care in these hospitals can either
be self-financed (sometimes referred to as self-insurance)
or funded through the purchase of reimbursement medical
insurance. Data for 1981 (Williams et al 1985b) indicated
that approximately 30 percent of private care was self
financed (primarily abortions) but Maynard (1988)
estimated that this had fallen to 10 percent by 1988.
It is clear that several factors account for the
precise nature of the interdependence between the public
and private sectors in the UK. Further, there are a
number of differences in the good provided in, and the
allocation mechanisms of, the two health care sectors.
In this work we take into account these differences, but
we focus particular attention on the consequences of
allocation by time in one sector and money in the other.
The thesis examines three features of the UK health care
market which are the result, wholly or in part, of this
difference in allocation mechanisms. The first is the
demand for private health insurance. The second is the
utilisation of private sector care by those covered by
health insurance. The third is the costs to consumers of
allocation of non-urgent medical care in the NHS by
waiting list. An understanding of the role of time in the
allocation of health care in the UK is necessary for the
analysis of any of these three topics. In the next
section, we outline the role played by time in the
allocation of health care generally, and in the NHS in
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particular. As our interest is primarily in the behaviour
of the consumer, we focus on the impact of allocation by
time on the demander, rather than the supplier, of care.
2.	 THE ROLE OF TIME IN THE ALLOCATION OF MEDICAL CARE
Becker (1965) argued that utility from market
goods can only be derived if the consumer inputs time into
their consumption. Further, as time is a scarce resource,
this use of time has a cost. This implies that consumption
has both a time and a money price. Acton (1976) proposed
a model of the demand for medical care which incorporated
Becker's analytical insights. In the Acton model the
consumer maximizes utility, derived from the consumption
of medical care and all other goods, subject to a budget
constraint which incorporates both income and time
constraints. Acton (implicitly) assumes a single unit of
time can only be used in one consumption activity, and
thus, in his model, the consumption of medical care has
both a time and a money cost. The comparative static
results indicate that the elasticity of demand for medical
care with respect to time depends on both the time and the
money price. The absolute value of this elasticity is a
positive function of the size of the time price relative
to the sum of the time and money prices of care. The
implication of these results is that time price will be
more important to demand in health care systems in which
care is primarily allocated by means of time, and money
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price more important in health care systems in which the
money cost is a large component of the price. Empirical
studies by Acton (1976) and Phelps and Newhouse (1974)
have given some support to these hypotheses. Later
research on the effect of time has distinguished between
different aspects of the demand for medical care. Coffey
(1983), for example, found that travel and waiting time
were significant correlates of the choice of the supplier
of medical care, but not of the frequency of use of that
supplier.
Research has also been undertaken into the
function of time as a rationing device (see Iversen (1986)
for a review). In this context, it is helpful to
distinguish between the queue and the waiting list. The
former involves waiting in person, the latter does not.
Both are used widely in the NHS. Access to primary care
and hospital outpatient care is generally by means of both
queue and waiting list, some GPs and some hospital
outpatient departments making greater use of queues than
others. Access to inpatient surgical speciality (once
referred by the GP) is primarily by waiting list.
Time spent queuing in person has an opportunity
cost equal to the next best alternative use of the time.
If the utility of medical care received is affected by the
amount of time spent queuing, queues act as a rationing
device (Barzel 1974) and time can be used instead of price
to restrict demand. If money price equals zero, the
marginal queuer will be the individual for whom the
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marginal utility of time spent in the queue will equal the
marginal utility of medical care to be received. The cost
of care is then the opportunity cost of the time spent
queuing.
Recently, attention has turned to the waiting.
list. Cullis and Jones (1985) have discussed several
(competing) economic explanations for waiting lists in the
NHS. These include the existence of a gap between the
individual and the social costs of NHS use, the 'crowding-
out' of private by public provision, the income effect
caused by the divorce for payment for and use of care, the
agency role of doctors and shifts in preferences towards
higher standards of medical care. None of these arguments
directly focuses on the cost of waiting lists to the
consumer, although none are incompatible with positive
costs of waiting list for the consumer. However, in a
recent paper Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) (hereafter
referred to as LF (1984)) focus directly on the costs of
waiting lists for the demander of medical care.
The main features of the LF (1984) model can be
summarised as follows. The demander of a good allocated
by waiting list incurs some cost when he joins the list.
Once on the list the demander incurs no cost from waiting
per se (in contrast to the demander who waits physically
in a queue). The mechanism that clears the market is not
the time cost of waiting but the effect of delay in
receipt on the value of the good. The value of a good
received at a later date is lower than the value of the
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good received at the present, not only because of a
positive discount rate, but because the nature of some
goods may mean that they are of less use at a later date.
More formally, if the value of the good to be
received at the time of joining the list is equal to Vo,
the value. of the good at time t is
Vt = Voexp(-gt)
where g is the 'decay rate', the rate at which the value
of the good decreases as the delay between joining the
list and receipt of the good increases. The authors posit
that there is some fixed cost, say c, of joining the
list. This cost which does not vary with length of wait.
The demander of care will compare the value of the good
received at time t with this fixed cost; the marginal
joiner of the queue will be the demander for whom
c= Voexp(-gt)
The authors argue that different goods have
different decay rates. Under the assumption that the cost
of joining the list is fixed across goods, the comparative
statics of the model indicate first, that the length of
waiting list will be inversely related to the decay rate
and second, that the responsiveness of waiting lists to
capacity increases is negatively related to the decay
rate.
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LF (1984) apply this model to the allocation of
treatment in the NHS by waiting list. From the general
model, they derive the hypothesis that the length of a
waiting lists for treatment is an inverse function of the
t
decay rate. This hypothesis appears to be supported by
empirical investigation. In this analysis the region was
taken as the unit of observation, diseases and all other
hospitalisable conditions were classified into three
categories on the basis of decay rates and the
relationship between length of list and decay rate
examined using regression analysis. A negative and
significant association between decay rate and length of
list was found.
The LF analysis is useful and important in that it
stresses the difference, for the consumer, between
allocation by queue and allocation by waiting list.
However, there are a number of issues which are raised but
not fully explored in the LF paper.
First, it is not possible to conclude from the
estimation results that consumer response to the decay
rate is the only factor determining the length of
different waiting lists. Perhaps in their focus on the
consumer Lindsay and Feigenbaum ignore the central role of
the provider of health care in the UK system. In
contrast, say, to entry onto the list for season tickets
to the opera or football matches (some of the examples
given by Lindsay and Feigenbaum to motivate their general
analytical model), the demander of NHS medical care will
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only get onto a list if referred there by a supplier of
care. Therefore the length of list may be determined by
the behaviour of suppliers rather than (or as much as)
that of demanders. For the suppliers, waiting lists are
useful to the extent that they represent a stock of work.
They ensure that the scarce and skilled resources of the
medical care team can be fully utilised. Additionally,
lists allow suppliers to pick 'interesting' cases or to
carry out their teaching duties (Cullis and Jones 1985).
If suppliers act to minimize their own costs, the longer
waiting lists will be for illnesses with low decay rates.
The reason is that the supplier-based costs of treatment
of conditions with low decay rates are not greatly
increased by a delay in treatment. Therefore to minimise
their own costs, suppliers will undertake other treatments
first. So the greatest delay in treatment will occur,
almost tautologically, for those medical conditions with
low decay rates.
Second, the precise nature of the costs incurred
by the consumer is not well spelt out in the LF (1984)
exposition. The formal model specifies a lump sum cost of
joining the queue, no cost to waiting per se and some drop
in the value of inpatient care as a result of the delay in
receipt of care. This model implies that the only costs
of the waiting list are the initial joining cost and the
fall in the value of treatment. In other words, the wait
itself has no costs. However, it would appear that there
are costs to waiting lists which are not the result of the
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deterioration of the value of the final treatment. First,
almost tautologically, individuals on a NHS waiting list
are in a poorer than normal health state. Therefore they
may not be able to carry out all their usual activities.
It might be expected that this restriction will be
associated with a positive cost. The total cost of such a
restriction will obviously increase as the wait increases.
But this cost is not the same cost as that which arises as
a result of the deterioration of the demander's health
during the wait for treatment. In fact, a situation
could be envisaged in which the demander's medical
condition remains stable, so the decay rate is zero. In
this case, the LF cost is also zero. But if the medical
condition prevents, say, the demander from working, the
cost of waiting is likely to be positive rather than zero.
Second, waiting for medical treatment, about which
the consumer is likely to have relatively little
information and for which the precise outcome may be
uncertain, may be associated with anxiety. Again, this
anxiety has a cost which is not necessarily related to the
final outcome of treatment. Third, the LF (1984) analysis
assumes that the date of receipt of treatment is known.
However, despite an increase in the proportion of booked
cases, i.e. those cases which are given a firm date for
admission, it is generally not possible for patients to
choose the date of admission within the NHS. This
uncertainty of admission date may cause anxiety and so be
a cost for the demander of care. Again, this is a cost to
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waiting which is not related to the final outcome of
treatment. Finally, the 'non-decay rate related' costs
discussed here may be borne both by the demander of care
and by the family or friends of the demander.
These additional issues do not invalidate the LF
(1984) analysis, but they prompt reassessment of the
assumption that the costs of waiting per se are zero.
Later in this work we return to a more detailed
examination of waiting list costs (Chapter 6). More
generally, the hypothesis put forward and tested in this
thesis is that the use of time as an allocative mechanism
in the NHS, in the form of queue or waiting list, imposes
positive costs on the demander of care.
3.	 THE RESEARCH PRESENTED IN THE THESIS
The organisation of the thesis is as follows. In
Chapter 2 we develop an analytical model of the non-
corporate demand for health insurance in the British
health care system. The term non-corporate refers to that
demand which is not funded by the employer of the insured.
This analytical model incorporates the assumption that
waiting lists and queues are associated with positive
demander-based costs. The predictions of the model are
tested by means of a computer simulation and by
econometric estimation using cross-sectional data from the
1982 General Household Survey.
	 The simulation is
presented in Chapter 3, the estimation presented in
21
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 we turn our attention to the
corollary of the demand for insurance; the demand for
private health care by those covered by health insurance.
Ideally, this demand should be analysed simultaneously
with the .demand for health insurance. Lack of data
prevents such a course of action. Instead, we develop a
model of demand for private sector medical care
conditional on health insurance cover. This model is
estimated using data provided by the largest private
health insurer in the UK market.
In Chapter 6 we return to the issue of waiting
lists and demander costs. We analyse the disutility for
the demander of waiting for treatment for a medical
condition with a near zero decay rate. We seek an
estimate (or rather a set of estimates) of the monetary
value of this disutility. To obtain such estimates, we
adopt a behavioural model which has been extensively used
to analyse the value of time spent in various transport
modes. The nature of the UK health care system means that
there is no data on observed actions with which to
estimate the behavioural model. Instead, we use data on
the stated intentions, rather than the revealed actions,
of users and potential users of the health service. In
the concluding chapter of the thesis we bring together the
principal findings of the three components of the research
and discuss possible extensions to the work.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UK:
A THEORETICAL MODEL
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we present a theoretical model of
the non-corporate demand for health insurance in the UK.
The term non-corporate demand refers to demand which is
not wholly or partly paid for by an employer. The purpose
of the model is to analyse the demand for health insurance
in a health care market dominated by a public supplier
which allocates care on the basis of need, by queue and
waiting list. The private sector provides a limited
substitute for public care and insurance provides
reimbursement for the medical costs of a limited set of
private sector treatments.
Research has examined many aspects of the
economics of health insurance. However, the nature of
demand for insurance in a health care system in which most
care is provided in the public sector has received little
attention. In the existing body of research few
researchers have made any distinction between the nature
of public and private care, other than the obvious
difference in the money price of the two types of care.
Yet in a health care system in which contributions to the
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public sector are mandatory, to exist the private sector
must distinguish its care from that provided in the public
sector. Previous work has generally focused upon the
optimal interior level of insurance purchase. But in a
market in which purchase of private health insurance does
not prevent the demander from using the public sector,
analysis of the discrete choice between some and no
insurance may be as, if not more, relevant than the
analysis of the optimal interior level of private cover.
We seek to model the essential features of the UK
market as it currently operates. With this aim, we pay
particular attention to the attributes of care provided in
the two sectors, to the limited nature of the private
sector and to the specific features of health insurance
contracts. We model the decision to purchase insurance
as a two stage process. In the first stage, the consumer
decides on the optimal level of insurance cover. In the
second, he compares the level of expected utility under
insurance with the expected utility under no insurance.
Only if the former is larger than the latter will
insurance be purchased.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.
In Section 1 we review the main features of the UK private
health insurance market and the contracts provided in this
market. In Section 2 we outline previous research into
the demand for health insurance. As indicated above, much
of thi research is not directly relevant to the UK
market.	 The model of demand is presented in Section 3
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and the analysis of the effects of changes in exogenous
variables on insurance demand is given in the fourth
section.	 Section 5 concludes the chapter.
1.	 THE UK PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
The nature of the UK private health insurance
market differs in several important respects from that of
other European or North American health care markets. The
UK market is small. Estimates for 1986 (the latest
available at time of writing) suggest that about 9.5
percent of the population is covered by insurance, and
that there are about 2.5m policy holders (Laings, 1987).
Policy holders in the UK are referred to as subscribers.
Subscribers can be divided into three groups; individual
purchasers, individuals who pay their own premia but are
enrolled through their employer (referred to as employee
or group purchase) and individuals covered by employer
purchased cover (referred to here as corporate cover). In
1986 (for the three largest provident companies only),
approximately 27 percent of subscriptions are individual,
18 percent employee purchase and the remainder are
corporate, paid for either in part or totally by an
employer.
The suppliers of insurance can be divided into two
groups; the not-for-profit 'provident' suppliers who
currently account for about 86 percent of subscribers and
90 percent of premia paid (Laings, 1987), and the more
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recent for-profit entrants. The market has been
historically dominated by one supplier whose market share
has fallen since the late 1970s, but which still accounts
for over 50 percent of the market (Grant 1985) . The
expansion of the for-profits appears to have been mainly
into the provision of corporate subscriptions.
The number of policies offered by each company is
very limited (two or three policies to each type of
subscriber) and the benefits provided to the different
groups of subscribers very similar. The benefits provided
by a policy are reimbursement for the medical and nursing
costs of treatment. The benefit levels are designed to
provide full or near full cover for both medical costs
(surgeons fees, theatre costs, diagnostic tests and drugs
and dressings) and daily bed costs (nursing care and the
'hotel' aspects of medical treatment). The higher cost
policies provide a higher daily reimbursement rate,
designed to cover the daily bed costs of hospitals with
charges equal to those of London NHS teaching hospitals.
No payment is made for income lost during the period of
illness. In contrast to the policies offered in the
American or some European markets, cost sharing devices
such as coinsurance or deductibles are not part of the
policy package. Coinsurance is the term used where the
consumer pays a fixed proportion of the cost; deductibles
are similar to the 'excess' used in the UK car insurance
policies. Rather, the set of treatments for which
insurance cover can be used is limited. Obviously,
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insurance is not required for care not provided by the
private sector, so the limited nature of the private
sector itself restricts the set of treatments for which
insurance can be used. In addition, private health
insurance only provides cover for a limited period
(generally 6 months) and does not cover long term home
nursing, psychiatric or geriatric care, or primary care or
preventative care, such as screening.1 ' 2 Finally, an
upper limit on total costs is a feature of some policies,
but this is set far higher than the average claim and is
therefore probably more nominal than real.
Premia are 'community rated' for individual and
small corporate subscribers and 'experience rated' for
larger corporate subscribers. Under community rating a
single premium which reflects the claims risk of a whole
population is set. Typically, in the UK private health
insurance market populations are defined by broad age
bands. Thus under community rating the premium in the UK
depends only on the age and number of persons covered by
the subscription. Under experience rating the premium for
a group of subscribers is set according to the risk of
that group. The rationale for the widespread use of
community rating would appear to be the relative size of
the administrative costs of experience rating in a small
market. However, the use of community rating opens an
insurer up to adverse selection and 'cream-skimming' (the
term referring to the situation where a competitor uses
experience rating to attract the low risk subscribers).
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This appears to have occurred with the entry of for-profit
insurers into the market. These suppliers have
concentrated their efforts on large corporate demand, for
which the ration of benefits paid to subscriptions are
lower than for non-corporate subscriptions (Bosanquet
1987).
Insurance markets may be characterised by two
types of market failure; the first termed moral hazard,
the second adverse selection. Both arise from asymmetry
of information between demander and supplier. Moral
hazard is the term given to the reduction in the incentive
to- self protection because of insurance cover (Varian
1978), although the term has been used in the North
American economics of health literature to refer to a non-
zero price elasticity for health care. In the US health
insurance market, cost sharing devices such as coinsurance
and deductibles are used to limit moral hazard, though
more recently attention has turned to organisational
changes intended to alter the incentives faced by the
providers of care (for example Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs)). However, in the UK health insurance market
moral hazard may be less of a problem. There would appear
to be few incentives for buyers of insurance to reduce
self-protection once insurance is purchased. Insurance
covers only a subset of types of care an individual may
require, and chronic conditions for which the demander
could neglect his/her health are generally excluded from
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insurance cover. Moral hazard in the sense used in the
North American health care literature would arise if the
insured were able to derive more care when fuller
insurance cover was purchased. However, the insurance
reimbursement process and the broader health care system
may serve to limit opportunities for moral hazard on the
part of the demander of care.
First, in order to get reimbursement for
treatment, the insured demander must generally be referred
into the private sector by his/her general practitioner
(GP). Dental care is treated differently. GPs are not
paid for this referral. There have been few studies
comparing referral rates by the insured with those of the
uninsured, but a study by Gillam (1985) of referral
concluded that the referral rates to private care varied
across GPs as did referral rates to public care and that
private referrals were perceived by GPs to have been no
less worthwhile that) NHS referrals. However, perhaps
somewhat contradictorily, referrals made privately were
twice as likely as NHS referrals to have been initiated by
the patient. Second, the demander of care in the UK has
been accustomed to delegate decision making to the
physician. When the insurance contracts provide full or
near full cover, there is no clear incentive for the
patient to depart from this mode of behaviour. Finally,
the type of treatments covered by insurance may itself
serve to limit moral hazard. Barzel (1981) has shown that
moral hazard (in the sense used in the health literature)
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will be lower when insurance is provided for treatments
which are substitutes than when insurance is provided for
treatments which are complements. The set of treatments
covered by UK insurance are broadly substitutes and
treatments complementary to elective care, such as primary
care, home nursing or preventative care, are specifically
excluded from cover.
Whilst moral hazard on the part of the purchasers
of insurance may be limited, the UK third party
reimbursement system of health insurance does permit cost
escalation through the actions of the suppliers of care,
and the incentives are perhaps reinforced by the habit of
delegation of decision making by the consumer to the
provider of care. Insurance companies have attempted to
tackle cost inflation, in the form of increases in
treatment charges and daily bed reimbursement rates, by
entering into agreements with private hospitals to fully
cover their charges if they are kept down to a prior
agreed level. But there are no mechanisms to limit length
of stay other than a limit on total payout, which is
generally well in excess of the total average costs of
elective surgery, and a limit on the total number of days
cover provided (generally 180 days), again well above the
average length of stay for acute medical care. Maynard
(1982) has argued that the private sector and insurers in
UK face the same problems of cost control as other
providers of third party reimbursement insurance who
operate within larger health care markets.
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In an attempt perhaps to minimize either adverse
selection or the claims arising from adverse selection,
insurance providers restrict the cover offered to
demanders who may have a high probability of making a
claim. Cover for the treatment of conditions which arise
from medical conditions the subscriber had in the recent
past (the previous 5 years) may be specifically excluded
from the insurance contract. Thus the treatment of
chronic conditions is not generally covered by private
health insurance. In addition, insurance cover is not sold
to demanders over 64 who have not previously been covered
by insurance. Finally, it should be noted that an
individual who is high risk with respect to all health
care is not necessarily a high risk for the insurance
market because of the limited nature of private sector
provision.
2.	 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The analysis of health insurance has been a central
concern of economic analysis of private health care
markets. Early research examined the existence and
optimality of the health insurance market (Arrow 1963;
Pauly 1974). In the context of the US market, economists
have examined the welfare loss from insurance (Feldstein
1973), the optimality of levels of cover (Feldstein and
Freidman 1977), the effect of insurance on the market for
health care (Feldstein 1973), the effect of insurance on
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the demand for self-insurance (Ehrlich and Becker 1972)
and for preventative care (Phelps 1978; Nordquist and Wu
1976), and the corporate (Holmer 1984) and non-corporate
(Phelps 1976; Keeler et al 1977) demand for various types
of insurance. Research outside this market has been more
limited, but studies have been conducted in both mixed
public-private and mainly (private) market health care
systems. In the European context, Zweifel (1982) modelled
the demand for health insurance in Switzerland and van de
Ven and van Praag (1981a) analysed the demand for
deductibles in the Dutch health care system.
Each study, implicitly or explicitly, refers to
some specific health care and insurance market. It is
therefore, in some cases, of limited use to apply the
findings of a specific study to a different type of
market. Conversely, the closer the markets in nature, the
more relevant the specific studies. We examine the
applicability of two models of the individual demand for
health insurance to the UK market. The first is one of
the most frequently quoted studies of individual demand;
the second is one of the few European studies and forms
the starting point for the model presented in the current
research.
Phelps (1976) analysed the demand for
reimbursement medical insurance under two conditions that
apply to health insurance in the American market. First,
the insurance coverage rate must be equal in all states of
the world (i.e. equal coinsurance) and second, the
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insurance premium is a function of the expected payout.
The level of medical care is determined by the demander
and is assumed to be price and income sensitive. The
consumer maximises expected utility, where the expectation
is taken with respect to the distribution of health
states. Health states are modelled as a single dimensioned
index. The two choice variables are the coinsurance rate
and the maximum limit on reimbursement given by the policy
(measured in units of health care rather than money). It
is implicitly assumed that a continuum of policies is
available so the consumer can choose any combination of
coinsurance rate (between 0 and 1) and maximum cover
(between 0 and + infinity). The comparative static
results of this model are frequently ambiguous. The most
important findings are first that the effect of income on
the demand for insurance depends not only on how risk
aversion changes with income but also on the income
elasticity of demand; second, that changes in the price of
medical care have an ambiguous effect on the demand for
coinsurance and third, that as the price of care changes,
the optimal level of maximum reimbursement changes only
according to income effects (Phelps 1976:131). The
complexity of the results is in part a function of the
assumption of endogeneity of the level of medical care (an
assumption we argue below is perhaps not valid in the UK
context) and in part the result of a very detailed model.
The relevance of the model for the UK is perhaps also
limited because of the assumption of a continuum of
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insurance policies. In the UK case, only a (small set) of
discrete policies are available. (Holmer (1984) has
argued that the assumption of a continuum is also
incorrect for the US market.) More importantly, in the UK
the coinsurance rate is always high, if not equal to 1,
and the decision variable in the insurance contract is not
the maximum total amount of medical fees to be reimbursed
but the maximum daily bed rate (as the upper limit on
total costs is very high compared to average costs of
private sector treatment).
Zweifel (1982) proposed a model with the following
features. The model explicitly distinguishes between
three types of medical care; ambulatory care, elective
hospital care and emergency hospitalisation. The level of
care in the latter two states is considered a random
variable by the demander; the amount of care is determined
by the physician acting in response to the patient's state
of health and also, for non emergency care, to the
patient's insurance cover. The typical insurance policy
offers only the choice of a maximum daily bed
reimbursement rate and an upper limit on treatment costs.
Coinsurance is exogenous to the demander (it is set by law
in Switzerland to 10%). The comparative static results
tend to be of ambiguous sign, but as in the Phelps model,
this is only to be expected in a complex model which deals
with an individual's response to risk. However, unlike the
American model, the results of the European analysis can
be given plausible interpretations in terms of the
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demander's subjective assessment of the probability
distribution of states of ill-health and his/her degree of
risk aversion. There are no interactions between the
price of care and income and the demand for care.
The distinction between the different states of
the world and the assumption of exogeneity of care in the
Zweifel model is a useful starting point for an analysis
of the UK case. However, in the UK market, it is not
possible to choose the level of daily bed care
reimbursement separately from the maximum amount
reimbursed for treatment costs. More importantly, the
Zweifel model does not incorporate a public alternative to
private care. It cannot therefore be used to analyse the
effect on insurance demand of changes in the attributes of
care given in the public sector. To analyse the demand for
insurance in the UK market, it is necessary to explicitly
consider the role of the public sector and the limited
range of discrete insurance contracts available. In this
context, the important decision is not the optimal
interior level of cover but the discrete choice of some or
no insurance. In the next section we present a model
which explicitly addresses these issues.
	
3.	 A MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE
	
3.1
	
Framework for the model
Our intention is to develop a model which
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incorporates the essential features of the UK system but
omits unnecessary detail. At its simplest the issue we
consider is as follows. Consumers essentially face a
choice between purchase of some and no insurance in a
. market in which the private sector provides only a limited
alternative to the public supplier of health care. Tax
payment for the finance of the public supplier is
mandatory. We make various assumptions in the development
of the model. We now present these and discuss their
validity.
We assume that public and private care differ in
terms of time spent waiting for care, the money cost and
the consumer orientated attributes of care. Care in the
two sectors may differ in terms of cost and quality of
'hotel services', but there is no difference in the effect
on final health status. The labour employed in the two
sectors is drawn from the same pool of labour. We assume
the quality of medical treatment is therefore the same and
that the quality of medical treatment received is the only
determinant of health status. This implies that waiting
lists in the NHS do not alter the final outcome of
treatment, but only the costs associated with receipt of
treatment, and the length of time taken to recover from
illness within the treatment period.
There is little evidence to test this assumption.
Measures of outcome are not widely used in the health care
sector. The results of peer reviews of outcome of
treatment carried out in the NHS are generally not widely
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publicised (Devlin and Lunn 1986). There are no direct
comparisons of outcome of treatment in the public and
private sector in the public domain. It is accepted that
consumer knowledge about health care and health insurance
is limited, even in the North American market (Marquis
1983). To our knowledge, there have been no studies in the
UK of the information/beliefs demanders of care have about
final outcomes of treatment in the two sectors. However,
as part of the pilot work for the study of the costs of
NHS waiting lists discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis,
twenty three respondents were asked to state the
differences they perceived between the public and private
sectors. Most individuals, and all who had considered the
purchase of insurance, were able to identify differences
between the public and private sectors in levels of
comfort, convenience and choice of specialist or hospital,
but few mentioned differences in quality of medical
treatment. When quality differences were mentioned, it
was generally stated that treatment in the public sector
was at least as good as that in the private sector.
Hence, it seems reasonable to make the assumption that the
potential demander of insurance perceives no difference
between the sectors in terms of final outcomes (as
measured in health status at the end of the period). It
should be noted that this assumption does mean that the
current model cannot be used to analyse the use of the
private sector for treatments with very high decay rates
(e.g. heart surgery on small children). 	 As at present
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this is a minor part of private sector activity we do not
feel this omission will alter the overall applicability of
the analysis.
The level of care is assumed to be exogenous to
the demander.. Consumers initiate care, but thereafter
accept their doctor's advice. Thus moral hazard on the
part of the demander is not considered. In the basic
model the level of medical care is modelled as a function
only of the level of sickness. However, it is possible,
as argued above, that suppliers of care do give different
levels of care in the two sectors and the model can easily
be extended to incorporate length of stay in the private
sector as a positive function of the level of insurance
cover.
As the level of reimbursement for treatment costs
is either fixed across contracts (for certain aspects of
treatment) or is a function of the level of cover
provided for the daily room and nursing charges, we assume
that demander can only choose the daily reimbursement
rate. The higher the rate, the higher the level of cover
for all costs of treatment. In the model we assume that
any level of cover can be chosen. This is a departure
from the reality of the discrete set currently available,
but as the primary focus of the model is on the discrete
decision between some and no insurance, this approximation
does not in fact alter the substantive results. However,
it permits analysis of the costs and benefits of higher or
lower levels of insurance cover for the demander without
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altering the basic analytical framework, and so allows us
to examine the effect of the introduction of coinsurance
within the UK health care market.
A single period framework is used, incorporating
the assumption that health status is the same at the end
of the period regardless of the sector in which treatment
is taken. A one period model would not have been
appropriate had the cost of insurance in period t been a
function of the utilization of insurance in period t-1.
However, in the British market (as outlined above) the
cost of insurance is not a function of insurance usage in
the previous period. No-claims bonuses or reductions in
premia for long-term subscribers are not a feature of the
UK market 3 . Except for subscribers of over 64 years of
age, there is no penalty for non purchase in previous
periods.
Costs and benefits which fall on family members
other than the demander may affect the utility of the
potential demander of insurance. The decision making unit
is therefore taken to be the family unit and the family is
assumed to have a single utility function.
Insurance provides reimbursement for the monetary
costs of private sector medical care, at a cost of a
premium paid in all states of the world. The alternative
to insurance is NHS provided care or both NHS care and
uninsured private sector care. To decide whether to
purchase insurance, the demander must first decide on the
optimal level of insurance cover and then compare the
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expected utility of insurance with the expected utility of
no insurance. If expected utility without insurance is
greater than expected utility with insurance, the demander
will not purchase insurance, even though in his/her
calculation of expected utility of insurance an interior
level of cover was optimal. We adopt the expected utility
framework not because it appears to be the only form of
'rational' behaviour under uncertainty (for a recent
survey of critiques see Machina 1983), but because it can
be used to generate testable hypotheses in the present
context.
The demander is assumed to derive utility from
income and healthy time, both of which are functions of
the state of health and the sector (public or private) in
which medical care is received. With subjective
probability p, an individual requires either no medical
care or only ambulatory care that could be provided by a
GP. With probability (1-p) he/she requires secondary
medical care. If this state occurs, the demander has some
level of illness. Illness is modelled as a single
dimensioned index of severity. Use of a single dimension
does not require that bad health itself is single
dimensioned, but by adopting a single dimensioned index we
assume the various dimensions can be related into a single
scale (as, for example, in the QALY measure of health
status (Kind et al. 1982)). We assume the state of illness
to be a random variable, s, with a (subjective)
distribution f(s) and range 0 to +infinity.	 The greater
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the value of s, the poorer the state of health. A
critical value of s, s*, can be defined. At s* emergency
admission to hospital is necessary.
From this framework three states of nature can be
defined. In the first, s=0 (this occurs with probability
p) and either no medical care or only ambulatory care is
required. In the second, s<s*, and elective hospital care
is required. In the third, s s* and the level of ill-
health is such that immediate hospitalisation is required.
The private sector does not provide treatment for s s*,
provision therefore exists only for states of ill-health
in the second state of nature.	 In the analytical model,
s* is defined exogenously, by the nature of the private
sector. This assumption can be relaxed but only adds
complexity to an already complex model. However, in the
simulation of this model which follows (Chapter 3) s* is
defined endogenously. It should be noted that over time,
as the private sector has expanded, s* has risen.
However, this dynamic process is not important for the
consumer considering policies which provide cover for one
year only.
We now turn to a more formal exposition of the
model, beginning with an exposition of the arguments of
the utility function in each sector in each state of the
world.
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The arguments of the utility function, income and
healthy time, depend on the three states of the world, the
sector in which treatment is taken (public and private)
and the method of reimbursement (insurance or no
insurance). We examine income and healthy time in each
state of the world in turn. In the first state of the
world, care is only provided in the NHS, so treatment and
healthy time are the same under insured or non-insured
care. As treatment is taken in the NHS, there are no
direct financial costs of care. However, as the insurance
premium is paid in all states of the world, income under
the insured prospect is lower than under the uninsured
income time the uninsuredoption. The and healthy under
prospect are given by
Y = wW (1)
and under the insured prospect are given by
H = T - W (2)
Y = wW - R (3)
H = T - W (4)
3.2	 Arguments of the utility function in each sector in
each state of the world
where
Y = income
w = wage rate per hour
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W = hours of work
H = healthy time
T = total time in one day
R = insurance premium (defined below)
As modelled, the consumer derives no direct
utility from work; work is undertaken only to derive
income. As a consequence it is also assumed that the
healthy time the consumer wishes to maximise is healthy
leisure time; being sick at work only has disutility if it
results in a loss of income. It is assumed that the
choice of hours of work is made prior to the decision
about insurance purchase, and that the total hours in the
day are fixed.
The restrictions on the second state are more
complicated. Both income and healthy time are functions
of the level of sickness, the sector in which care is
received and the financing arrangements for care.
Examining NHS care first, the restrictions are
Y = w[W - a.g.L(M(s),Q , q)]
	
(5)
H = T - W - (1-a)L(M(s), 0',, q )	 (6)
where
a =	 proportion of sick time taken during normal
working hours
g =	 proportion of sick time taken at work that
is deducted from income
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L(.) = time lost from sickness (assuming medical
care to be taken)
M(.) = length of stay in hospital (in days)
-
4	 = quality of 'hotel services' (exogenous)
q	 = length of waiting list (random variable)
s	 = level of sickness.
Under private uninsured care, the restrictions are
Y = w[W - a.g.L(M(s), Q,0)] - m(Q)M(s)
	
(7)
H = T - W - (1-a)L(M(s), Q,0) 	 (8)
where
m(.) = daily cost of hospital stay
(2	 = quality of 'hotel services' (choice
variable)
Other symbols as above
Under insured (private) care, the restrictions are
Y = w[W - a.g.L(M(s),Q,0) - [m(Q)-b]M(s) - R	 (9)
H = T - W - (1-a)L(M(s), Q,0)
	
(10)
where
b = maximum daily reimbursement rate provided by
insurance policy
R = insurance premium
Other symbols as above
The assumed signs of the first derivatives of the
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length of stay, quantity of medical care and costs of
medical care functions are:
OL > 0, 5L < 0, 5m > 0, 6m > 0. 	 (11)
5s	 5Q	 5s	 5Q
In more detail, the assumptions made in these
restrictions are as follows. A rise in the severity of
illness, s, increases the length of stay, L. The amount
of time lost due to sickness, L(.) is reduced by medical
treatment. This treatment has two dimensions, length of
stay, M, which is a positive function of the level of
sickness and is exogenous to the demander, and quality of
care, Q. The higher the quality, the lower the length of
stay for any s and M. However, the higher the quality,
the higher the daily hospital charge m.
Quality can be chosen in the private sector but is
fixed in the NHS. Quality refers not to medical treatment
per se but to the 'consumer orientated' attributes of
care. Access to medical treatment in the NHS is
determined by waiting list and queue, which are modelled
as stochastic. The exact length of wait is assumed unknown
to the demander of care, but the distribution of length of
wait is assumed to be known by the demander. The
distribution is given by the function h(q). The effect of
a wait is to increase the amount of time lost for any
state of illness, s. This fairly general specification
has the advantage that problems of non-exclusive use of
time spent on waiting lists are overcome.
45
A proportion of the time lost due to illness may
occur in work time (the amount is given by parameter a of
the model). The effects of this time loss on income are
determined by the conditions of employment. For some
individuals no income loss will result, and for others all
the value of the time lost at work will be deducted from
income.	 This variation is modelled through the use of
parameter g, which ranges from 0 to 1. The time loss
associated with any level of ill-health, s, is larger
under NHS treatment as a result of the queues for care.
This will affect both healthy time and income (provided
a#0 and g*0). The monetary costs of medical care affect
the income argument under private non-insured care and
under private insured care if insurance cover is less than
full. Under non-insured private care income is reduced by
the full cost of care, under insurance it is reduced by
the difference between the insurance payout, b, and the
price of care, m(Q). The price of care is a function of
the quality of the hospital in which care is taken. Under
insurance, income is also reduced by the premium (as in
all three states of the world).
In the third state of the world, the consumer
requires immediate hospitalisation. He/she cannot work
and his/her income is exogenously determined by the
conditions of his/her employment or the social security
arrangements for sickness. The private sector does not
provide emergency care, so only NHS care is available.
The only difference between insurance and non-insurance is
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the payment of the premium. Thus for the uninsured
option, the income and health restrictions are:
Y =	 (12)
H = T - L(M(s),05,0) 	 (13)
and under insurance,
Y = -Y- - R	 (14)
H = T - L (M(s), 'CIO)	 (15)
where
_
Y = exogenously determined income of demander when
he/she cannot work
Other symbols as above.
The zero value for queues reflects the fact that
hospitalisation is immediate.
On the basis of these restrictions, we can now
examine the insurance decision. We begin with an
examination of the expected utility and choice of optimal
coverage of insurance (assuming a continuum of coinsurance
is available). We then move to an examination of the
expected utility of no insurance. In Section 4 we turn to
an examination of the factors which affect choice between
the two prospects.
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3.3	 The expected utility of insurance
Insurance cover can be used only in state 2, where
it can be used to reduce the financial costs of private
sector care. The insured can choose between hospitals of
different quality; the higher the quality the higher the
cost, so the higher must be the level of insurance to
cover the direct financial costs of care. Hence, ex ante,
the consumer must choose the level of quality of hospital
in which he/she wishes to be treated and the level of
cover he/she desires. Formally, the problem is given as
max EU = pU(Y,H) + (1-P)fg*U[Y(s),H(s)]f(s)ds
Q,b
+(l-p)fU[i,H(s)]f(s)ds
where Y, H, H(s), Y(s) and Y are defined as in equations
(3), (4), (9), (10), (14), (15), p is the probability of
not requiring secondary care, and f(s) is the distribution
of sickness.
We follow Phelps (1976) and Zweifel (1982) by
assuming that the states are linked through specification
of the insurance premium. The premium is a function of
expected payout and some loading factor representing
administrative costs.
Thus
R = (1 + 19)fg*(bM(s)]f(s)ds
where 0 is the loading factor.
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For an interior optimum we require
6EU = 0; 6EU = 0; - 6 2 EU 62EU-
neg. definite6Q 5b 5Q 2
6 2 EU
5Q6b
6 2 EU
_ 6Q5b 6b 2
-
The first order necessary condition for Q is:
s6EU = 6 [pU(.)f(s)ds + f o *
 U(.)f(s)ds + fes**U(.)f(s)ds]
5Q	 -EQ
= p.O.f(s)ds + (1-p)ifrOU(.)/OY.5Y/6Q.f(s)ds +
fr6U(.)/6H.5H/6Q f(s)ds +f0.f(s)ds)
= fr[Uy (-w.a.g.5L/5 42 - 6m/5Q. M(s))
- UH (1-a)6L/60 f(s)ds
= 0 (16)
The zero terms for states requiring either primary care or
emergency care reflect the lack of private sector
provision for care in these states of ill-health.
Rearranging (16) we derive:
-[frUy (w.a.g.n/Wf(s)ds + fr (UH(1-a)5L1e5Q)f(s)ds)
(+)
= frUy6m/5Q.M(s)df(s)ds
(+)
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the interpretation of which is that the consumer will
increase the quality of hospital until the marginal
utility gain due to increases in both healthy time and
income is equal to the marginal utility loss from the
increase in the price of care.
The second necessary condition is
p= 5 (PU(.)f(s)ds+(l-p)(frU(.)f(s)ds
5b	 5b
+ f"s*U(.)f(s)ds}]
= p5U(.)5Yf(s)ds + fr5U(.)5Yf(s)ds
5Y 5b
	 SY 5b
+ f;„ 5U(.)5Yf(s)ds	 (17)
SY 5b
0
The lack of terms in 5H/5b reflect the lack of impact of
insurance reimbursement on the amount of healthy time.
To evaluate (17), we need to specify 5Y/5b in each
state,
5Y =
-(1+0)frM(s)f(s)ds, s-O
5b M(s)	 -	 (1+0)	 frM(s)f(s)ds,
-	
(1+0) frM(s) f (s)ds,
0 < s
s*<
< s*
s	 < co
The first and third terms are negative, the second
positive provided the loading factor is not large. In the
UK the administrative costs of the insurance companies
appear to be about 12 percent, so we maintain the
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assumption that the second term is positive. Letting
(1+0) ig *M(s)f(s)ds = OR/3b,
the component parts of equation (17) can be signed as
5EU/3b = -pUy.6R/5b.f(s)ds
+ (1-13)(frUTIM(s)-5R/6b]f(s)ds
-f:*117.5R/5b.f(s)dsl
=0
This condition states that the consumer will
increase the level of reimbursement upto the point where
the expected utility gain in the second state is equal to
the expected utility losses in states 1 and 3.
The model can be extended to allow for moral
hazard on the part of suppliers of care, by specifying the
length of stay M(.), as a positive function not only of
sickness s, but also of the level of insurance cover, b.
The necessary condition becomes more complicated in form,
but remains straightforward to interpret. This
specification adds additional positive terms in the
marginal utility of time and income in equation (17). If
the insurance company takes into account this moral hazard
on the part of suppliers, this will be reflected in a
further additional term in equation (17), this term
reflecting the effect of increased length of stay on the
premium. If the insurance company does not anticipate
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this response, then the level of insurance purchased is
unambiguously greater if moral hazard (on the part of the
suppliers) exists and the consumer expects/knows of the
suppliers actions.
The location of the optimum of Q and b, whether
supply side moral hazard is present or not, depends upon
the demander's subjective assessment of the probability
distribution of illness, f(s), the relationship between
the payout and the premium, and the marginal utility of
income in each state. Insurance will be less attractive
to individuals who think that they face a distribution of
health states which has more weight in the tails than in
the centre. Zweifel (1982) derived the same basic result
in his more complex model. Finally, regardless of the
distribution of health states, if insurance premiums are
community rated, individuals who are bad risks within any
one community will be more likely to buy insurance than
those who are good risks.
3.4	 Expected utility of no insurance
Once the individual has chosen his/her optimal
level of insurance cover, he/she must compare the expected
utility from insurance with the expected utility from no-
insurance to ascertain whether there is any benefit from
insurance purchase. If uninsured, the consumer can choose
between private and public care once the state of ill-
health is revealed. If the utility of uninsured private
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care is greater than that of NHS care it is that assumed
the consumer will choose private care. The expected
utility of uninsured care is then a function of the
private care taken in some states of ill-health and NHS
care in others.
As private sector care only exists for non-urgent
hospital treatments i.e. for s such that 0 < s < s*, we
need only examine the choice between uninsured private and
NHS care in the second state of the world. For any s in
this set, the consumer will choose private care if
-	 _
U[Y(s,Q,m),H(s,Q,0)] 2 .1-.0°U[Y(s,Sici),H(s,,q]h(q)dq
where
_
Y(s,Q,m) = income if private sector (uninsured) care is
taken
_
H(s,Q,0) = healthy time if private sector (uninsured)
care is taken
_
Y(s,Q, q ) = income if NHS care is taken
H(s,Q,q) = healthy time if NHS care is taken
Q . quality of private sector hospital, chosen
by demander if not insured
m = price of treatment in private sector
hospital
-0- = quality of NHS care (not a decision variable
for demander)
h( q) = distribution of waiting list time
q = time spent on waiting list (or in queues)
To identify those situations in which the consumer
will choose private non-insured care and those in which
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the consumer will choose NHS care, the joint distribution
g(s,q) must be defined. For simplicity, we have made the
assumption
plim	 g(s,q) = 0 , q > 0
and
g (s, q ) = f(s)h(q),	 q > 0
0 5 s < s*
Without this assumption it is not possible to
distinguish, on the basis of the level of severity of
illness, states of illness for which private care is
preferred from states of illness for which public care is
preferred. Although the length of waiting list is likely
to be a function of severity of illness, the relationship
is not a simple monotonic function. For analytical
purposes some assumption about the relationship between
severity and queue has to be made, and in an already
complex model we feel the simplest assumption is b the
most useful.
Using the assumed properties of the functions
given in (11), and provided the price of care is a
monotonic and positive function of severity of ill-health,
there will exist a unique s, say g , at which the consumer
is indifferent between private and public care. For all s
> g , the consumer will choose public care, for all s 5 g,
private care. Note that g , unlike s*, is endogenous to
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the consumer and depends on the utility function with
respect to income and time. Given g , the expected utility
of no-insurance, denoted EU(nins) is given by
EU(nins) = pU(Y,H) + (1-p)(f:tU(Y(s,6,m),H(s,-6,0)f(s)ds +
fac:frULY(s,O. , q ),H(s,U,cilf(s)h( q )dsdq +
f;lrucr7,	 ,H(s,-05,0)]f(s)ds1
4.	 COMPARISON OF EXPECTED UTILITY UNDER INSURANCE AND
EXPECTED UTILITY UNDER NO INSURANCE
Given this framework it is possible to analyse the
effect of changes in exogenous parameters on the discrete
choice between some and no insurance. Since we are not
analysing the effect of changes in these parameters on the
optimal level of cover, this analysis does not take the
form of the standard 'comparative statics' exercise as
undertaken by Phelps (1976) and Zweifel(1982). Rather, we
need to analyse the effect of changes in parameters on the
difference in the level of expected utility of the two
prospects. Letting EU(ins) denote expected utility of the
optimal level of insurance cover and EU(nins) expected
utility under no insurance, let
G = EU(ins)-EU(nins)
At the point of indifference between the two options G =
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0. Letting z denote the parameter of interest, the sign
of
6GI
6zI G=0
indicates which option a previously indifferent individual
will prefer following a unit change in z.
We can divide the parameters of interest into
three groups; those effecting only the cost or benefit of
NHS care, those affecting the costs and benefits of
private sector care (uninsured and insured) and those
affecting the costs and benefits of both sectors. In
general, the nature of the problem makes it difficult to
sign these effects unambiguously. For reasons of space,
we omit most of the algebraic analysis, but present the
main results.	 0.1
4.1
	 Parameters affecting the net costs of NHS care
The two parameters affecting only NHS care are the
level of the quality of NHS care and waiting time. An
increase in the quality of NHS care will increase the
relative expected utility of the non-insured prospect. As
waiting time is stochastic, a decrease in waiting time can
be modelled as a leftward shift in the distribution of
h(q) (Hey, 1981). This is equivalent to a decrease in the
expected value of q for every s. The effect is to make
uninsured care more attractive. Hence for both these
parameters
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EiG I	 < 0
5z I G=0
4.2	 Parameters affecting the net costs of private
sector care and/or insured care
The utility of private sector care is affected by
the price of medical care. The effect of a price increase
unrelated to a change in quality (i.e. a change in the
functional form of in = m(Q)) depends on whether the
insured purchase gives full or partial cover and on the
effect of a price increase on the insurance premium. If
the cover provided is full (regardless of the price of
care) and the insurance premium does not alter to reflect
the increase in the price of care, this increase has no
effect of the expected utility of insurance. If cover is
less than full and/or the premium is a function of the
change in price, the effect will be to decrease the
expected utility of insurance. Thus we have the binary
set
5EU(ins)	 0 for those who are fully insured
5m	 =	 if the premium does not change
<0	 otherwise
To analyse the effect on the difference between
the insurance and no insurance prospects we must also
consider the effect on the uninsured option. The change in
price will unambiguously decrease g , and this will
decrease the expected utility of no-insurance. Thus the
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qualitative effect of an increase in the price of medical
care on the choice between insurance and no insurance is
not known for certain. For those with full cover who do
not anticipate any change in their premium it will make
insurance more attractive, but for all others the effect
cannot be definitely signed. However, if the demander
attaches a high probability to being in states of health
such that s < g , then expected utility of no insurance
will fall more than if he/she attaches a high probability
to the occurrence of s 2 g . Tentatively, we conclude
> 0 for the fully insured with no premium
5G =I	 change who consider the probability of
5p I G=0
	
s < g to be high
> 0 for those who are not fully insured
<	 and expect s 2 s
An increase in the loading factor of the premium,
0, will decrease EU(ins), will not affect EU(nins), and so
5GI	 < 0 for any f(s)
50 G=O
4.3	 Parameters affecting the net costs of both private
and public sector care
These are parameters which are related to
conditions of employment or to income. We consider first
the parameter g which determines the proportion of time
taken off work due to sickness which is deducted from
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pay. The fall in EU(ins) following a unit increase in the
amount of sick time that can be taken from work time
without incurring a loss of income will be smaller than
the fall in EU(nins) if the individual was previously
indifferent between the two prospects. Thus
6G1 > 0
OgIG=0
The effect of a change in the relative amount of
sick time taken in leisure hours and taken during work
hours (the parameter a) is ambiguous. So is the effect of
an increase in the wage rate. Further, the results for
the wage rate are somewhat counterintuitive. Examining
the effect of an increase in the wage rate, w, on the
expected utility of the two prospects separately, and
indicating the arguments of the utility functions within
square brackets we obtain
SEU(nins) = pU[c]	 (18)
bw
+(l-p)frUy[d](W-a.g.L(s,,q))f(s)ds
and
EINS = pUy[a]
bw	
+(1-p)frUy[b](W-a.q.L(s,Q*,0))f(s)ds (19)
where
U	 = partial deriative of U[.] w.r.t income argumentY
[a] = (wW-R, H)
[b] = fw[W-a.g.L(s,Q*,0)]-R, H(L(s,Q*,0))j
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[c] = (wW, H)
[d] = fw[W-a.g.L(s,Q,q)], H(L(s,Q,q))I
Q* = quality chosen under insurance
(We have illustrated the simplest no-insurance prospect -
that in which the demander would never chose private
uninsured care - for simplicity of exposition. The
argument is not altered if some private uninsured care
would be considered).
To examine 5GI	 we need to compare the terms
6w G=0
of equations (18) and (19). Examining the arguments of
the utility functions, clearly a < c. Given that it is
assumed the demander is initially indifferenie between the
two prospects, b > d (the gain from insurance cover must
occur in State 2). Using these conditions
E.GI = (U[a] - Uy [c]l +
5wIG=0	 (>0)
(1-P)fg*(Uy[b](f)	 - Uv[d](e)If(s)ds
(>1< 01	 (20)
where
_
(e) = (W-a.g.L(s,Q,q))
(f) = (W-a.g.L(s,Q*,0))
_
and (e) 5 (f) as L(s,Q,q)  L(s,Q*,0) for all q.
The first term in (20) can be signed easily and is
positive; the sign of the second is ambiguous without
assumptions about the functional form of the utility
function and the relative gains from insurance. However,
even without these assumptions it can be seen that if
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probability p is high (i.e. the demander considers
him/herself unlikely to require secondary care) it is more
likely that an increase in wage rate will result in an
increase in the relative attractiveness of insurance.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive, as insurance is
less useful for those individuals than for individuals for
whom p is low.
If utility is additively separable in its two
arguments and the benefits from insurance in State 2 comes
from gains in healthy time, rather than from gains in
income (i.e. the net income costs of insurance are
negative or zero even in State 2), then it is possible to
unambiguously sign equation (20). In this case, the
expected marginal utility of income is higher under
insurance in both States 1 and 2, so that
6G1	 > 0,
5w1 G=0
and an increase in the wage rate will increase the
attractiveness of insurance.
This result can perhaps be generalised to suggest
that the more the benefits from insurance are seen in
terms of gains in healthy (leisure) time, the more likely
an increase in purchase following an increase in the wage
rate. It is interesting to note that for individuals who
do not bear any financial costs from losing work time due
to sickness, the net financial costs of insurance are
always negative.
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5.	 CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that many of the analytical
predictions of the model are ambiguous. In part, this is
not unexpected as we have placed few restrictions on the
functional forms of the model, but this ambiguity may also
be the consequence of the nature of the problem. The
problem is not the one-risk model frequently used in the
analysis of demand for insurance, but is a more general
multi-hazard model. Private insurance does not cover all
the risks associated with health care. The risk associated
with the monetary costs of private sector care in a
particular health state may be fully reimbursed, but the
associated risk of income costs is not covered at all.
In addition, the consumer has compulsory insurance against
the monetary cost of NHS treatment. So, in choosing
private health insurance in the UK, the consumer faces a
choice between two uncertain prospects rather than the
choice between uncertainty and certainty. Schulenburg
(1986) showed that many of the well known conclusions
derived from a one-hazard model (for example, the
prediction that risk averse consumers will only buy full
cover if the premium is actuarially fair) do not hold in a
multi-hazard model with compulsory insurance against a
single risk. The model specified here differs from that
used by Schulenburg, but shares the feature of compulsory
insurance. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that we
cannot derive unambiguous results with respect to either
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changes in attitude to risk or to changes in income.
To further investigate the model we first need to
specify functional forms. If data were available we could
then test the model by an econometric analysis.
Unfortunately, there is no data available for many of the
variables of the model. Given this lack of data, there
are two possible courses of action open to the researcher.
The first is to choose specific functional forms and to
carry out a computer simulation of the model. The second
is to use the current structure of the model as a starting
point for a simpler model that can be estimated using
available data. This research took both courses of
action. A computer simulation of the analytical model
discussed here is presented in the next chapter and an
econometric estimation of a simpler model is presented in
Chapter 4.
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NOTES
1. Market behaviour appears to reflect the actions of the
leading health insurance supplier. This supplier does not
appear to think that cost-sharing devices . are likely to
increase market share. In June 1988 it introduced a new
policy which offers cover for a narrower set of treatments
at a lower cost. It is not known, at the time of writing,
what impact this policy has had on sales.
2. One very small insurance supplier (Health First) covers
women for breast and cervical cancer screening (and
treatment).
3. A company with a very small market share offers a
policy with a no claims bonuses, but no competitors appear
to have felt this to be an attractive marketing strategy.
64
CHAPTER 3
SIMULATION OF THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the simulation is to investigate the
effect of changes in parameters of the analytical model on
the difference in expected utility of the two prospects.
This is analogous to an investigation of the comparative
statics of the model. However, the term comparative
statics is differently interpreted in the discrete choice
model and the standard economic model in which the
consumer can choose any level of a good. In the present
discrete model, a comparative static effect should be
interpreted as the effect of a shift in the distribution
of a parameter on the probability of purchase of health
insurance, or as a change in the proportion of the
population buying insurance.1
The structure of the simulation problem is as in
the analytical model, with two minor changes. First, in
Chapter 2 the level of ill-health at which the consumer no
longer uses private insured care, s*, is exogenous. In
the simulation we allow s* to be endogenous. Thus s* is
defined as that state of ill-health for which the utility
from private care which is fully reimbursed by insurance
is equal to the utility of NHS care.
	
This removes the
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need to define the boundary between the public and the
private sector in terms of severity of illness. This
modification adds considerable complexity to the analysis
of the analytical model, but is simply achieved in
computer simulation. Second, we only consider the case of
full cover insurance. As it is estimated that about 95
percent of insurance claims are met in full we felt this
assumption mirrored reality fairly closely.
1.	 THE SIMULATION MODEL
A simulation exercise allows the researcher to use
different specifications for key functions of the
analytical model. Different versions of the program
incorporated different specifications of the following
functions:
i. the utility function, specified as Cobb-
Douglas or as exponential to allow for
constant absolute risk aversion,
ii. the distribution of states of ill-health,
f(s), specified as uniform, exponential or
log-normal, and
iii. the insurance premium, specified as either
related to the expected costs of private
sector care or fixed.
The specific functional forms are presented in Table 3.1.
A subset of the 12 possible combinations of these
functions was investigated. The subset primarily was
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Utility Functions 
1. Cobb-Douglas
U(s)	 y(s)alh(s) bl
Notes
al + bl = 1
Distribution of sickness
1. Uniform
f(s) =	 1
(b3-a3)
2. Exponential
f(s) = Aexp(-As)
b3 = maximum of range
a3 = mdnimumofrange
1/A = mean of f(s)
A = gi(s)ds
b = maximum of range of s
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o = loading factor, 0<e<1
p = probability illness
m(s) = monetary costs of
treatment
s
*
 = s at which the indi-
vidual is indifferent
between NHS and private
care when insured.
Table 3.1
Functional Forms used in Model
3. Exponential
U(s) = a2(1-exp(-b2y(s)h(s))
4. Truncated log-normal
f(s) = 	 1  exp (-1/2a2 (ln s-p) 2 dl
g2n)cr)1/2
Premium
1. Actuarily fair plus loading factor
sub = (1+0)pf:m(s)f(s)ds
2. Fixed
sub = k
chosen to examine the impact of changes in the utility
function. The precise forms of the functions in the
model are given in the program listing in Appendix 1.
Comparative statics were sought for changes in the
following sets of parameters: income, unearned and earned;
the time costs of public and private sector care; the
money costs of private sector care; the insurance premium;
the probability of not requiring secondary care; the
distribution of states of ill-health and risk aversion.
The analysis of Chapter 2 yielded the following signs for
the comparative statics. An increase in the costs of NHS
treatment increases the probability of insurance purchase,
an increase in the costs of private sector treatment
decreases the probability of purchase and an increase in
the premium decreases the probability of purchase. The
qualitative effects of changes in other parameters cannot
be determined without using specific functional forms for
the central functions of the model. This is either
because the qualitative impact of a change of the
parameters are of the same sign for each prospect or
because the effect of a unit change in a parameter on one
or both of the prospects cannot be signed unambiguously.
Data sets currently in the public domain do not
contain estimates of the values of certain parameters,
such as the value of time spent waiting for NHS treatment
or the monetary or time costs of treatment for a unit of
sickness in the private or the public sector. Values
chosen for these parameters were based on the values of
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more easily observed related variables, such as
remuneration per hour, the cost of an initial consultation
with a specialist, the current premia cost and the
distribution of claims in a sample of the insured. The
parameters together with the starting values and the
ranges used in the simulation, are presented in Table 3.2.
Two sets of results were derived from the
simulation. The first was the comparative statics; the
effects of a change in each of the key parameters on the
level of expected utility of insurance relative to the
expected utility of no insurance. These were examined
under several specifications of central functions in the
analytical model. The second was the analysis of the
effect of a change in each parameter upon the extent of
relative utilisation of the public and private sectors. We
discuss each set of results in turn.
2.	 COMPARATIVE STATICS
Let the expected utility of insurance be denoted
EINS and the expected utility of no-insurance be denoted
ENO. The comparative static effect of parameter z is
5(EINS-ENO)/6z. If positive, an increase in the parameter
will increase the probability of insurance purchase, if
negative, it will decrease the probability of purchase.
For each parameter, the sign of 6(EINS-ENO)/5z was
examined for the different specifications of the utility
function, of the distribution of sickness, of the premium,
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Table 3.2
Parameters of the Simulation Model
Type .	 Parameter Symbol Range Initial
Value
Work
related
Proportion sick time
taken from work
a 0-1 0.5
Daily hours of work w 0-16 8
Earnings per hour e 0-60 15
Premium
related
Loading factor on
premium
r 0-1 0.12
probability of being ill P 0-1 0.5
Costs of Fixed money cost private care ma 0-100 50.0
illness Variable money costs private care mb,mc 0-10,0-6 5.0,3.0
Fixed time costs NHS care lal 0-10 5.0
Variable time costs NHS care lbl 0- 1.0
Variable time costs private care 1b2,1c2 0-5,0-3 0.7,0.3
Income Unearned income ul 1000-4000 2000
Utility Cobb Douglas parameters alph,bet 0-1,0-1 0-5,0-5
Exponential parameters alph,bet 300,0.0001- 300,0.0001
0.0005
Difference between public and
private U gam 0-5.0 2.5
f(s) Uniform mean,max 0,100-200 0,200
Log-normal mu,sig2 0.1-2,0-2 1.6,2.0
Exponential mean,max 0-1,100-200 0.1,100.0
I
Simulation programme alters parameter by 10% of the range specified. For large
ranges the programme was run twice on half the range each time.
and for different values of the other parameters of the
model.
Broadly, changes in the distribution of illness,
f(s), had little impact upon the qualitative results.
The signs of the comparative static effects of certain
parameters differed under the two specifications of the
utility function. This is not surprising as the Cobb-
Douglas specification assumes different attitudes to risk
from the exponential specification. Finally, altering the
premium structure lead to changes in the signs of some of
the comparative statics.
Parameters which have unambiguous comparative
static effects under all specifications of the utility
function, the distribution of states of ill-health, the
insurance premium and the values for all other parameters
of the model are presented in Table 3.3. Parameters for
which the sign of 5(EINS-ENO)/5z is not constant across
all specifications of the model are given in Table 3.4.
Non-constancy may occur because 5(EINS-ENO)/5z changes
sign as z increases, changes sign under different
specifications of the key functions in the model or
changes sign for different values of the other parameters
of the model. In the notes in table 3.4 we indicate the
impact on the comparative statics of different
specifications of the key functions and values of key
parameters. In general, the results confirm the
predictions of the theoretical model in the case in which
the comparative statics could be unambiguously signed, and
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extend the predictions for cases where the comparative
static effects of the analytical model were ambiguous.
However, in some cases the results are quite sensitive to
the particular functional forms used.
Table 3.3
Unambiguous 'Comparative Static' Effects 
Parameter
z
5(EINS-ENO) Notes
.
5z
Private <0 Rate of change in EINS-ENO is
sector less if the premium is not fixed
time costs as the higher costs of the public
sector increases the use of the
private sector and so increases
the insurance premium
Loading <0 Doesn't affect use of public or
on premium private sector, only costs of
or cost of
premium
insurance
Wages per >0 The level of (EINS-ENO) depends
hour on the specifications of the
function
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2.1	 Time costs of treatment
Time costs are modelled by the function L=L(s,q)
where s denotes severity of ill-health and q the amount of
waiting time for NHS care (q=0 for private care).
Increases in time costs in both sectors were analysed, the
increase in NHS costs (time) modelled as a rightward shift
in the distribution of waiting time, h(q), the increase in
private sector time costs as a change in the functional
form of L(s,0). The effect of an increase in time costs
was as expected from the analysis of Chapter 2.
An increase in time costs in one sector increases
the use of the other sector. When the premium is fixed, an
increase in NHS time costs increases the probability of
insurance purchase. An increase in private sector time
costs decreases the probability of insurance purchase.
The results are less clear cut if the premium is
not fixed but instead depends on expected private sector
medical care consumption. In this case, an increase in
NHS time costs leads to an increase in the use of the
private sector. This in turn leads to an increase in
the premium, which decreases the expected utility of
insurance, but not of private sector non-insured care.
The effect on the difference between the expected utility
of insurance and no insurance depends on the level of
costs of NHS care. If the costs of NHS care are low
relative to those of private sector care, a small increase
in NHS time costs increases s the level of sickness at
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which the uninsured individual is indifferent between
public and private care. The expected amount of private
sector utilisation is thus increased. This in turn
increases the insurance premium and so the net effect is
to increase the expected utility of no insurance relative
to that of insurance. Thus the probability of insurance
purchase falls. If NHS costs are high, the expected amount
of private sector utilisation is larger, and the expected
increase in costs of uninsured private sector care is
larger than the increase in the insurance premium. Thus
the relative expected utility of insurance, and so the
probability of insurance purchase, rises.
2.2	 Cost of premium.
An increase in the loading factor, or in the cost
of a fixed premium, unambiguously decreases the
probability of insurance purchase, confirming the
predictions of the analytical model.
2.3
	
Income
The demander's income can be increased through a
rise in unearned income, through a rise in earning per
hour and through a rise in hours worked. Changes in the
first two parameters affect only the income argument of
the utility function, while a change in the third
increases the value of the income argument but decreases
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the value of the leisure time argument. We were unable to
sign the comparative statics for any of these variables in
the analytical model. In the simulation, the effect of an
increase in these parameters was frequently dependent upon
the specification of the utility function, the relative
weights given to the income and leisure arguments of the
utility function for the Cobb-Douglas specification of the
utility function (the parameters a and 5), and the value
chosen for the parameter a. This paramter determines the
proportion of sick time which is taken from work time
rather than leisure time (and so is one of the
determinants of the extent of income loss from sickness).
The simulation indicated that an increase in wages
per hour increased the probability of insurance purchase.
This result held for different specifications of utility,
of f(s), of the premium and of values for the set of
exogenous parameters 2 . The effect of a shift in unearned
income is less clear cut; the sign of the comparative
static effect depends on the level of the parameter a.
When parameter a is close to 1 or 0 or, when the utility
function is specified as Cobb-Douglas (for all values of
a) the probability of purchase increases if unearned
income rises. In cases other than these, the effect of an
increase in unearned income is to decrease the probability
of insurance purchase.
The effect of an increase in hours worked depends
on the initial base level of hours worked from which the
increase is modelled. For all specifications of the
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utility function, at low initial levels of hours of work,
the probability of insurance purchase increases. As the
number of hours rises, although both EINS and ENO increase
in absolute magnitude, the relative increase of ENO is
faster and the probability of insurance purchase falls3.
As the effect of changes in income appeared to be
dependent upon the value of the parameter a, we also
directly examined changes in this parameter. An increase
in a has a similar effect on the probability of purchase
under all specifications of the distribution of states of
ill-health and of the premium. But an increase has
dissimilar results under different specifications of the
utility function.
Under the Cobb-Douglas specification, the
comparative static effect is always to reduce the
probability of insurance purchase. Under the exponential
specification, as parameter a is increased from initial
levels close to 0 (at this point sickness only reduces
leisure time), the probability of insurance purchase
increases. As parameter a tends towards 1 (the point at
which all sick time is taken during work hours) the
probability of insurance purchase decreases. This sign
reversal is not the result of an increase in the cost of
insurance as this result occurs whether the premium is
fixed or a function of expected claims (although the level
of a at which the sign reversal occurs does depend on the
specification of the premium. Rather, this sign reversal
occurs because as parameter a increases the demander's
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income falls and so utilisation of private sector care
falls. This makes the non-insured option relatively more
attractive, and so the probability of purchase of
insurance falls.
2.4
	 Increases in risk aversion
In contrast to models of insurance in which the
consumer compares a risk reducing prospect (insurance)
with a risky prospect (no insurance), the consumer in the
UK health market does not necessarily reduce risk in all
states of the world by purchasing insurance, as private
health sector care gives lower net benefits than public
care at level of sickness greater than s*• We therefore
did not expect that an increase in risk aversion would
necessarily increase the probability of insurance
purchase.
The simulation exercise (for the constant absolute
risk aversion case only) showed that the effect of an
increase in the risk aversion parameter was generally to
increase the probability of purchase. However, at very
high levels of risk aversion, the effect of a further
increase in risk aversion is to decrease the probability
of purchase. This result occurs because s* (the level of
sickness at which the insured consumer is indifferent
between private and public care) is endogenous to the
model.	 As risk aversion increases, s* falls and
eventually equals 0. The no-insurance prospect then
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dominates the insurance prospect.
The results with respect to changes in risk
aversion are also sensitive to changes in the levels of
other parameters in the model. In particular, the effect
of a change in the risk aversion parameter depends on the
probability of requiring any secondary medical care (the
parameter p in the analytical model). If this probability
is low (in the range 0.1 to 0.3), an increase in risk
aversion is accompanied by a decrease in the probability
of purchase. For values of p above 0.4, the probability
of purchase generally increases as risk aversion
increases. The latter result is as expected, but the
first result is somewhat surprising. It appears to be the
case that the effect of the probability of requiring any
secondary care dominates the effect of changes in the risk
aversion parameter.
2.5	 Increases in health risk
An increase in health risk can be modelled as a
rightward shift in the mean of f(s) or as an increase in
the variance of f(s). If a random variable has a
lognormal distribution, the variance of that the random
variable is proportional to the square of the mean
(Amemiya 1973). Thus, when the distribution of states of
ill-health is specified as having a log-normal
distribution, an increase in risk due to a shift in the
mean could not be modelled separately from an increase in
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Table 3.4
Ambiguous 'Comparative Static' Effects 
Parameter	 z 5(EINS-ENO)
Oz	 .
Monetary Costs
of Private
Sector Treatment
>0 if premium fixed
<0 if premium increases as monetary
costs increase
Probability
Being Ill
>0 for low levels of p, fixed and 'fair'
premium
<0 at high levels of p in case of fair
premium
Time Costs of
NHS Treatment
>0 for fixed premium
<0 for	 low levels of time cost) premium
>0 for high levels of time cost} not
fixed
Risk Aversion
(exponential
utility function
only)
>0 at	 low levels of risk aversion
<0 at high levels of risk aversion
Result dependent on probability p
Hours
worked
>0 for low hours, all utility functions
<0 for high hours if utility function is
exponential and if premium is not
fixed
Percentage of
sick time taken
from work
<0 for C-D utility function
>0 for a close to 0 for exponential
utility function
<0 for a tending to 1 for exponential
utility function
Unearned
income
>0 for C-D utility function
>0 for exponential utility function and
parameter a near 0 or 1
<0 for exponential utility function and
parameter a not close to 0 or 1
Mean	 of
distribution
f(s)
>1(0 for log normal distribution of f(s)
<0 for exponential distribution of f(s)
Results dependent on other parameters
of the model
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risk resulting from an increase in the variance of the
distribution4.
The simulation indicated that the effect of an
increase in the mean of f(s) was in general ambiguous for
both the lognormal and exponential specification of f(s)
and dependent on the values of other parameters in the
model. For the lognormal specification of f(s), from low
initial starting levels for the mean, the effect of an
increase in the riskiness of f(s) was initially to
increase the probability of purchase, but as the mean was
further shifted to the right, the probability of purchase
fell. For the exponential distribution of f(s), an
increase in the mean was generally accompanied by a
decrease in the probability of insurance purchase. (We
did not investigate the effect of an increase in the
variance of the exponential distribution on the
probability of purchase).
On balance, it appears that an increase in the
mean of f(s) decreases the probability of purchase. The
explanation is that as the mean of s increases, the
probability that the individual will require treatment
which cannot be taken in the private sector increases, so
the relative expected utility of insurance falls5.
3.	 RELATIVE LEVELS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
UTILISATION
The simulation permits analysis of the relative
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levels of utilisation of the private and public sectors.
The effect of an increase in any parameter, say z, on the
utilisation of the two sectors is indicated by changes in
OS
s* and s (both endogenous to the model). s is that level
of sickness at which an uninsured individual is
indifferent between public and private sector care. s* is
that level of sickness at which an insured individual is
indifferent between private sector care and public sector
care. An increase in either s or s* indicates
(conditional on a positive amount of medical care being
required) that more care will be taken in the private
sector. As predicted by the theoretical model, s is less
than s* in the simulation model for all interior solutions
A
for s and s*. However, the results of the rest of this
part of the simulation exercise need to be interpreted
AS
with caution. The absolute levels of s* and s are very
sensitive to the specification of the utility function, of
the distribution of sickness, and of the premium. In
addition, the absolute value of s* is very sensitive to
small changes in some of the other parameters of the
model.
The effects of increases in the key parameters on
the utilisation of the private relative to the public
sector are given in Table 3.5. The results indicate that
relative utilisation of the private sector rises with an
increase in the time costs of NHS treatment and with an
increase in income (both earned and unearned). Relative
utilisation of the private sector falls as the costs (time
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Table 3.5
Effect of an increase in parameters on the 
relative utilisation of the private sector 
Effect on relative
utilisation of the
private sector
Parameter
•
No change
Decrease
Increase
Ambiguous
Probability of requiring
any secondary medical care
Parameters of the distribution
of f(s)
Fixed and variable money costs
of private sector treatment
Time costs of private sector
treatment
Loading factor on premium
Time costs of NHS treatment
Unearned income
Pay per hour
Hours of work
Proportion of sick time taken
during work hours
Note: These results hold for different specifications of
the utility function, the distribution of sickness
and the type of premium
and monetary) of private sector care increases and as the
insurance premium increases. The relative levels of
private and public sector utilisation are unchanged by an
increase in the mean or variance of f(s). It was not
possible to sign the effect of an increase in either hours
worked or the proportion of sick time taken in work hours.
Given the ambiguous comparative static results for these
last two parameters this result is not surprising.
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CONCLUSIONS
The simulation exercise has confirmed and extended
the predictions of the analytical model. The comparative
statics of the simulation are of the same sign as those of
the analytical model for parameters with unambiguous
effects in the analytical model. For parameters for which
a specific functional form was necessary to the sign of
the comparative static effect, the simulation has
indicated that the comparative statics are not greatly
affected by the specification of the distribution of
states of ill-health. However, they are often dependent
upon the choice of utility function, the specification of
the insurance premium and the level of certain parameters.
So, for example, the effect of an increase in earnings
depends upon the relative level of time spent in leisure
and in work, and the effect of a change in risk aversion
depends upon the probability of being in need of secondary
medical care. In addition, the effect of a change in a
parameter often depends upon the initial base from which
the small change is made. For example, the effect of an
increase in NHS time costs is to increase the probability
of insurance purchase if NHS time costs are already high;
if they are low the comparative static effect has the
opposite sign.
Given these results, the conclusions we draw must
be tentative. In addition, they are subject to the
particular specification of functional form adopted. For
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those parameters of most interest, the simulation
generated the following results. The effect of an increase
in income, in the money costs of private sector treatment,
an increase in risk aversion (if initially at a low
level of risk aversion) and an increase in NHS time
costs (if initially at a high level) is probably
to increase the probability of purchase. The effect of
an increase in the riskiness of the distribution of
health states and of an increase in the money costs of
private sector treatment (if the premium depends upon
expected utilisation) is probably to decrease the
probability of purchase.
Many of the variables of the analytical model are
not easily measured. Some of the sign reversals may occur
at levels of the variables which do not often occur in
practice (for example risk aversion) or for combinations
of levels of variables which do not occur in practice (for
example the combination of high wages and the loss of a
large proportion of labour income if ill). Given the
paucity of accurate measures of some of the functions and
parameters of the model, these issues are unlikely to be
easily resolved.
However, the analytical model (or a simple version
thereof) can also be tested by empirical estimation using
data based on observed actions. We will not have measures
of the 'not-easily-measured' variables, otherwise we could
have used them in the simulation exercise, but we can
identify which individuals have purchased insurance and
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some of their characteristics. Such an estimation, which
forms a complement to the simulation exercise is presented
in the next chapter.
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NOTES
1. The interpretation given to the comparative statics
at the level of the individual is a change in the
probability of insurance purchase. However, as the model
presented in chapter 2 and simulated here is deterministic
this interpretation cannot strictly be made.
2. For most of the specifications estimated, there were
discontinuities in the plot of wages against (EINS-ENO) at
the points at which s increased sharply and the level of
(EINS-ENO) fell. Altering the specifications of the
utility function or the value of the parameter a resulted
in a change in the level of wages at which these
discontinuities occurred, but did not change the general
pattern.
I%
3. At very high levels of wages, both s and s* fall,
indicating a decrease in usage of the private sector.
This is an artefact of the model specification. As hours
worked increases, leisure time tends towards zero for any
level of sickness. The model does not permit negative
leisure time. When leisure time becomes non-positive, the
level of leisure is set arbitrarily to a small positive
number between 0 and 1 which is the same in both sectors.
This will increase the relative attractiveness of the NHS
and therefore increases the relative benefit of the non-
insured prospect.
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4. The parameters mu and sigm2 in the simulation program
are not the mean and variance of the lognormal
distribution. However, an increase in the parameter mu
increases the mean and an increase in sigm2 increases the
variance of the lognormal f(s). 	 If we denote the
parameters mu and sigm2 of the simulation program as p and
02 respectively, the mean and variance of the lognormal
distribution are (Aitchison and Brown 1957):
mean = exp(p + %a2)
variance = exp(2p + o 2 )(exp(c 2 )-1)
5. We did not investigate the effects of changing the
mean and variance for different values of the probability
of illness.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
In this chapter we discuss the estimation of an
econometric model of the non-corporate demand for health
insurance. The econometric model is a simplified version
of the analytical model presented in Chapter 2. As we
were primarily interested in the discrete choice between
some and no insurance and as the market currently does
not offer the consumer the choice of continuum of
policies assumed by the analytical model, but offers the
discrete choice between at most 3 different levels of
cover, we sought to estimate only the discrete choice
between the insurance and the no-insurance prospects. As
in the analytical model, the unit of analysis is the
family as defined by the insurance suppliers (similar
definition to the tax unit). The dependent variable has
value 1 if the family unit has self-purchased insurance
cover and 0 otherwise. The model was estimated using
cross sectional data from the 1982 General Household
Survey (GHS).
The organization of the chapter is as follows. We
begin Section 1 with a brief summary of the effect of
parameter changes on the probability of insurance purchase
predicted by the analytical model and the computer
simulation. We then examine measures of the parameters
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which are available in the GHS. In the second section, we
discuss the choice of econometric estimator. In the
third, we present the results of the econometric
analysis. In the final section we examine extensions to
the research that.are suggested by the estimation results.
1.	 RESULTS FROM ANALYTICAL MODEL AND SIMULATION
From the analytical model, we derived the
results that an increase in the time costs of NHS care, a
decrease in the insurance premium, an increase in the
money cost of private sector care that did not feed
through into an increase in the insurance premium
and an increase in the probability of being unwell
would all lead to a rise in the expected utility of
insurance relative to the expected utility of no-
insurance. The simulation exercise confirmed and
extended the predictions of Chapter 2. An increase in
the wage rate and an increase in hours worked generally
increased the relative expected utility of the insurance
prospect. The effect of a shift in mean or spread in the
distribution of sickness and an increase in risk aversion
could not be predicted unambiguously by either the
analytical model or the computer simulation, though on
balance we thought the effect of both would be to decrease
the probability of insurance purchase.
To estimate this model, we required measures of
these variables in the population. 	 In the absence of
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data collected specifically for this research, we had to
use a secondary survey and chose to use the GHS. The GHS
is increasingly being used to analyse the behaviour of
households, families and individuals in England and Wales.
It has recently been, used to estimate the demand for
primary health care (Puffer 1987; Winter 1987). It is an
annual cross-sectional survey of approximately 12,000
households in England and Wales containing information
on the age, sex, education, employment, income, medical
care and health insurance cover of all household members
and, although a household survey, allows the
identification of family units.
The GHS has a number of advantages for the purpose
of the current research over the other annual national
cross-sectional survey, the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES). The GHS permits the separate identification of
those individuals with employer purchased health insurance
cover from those with self-purchased private health cover.
In contrast, as the FES is an expenditure survey, those
households with corporate cover are recorded as having
zero expenditure on private health insurance. So use of
the FES might result in biased estimates, as the creation
of a discrete dependent variable from recorded expenditure
would result in a certain number of incorrectly assigned
zeros in the dependent variable. Further, the GHS
contains some data on health status and recent health
care utilisation while the FES contains no data on these
variables.
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The GHS has advantages of relatively easy
accessibility and a large sample size, but suffers the
disadvantage common to all secondary data sets: the
variables measured in the survey may not correspond
exactly with those of the analytical model. However, the
low incidence of health insurance purchase in the
population meant collection of data for the specific
purpose of analysis of the demand for health insurance was
prohibitively expensive. Moreover, until the usefulness
of the GHS was tested, no case could be made for the
collection of such a data set.
The parameters of the analytical model are the
time loss associated with each state of ill-health, the
income loss associated with this time loss, the wage
rate, unearned income, the probability of requiring
secondary medical care, the subjective distribution of
states of ill-health and attitudes towards risk.
Obviously, many of these cannot be measured with any ease
and none are measured directly in the GHS. We therefore
have to seek proxies from those variables that are
measured in the GHS.
The time loss function cannot be proxied by any
GHS variables. However, the GHS can provide some measure
of the cost of this time loss. Being in a state of ill-
health reduces the amount of healthy time available and so
the cost of ill-health is a positive function of the
opportunity cost of healthy time. This may be a (positive)
function of income but is also likely to be a function of
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the source of income (i.e. whether it is earned or
unearned) and a function of the extent to which
individuals can reallocate their uses of time. A priori,
the greater the number of constraints on uses of time, the
higher the opportunity cost may be. expected to be.
Constraints on the allocation of time may arise as a
result of a high proportion of time being committed to
work or a high proportion of time being committed to
household production. Measures of earned and unearned
income were available in the GHS. Employment status,
number of jobs, hours worked (or alternatively whether
overtime was regularly worked), and family composition
were used as proxies for the constraints on allocation of
time.
The analytical model assumes that the loss of time
associated with any state of ill-health depends upon the
sector of treatment. The GHS provided no direct measures
of these differences. Published DHSS data was also of
relatively little use. Neither the number of persons on
NHS waiting lists nor the average length of wait across
all inpatient treatments are necessarily good measures of
the time loss associated with a particular state of ill-
health. The number of persons on a list gives no
indication of the length of wait. The average length of
wait is probably too aggregate a measure. Therefore these
variables were not used in the analysis. However, as
private sector facilities are unevenly distributed across
the UK, it was felt that geographical location of the
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family unit could be used as a proxy for the relative time
costs of access to the private and public sectors.
The expected distribution of states of ill-health
and the probability of requiring any secondary medical
care were proxied by various self-assessed measures of
health status and measures of recent utilisation of the
health services. For measures of health status,
respondents to the GHS are asked to rate their health,
whether they suffer from any chronic conditions and
whether these chronic conditions have limited the
respondent's activities in the last two weeks. For
measures of utilisation, respondents are asked to provide
details on all household GP consultation within the
previous two weeks, outpatient treatment within the
previous three months and inpatient treatment within the
previous year.
Measures of attitude to risk, with respect to
either loss of healthy time or loss of income, are very
limited in the GHS. One possible measure of attitude to
risk with respect to health is a discrete variable
reflecting attitudes to the health risk of smoking. A
possible indicator of measures of risk with respect to
income is whether or not the head or spouse of the family
unit is self employed; the self employed being assumed to
be less risk averse than the employed, holding income,
family composition, age and health status constant.
Dummies for both these variables were used in the
estimating equation.
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The analytical and simulation results yielded the
following a priori predictions for the signs of these
variables. Variables reflecting the opportunity costs of
time and lower relative costs of private sector access
were expected to be positively associated with th•e
probability of purchase. Variables measuring poor health
and a high degree of risk aversion were expected to be
negatively associated with the probability of purchase.
2.	 ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATOR
2.1	 Choice of Estimator
The observed dependent variable (whether or not a
family unit has self-purchased health insurance cover) is
binary. An estimator appropriate to a qualitative response
model should be therefore be used (Maddala (1983)). In an
extensive discussion of choice between known outcomes,
McFadden (1974, 1981) has shown that if utility is
specified as a random variable which is additively
separable into a deterministic and a random component, the
choice of estimator depends upon the assumed distribution
of the random component. In notation
U(xj ,c) = V(x j ,c) + e(xj ,c)	 (1)
where U(.) = random utility of choice j
V(.) = deterministic component of utility of choice j
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e(.) = random error of choice j
xj = vector of attributes of choice j
c = vector of socio-economic characteristics of
choice maker
Further, if the deterministic component can be specified
as a linear function of (functions of) the choice
attributes and the socio-economic characteristics of the
choice maker, e.g.
V(xj,c) = lkokzk(xj,c)	 (2)
= Z(xj ,c)'0	 (3)
where Zk (.) = known function of the attributes of good j
and the socio-economic characteristics of
the demander
Z'	 = (Z 1 ,...,Z k ), a row vector of the Z k
functions
13
	
= (p 1 ,..., 0k ), a column vector of unknown
parameters.
The Zk are the variables of the econometric model and the
pk the estimated parameters. These estimated coefficients
of the econometric model can then be interpreted as the
weights given to each (function) of the attributes and the
socio-economic characteristics in the probability of
choice of a particular action. We discuss the McFadden
model at more length in Appendix 2 and briefly also in
Chapter 6 .
McFadden discusses choice between certain
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alternatives; the choice between insurance and no-
insurance is the choice between two uncertain prospects
with known expected value (under the assumptions of
expected utility used in the analytical model). To
provide the link between the statistical and the
analytical model, the McFadden discussion must be applied
to choice under uncertainty. We outline a simple
extension to the McFadden model that incorporates
uncertainty in Appendix 2. Here we only summarise the
results.
Using the same notation as above, let the expected
utility of a prospect be modelled as
EUj = Ips (V2 + el)	 (4)
s
where Vj is the deterministic component of utility ofs
option j in state s, and eg is the random component in
state s of option j and ps is the probability state s will
occur. Provided that it is assumed that the deterministic
component vg depends on the state only through its
arguments, i.e. the deterministic component of the utility
function is state independent, then the link between
utility maximization and the specification of a probit or
logit model is similar to the case of choice between
certain alternatives, discussed in Domencich and McFadden
(1975).
Modelling expected utility as in (4), the decision
maker calculates the expected utility of each of the two
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prospects with some error. This error is distributed
independently of the deterministic component of expected
utility. The difference between the errors associated
with any two prospects will have some distribution; if the
difference is assumed to be normally distributed then the
appropriate estimator is the probit MLE, if the difference
is distributed logistically, then the appropriate
estimator is the logit MLE. In practice, the two
distributions are very similar, except the latter has more
weight in the tails. As the decision to purchase health
insurance is made only once a year, we assumed the
error associated with the calculation of the expected
utility of each of the two prospects (insurance and no
insurance) could be large, so a distribution of
differences in errors with greater weight in the tails
was preferred to one with less. We therefore chose to use
the logit estimator.
The estimated parameters of the econometric model
have an interpretation similar to the lis of equation (3).
In the choice between two uncertain prospects with known
mean, the estimated Os can be interpreted as the relative
weights of the deterministic components of the difference
between the expected utility of the insurance and no-
insurance prospects. Note again that this specification
implies that the deterministic components of the utility
function are state independent. (For more details see
Appendix 2).
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2.2	 Choice Based Sampling
Estimation was carried out using a sample of
observations from the 1982 GHS. The unit of analysis was
the family, as defined in health insurance contracts and
the dependent variable was binary, equal to one if the
family had self-purchased cover for one or more family
members and zero otherwise. Family units with any adult
over 64 were excluded on the grounds that inclusion might
bias the estimates, as anyone with insurance aged 65 and
over had to have purchased insurance in an earlier period.
As the proportion of families in the 1982 GHS with
positive self-purchased cover is under 5 per cent, a
random sample (say 10 per cent) of the GHS would have
resulted in insufficient information on observations with
a dependent variable with value 1. We therefore selected
a sample by first stratifying observations (family units)
into two groups on the basis of the dependent variable and
then selecting different sized random samples from each
group.
This procedure is referred to in the econometric
literature as choice based or endogenous sampling (Manski
and McFadden 1981a). While the aim of exogenous or
endogenous sampling is the same - to attain more
information on the decision to undertake an action - the
likelihood function in the two methods of sampling, and so
the appropriate MLE, differ.'
In choice based sampling, the data are
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deliberately sampled so that one of the other outcome is
overrepresented in the sample. However, this must be
taken into account in the estimation, since it will
obviously import some bias. The "weighted" exogenous
sampling ML estimator (WESML) proposed by Manski and
Lerman (1977) is a computationally simple approach to
overcome this bias. To derive this estimator, it is
assumed that the population proportions in each category
are known. The sampling proportions are also known, since
they are chosen by the researcher. The general principle
of the WESML estimator is to scale down the responses
overrepresented in the chosen sample by a factor equal to
the ratio of the (known) population proportion to the
sampling proportion and to scale up the underrepresented
responses by a similarly constructed factor.
This estimator was used in the current 'research.
Although the WESML estimator may be less efficient than
estimators proposed subsequently by Cosslett (1981), it
has the significant advantage of computational
simplicity. (For further discussion of the issue of choice
based sampling see Manski and McFadden (1981)).
When endogenous sampling is used, the researcher
chooses the relative sizes of the groups with positive and
zero values of the dependent variable. Amemiya (1985) and
Cosslett (1981) have argued that choice of the proportion
of observations with value 1 on the dependent variable to
replicate random exogenous sampling is not necessarily the
best sampling rule.
	 For a binary logit model with one
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exogenous variable (for a range of values for the
probability distribution function of the exogenous
variable and for the share in the population with
dependent variables equal to one) they showed that the
most efficient 2 size of the sample proportion of
observations with value one for the dependent variable was
one half. In other words, the sample should be drawn to
obtain equal proportions of positive and zero observations
on the dependent variable. Accordingly sampling rates for
the two groups (families with cover, families without)
were set to achieve a sample in which the proportion with
positive purchase was close to 50 per cent. The final
achieved sample size was 1026 family units. Of these, 464
were insured and 562 were uninsured.
	
3.	 ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES
	
3.1
	 Model Selection
McCullagh and Nelder (1983) have stressed that a
single model is not likely to dominate all others on all
the criteria used to select a model. A single model
therefore should be viewed as one of a set of models which
have a similar fit. Selection of a model was made on
the basis of theoretical validity, goodness of fit tests
appropriate to qualitative models and log likelihood ratio
(LR) and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for specification
error in logit models (Davidson and MacKinnon 1984). The
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goodness of fit tests used were the pseudo R-squared
defined by McFadden (1974) and for some models, the
percentage of outcomes that are correctly predicted by the
model (Judge et al 1981).
One version of the model is presented in Table 4.1
(referred to as Model 1). The sign and magnitude of the
parameter estimates in this model are similar to those
derived using both larger and smaller sets of the
regressors. While certain parameter estimates are not
well defined, choice of variables in the independent
variable matrix was made on the basis of the LR and LM
tests, rather than on the significance of point estimates.
The pattern of coefficient estimates in Table 4.1
indicates a positive association between purchase and
income, employment of both spouses, and location in the
South East and a negative association between purchase and
various measures of health, medical care utilisation and
smoking. The implications of these results will be
discussed in more detail below; at this point we
concentrate upon the process of model selection.
Misspecification of the distributional assumptions
in probit and logit models leads to inconsistent
estimators. It is therefore important to test for
heteroscedasticity in these models. Davidson and MacKinnon
(1984) have proposed several computationally convenient
score or Lagrange Multiplier tests for omission of
specified variables and heteroscedasticity of known form
in binary logit and probit models. Among the tests they
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discuss are three asymptotically equivalent tests based on
the artificial regression of the standardised residuals
ri(;Yi) = (Yi-(1-Fi6))]/(Fi6)(1-Fi6))]	 (5)
upon the matrix R(0) with typical element
Ri5 () = [F(x1())F(-xi(i))]- f(x1())X15() 	 (6)
where F(xi(0)) = exp(x i (0))/(1+exp(xi (P))) in the logit
model, f(z) denotes the first derivative of F(z), x i is a
row vector of exogenous variables for individual i, 0 is a
column vector of parameters estimated under the null
hypothesis and X 15 (0) is the derivative of x 1 (0) with
respect to Os.
The regression of (5) on (6) i.e.
n•n 	 n••
r(0) = R(0)c + errors	 (7)
generates three test statistics. These are the explained
sum of squares from (7), denoted LM 2 , n times the
uncentered R2 from (7) and a pseudo F-statistic,
F2
 = ((r'r-SSR)/k) (SSR/(fl-m))
where r'r is the total sum of squares from (7), SSR the
residual sum of squares from (7), k the number of
restrictions, in the dimension of xi , and n the number of
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observations. If there is only one restriction, the t-
statistic on the column of R corresponding to the
restriction is an asymptotically valid test statistic
(Davidson and MacKinnon (1984)).
The specification of x i ( P)
 as non-linear allows
these statistics to be used to test for heteroscedasticity
of known form. While the advantage of these tests over
more familiar likelihood ratio (LR) tests is small when
testing for single omitted variables, the LM test for
heteroscedasticity is considerably simpler than an LR
test. Using the LM tests discussed above we tested Model
1 (Table 4.1) against the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity
in subsets of the regressors. The number of regressors in
Model 1 prevented us from testing for heteroscedasticity
in all regressors simultaneously. At the risk of omitted
variable bias in the vector of variables causing
heteroscedasticity, we classified the regressors into two
groups, the income variables and the health, health
utilisation and the attitudes to smoking variables and
tested for heteroscedasticity in each of the three sets
separately. As the properties of these tests have not
been examined under choice based sampling, the LM tests
were carried out using a 10 per cent random sample of the
1982 GHS, but are presented with the relevant choice based
model.
The results of the tests are somewhat
contradictory. The hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity
of the specified form could not be rejected using the nR2
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version of the score tests, but was consistently rejected
using the LM2 test statistic. These statistics can also
be used to test for misspecification in the form of
omitted variables (Davidson and MacKinnon (1984)). Monte
Carlo evidence presented by Davidson and MacKinnon (1984)
indicated that the LM2 test statistic rejected a true null
less often than either the pseudo-LM statistics nR 2 or F2
and less often than the LR statistic. However, this
pattern was not repeated for the present reasonably large
data set. The LR, nR 2 and F2 statistics for omitted
variables were always smaller than the 95% critical value,
while the LM2 statistic was consistently larger,
indicating that the null should be rejected.
Given this contradictory evidence for our data,
perhaps the LM2 statistic should be given less weight in
the present estimation. However, the parameter estimates
should be regarded as preliminary.
3.2	 Parameter Estimates
While the fit of the model in terms of pseudo R2
is not high, this is neither uncommon in cross-sectional
analyses, nor is it unexpected given the discrete nature
of many of the exogenous variables as measured in the
GHS. The stability of the parameter estimates was
examined across models with different specifications of
the income variables and the estimated coefficients 	 of
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Table 4.1
Model 1 (Logit Estimates using WESML Estimator)
Coefficient Standard error
Constant -3.896** 1.027
Urban -0.409 0.289
South-East 0.308 0.27
Spouse 0.218 0.471
Class 1 or 2 0.36 0.297
Head in work 1.688** 0.647
Spouse in work 0.668** 0.325
Self-employed head -0.299 0.441
Overtime, head 0.352 0.363
Overtime, spouse -0.935** 0.463
Good health, head -0.932 E-01 0.322
Good health, spouse -0.477 0.307
Chronic illness, head -0.260 0.303
Smoker, head -0.244 0.265
Smoker, spouse -0.439 0.308
Out-patient, spouse -0.668* 0.396
GP consultation, spouse 0.388 0.397
Family earned income -1.079** 0.361
Family earned income2 0.204** 0.057
Family unearned income -0.400 E-01 0.309
Family unearned income2 0.115 0.081
Log - likelihood -243.46
Pseudo R2 0.12
1026
Heteroscedasticity
in health variables LM2 192.6	 (14.07)
NR2 1.38	 (14.07)
in income variables LM2 269.2	 (9.488)
NR2 1.3041(9.488)
* p ( 0.10
** p
	 0.05
All variables are 0/1 dummy variables except (gross) income variables which
are in logarithmic form. Variables are defined as a unit response if
household in South-East England for South-East; if spouse (always female)
present in household for spouse; if occupation of head classified as in
socio-economic groups 1 or 2 for class 1 or 2; if head does any regular
overtime for overtime, head; if spouse does any regular overtime for
overtime,spouse; if reported a chronic condition for chronic illness,
head; if reported good health for good health, bead; if had a consultation
with a General Practitioner in last 2 weeks for GP consultation.
LM2 and nR2 are Davidson and MacKinnon test statistics, calculated for 10%
random sample.	 Critical K2 values in parentheses.
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Table 4.2
Model 1 Re-estimated Using 10% Random Sample (Logit Estimates) 
Coefficient Standard error
Constant
-4.411** 1.023
Urban
-0.468 0.322	 -
South-East 0.408 0.304
Spouse 0.8937 0.556
Class 1 or 2 0.196 0.367
Head in work 1.911** 0.8618
Spouse in work 0.436 0.361
Self-employed head
-1.1168** 0.666
Overtime, head 0.8758** 0.411
Overtime, spouse
-0.7989 0.657
Good health, head
-0.2058 0.383
Good health, spouse
-0.14247 0.363
Chronic illness, head
-0.195 0.367
Smoker, head 0.197 0.3066
Smoker, spouse
-0.207 0.348
Out-patient, spouse -1.154* 0.602
GP consultation, spouse 0.444 0.415
Family earned income
-1.146** 0.457
Family earned income2 0.18245** 0.737 E-01
Family unearned income
-0.393 0.377
Family unearned income2 0.160 0.377
Log - likelihood -170.51
Pseudo R2 0.13
% Correctly predicted 91%
n 621
* p ( 0.10
** p ( 0.05
All variables are 0/1 dummy variables except (gross) income variables which
are in logarithmic form. Variables are defined as a unit response if
household in South-East England for South-East; if spouse (always female)
present in household for spouse; if occupation of head classified as in
socio-economic groups 1 or 2 for class 1 or 2; if head does any regular
overtime for overtime, head; if spouse does any regular overtime for
overtime,spouse; if reported a chronic condition for chronic illness,
head; if reported good health for good health, head; if had a consultation
with a General Practitioner in last 2 weeks for GP consultation.
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variables other than income remained stable across these
different specifications. A comparison of the WESML point
estimates (Table 4.1) with those from the non-weighted 10
per cent sample (presented in Table 4.2) indicates that
the signs and magnitudes of the point estimates are
similar for both samples, the larger intercept in Table 2
perhaps reflecting the lower information available on
the purchasers of health insurance in the random sample.
In the model of Table 4.1 the probability of
insurance purchase is significantly associated with earned
family (head plus spouse) income (for the range of income
in the sample the estimate of the overall effect of the
linear and square term for earned income was positive),
and significantly and positively associated with
employment of head of family and of spouse (the head being
recorded as the male in two adult families in the GHS).
Though not well defined, the coefficients on location in
the South-East and on membership of socio-economic classes
1 or 2 are also positive.
These coefficients are all of the a priori
expected sign. The simulation model indicated that an
increase in earned and unearned income generally increased
the probability of insurance purchase. It is interesting
to note that the importance of unearned income is smaller
than that of earned income. This perhaps provides some
support for the hypothesis that the cost of time is a
determinant of the probability of purchase. Observations
with a higher proportion of income from earnings have
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less ability to reallocate uses of time without suffering
an income loss, so have a higher opportunity cost of time.
Several different specifications of the income variable
were tested. Two income variables are used in Model 1;
total family earned income and total family unearned
income excluding social security payments. (The unearned
variable, while not a measure of wealth, is perhaps best
interpreted as an index of liquidity). Model 1 was re-
estimated, first, without the constraint that the
coefficient on earned and unearned income of the two
spouses (where present) be equal, second, replacing family
earned income with earned income per hour for the head of
family, and finally, without the constraint that the
coefficients of earned and unearned family income be
equal. These other specifications did not give
significantly better fits to the data than the model
presented in Table 4.1. We therefore tentatively
conclude that for the purpose of health insurance purchase
earned and unearned income are regarded differently, but
the provider of the income (head or spouse) is
unimportant.
The positive coefficient on membership of socio-
economic class 1 or 2 may reflect either unmeasured income
or wealth of those in higher socio-economic classes or a
price effect. Individuals who purchase through group
schemes organized by their employers generally pay lower
premiums than those who join individually. As such
schemes are more widely offered to higher paid employees
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(Grant 1985), those in the higher socio-economic groups
may face lower prices.
The positive effect of higher income, employment
and higher socio-economic status on the probability of
purchase can be seen in Table 4.3 in which , estimated
probabilities of purchase for different types of
observation are presented. In the logit model, the
parameter estimates provide an estimate of the change in
the probability of undertaking the action measured by the
dependent variable.
The positive coefficient on location in South-
East, though poorly defined, is of the expected direction
and perhaps reflects the lower relative costs of access to
private sector facilities in this region.
Table 4.3
Estimated Probabilities of Purchase from Model 1 
Single adult family, head unemployed,
gross weekly income £100
Two adult family, head and spouse employed,
gross weekly income £100
Single adult family, head unemployed,
gross weekly income £400
Two adult family, head and spouse employed,
gross weekly income £400
Probability of
Purchase
1%
12.3%
7.2%
51 %
£100 per week is approximately mean income for sample.
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The parameter estimates for those variables which
were intended to measure the constraints on the allocation
of time (overtime, self-employment) are generally not
significantly different from zero ' and some are of
unexpected sign. The estimate of the effect of head of
family overtime is positive, but that of spouse is
negative. We would have expected the sign of this latter
coefficient to be the same as that of the coefficient of
overtime of head. Also unexpectedly, the coefficient on
self-employment is negative (though not well defined). A
priori, it was expected that the income of the self-
employed would be more affected by having to take time off
work in the event of illness, so amking insurance more
attractive to these individuals. However, the future
stream of income of the self-employed may be less certain
than that of employees, so a self-employed individual may
be less likely to purchase a relatively expensive
insurance policy than an employee with the same income,
location and health. Self-employment may also be a proxy
for lower risk aversion, in which case we would expect the
sign of the coefficient to be negative, not positive.
Given that this variable is possibly proxying several
different factor, the poorly defined parameter estimate is
perhaps not so surprising.
The inclusion of data on self-assessed health
status and recent health care utilisation in the GHS was
one of the reasons for choice of the GHS as the data base
for this study.	 However, the results do not present a
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clear pattern of the effect of the GHS measures of health
status or utilisation on the probability of purchase of
health insurance. Most of the health variable parameter
estimates in Table 4.1 are not significantly different
from zero. Inspection of the covariance matrices of the
data and the parameter estimates for this subset of
variables did not suggest that multicollinearity was the
cause of the poor precision of these estimates. The
problem may stem from the nature of the measures in the
GHS.
The health status and utilisation variables in the
GHS are broad-brush measures which indicate whether or not
a respondent rates his/her health as good, whether or not
he or she has a chronic condition, and whether or not he
or she has used various types of medical care within a
certain time period. These variables therefore serve as
some indication of current health status. The simulation
results suggested that the decision to purchase insurance
may be related to health status in a non-linear manner.
For those who are currently in very good health, the
probability of requiring any medical care may be small,
hence the pay-off from insurance is limited. For those
who have very poor health status, private sector care may
not be available. In addition, for this group, the
imposition by insurance suppliers of restrictions on cover
for those in poor health may reduce the expected utility
of insurance, so overall the probability of purchase is
probably low for this poor health group. Thus the
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relationship between health status and purchase is
probably not linear. It was hoped this non-linear
association could be measured by modelling interactions
between the various health status and utilisation measures
in the GHS. Unfortunately, the results (not presented
here) indicated that this appeared not to be a fruitful
approach. We therefore present only the non-interaction
health terms. These have an ambiguous effect on the
probability of purchase.
A similar argument may account for the lack of
impact in the model of the number of, or the health of,
children in the household. The estimated coefficients
were small and had large standard errors in all
specifications of the model. (For these reasons, the
children related variables were excluded from Model 1 and
so the coefficients are not given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
First, if the illnesses children are most likely to get
are not covered by insurance, the health of children will
not have any direct positive effect on the probability of
health insurance purchase. Second, if public sector
treatment for children is viewed as no worse or better
than private sector treatment then again there is no
benefit from the purchase of health insurance to cover
children. Thus there will be no association between
children's health and the probability of health insurance
purchase.
Finally, in Table 4.1 it can be seen that 	 the
proxies used for attitudes to risk (self-employment,
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assessment of the risk of smoking) have negative
coefficients. We expected negative coefficients for
these variables on the basis of the results from the
simulation model, although the coefficients are poorly
defined. As noted above, self-employment may be proxying
a number of factors, so this may account for the small
size of the coefficient.
Overall, the results confirm the positive effect
of income on purchase derived in the simulation. They
perhaps also give some support to the effect of the value
of time, operating through employment status and the less
well-defined parameter on the overtime of head on
insurance purchase. Unfortunately, the impact of health
status is not well-defined and is somewhat contradictory,
though the negative coefficient on both the good health
variables and the measures of utilisation may be some
evidence of the non-linear effect found in the simulation.
4.	 POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS TO THE CURRENT MODEL
While several of the parameter estimates are of
the expected sign, some of these are not well-defined.
Although the ranking of predicted probabilities from the
model is fairly consistent with the observations, the
model underpredicts the probability of purchase. It may
be the case that certain determinants of purchase have
been omitted from the econometric model. In part, these
omissions are likely to be the result of poor data, a
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problem hardly unique to the present study and one
frequently encountered in the analysis of behaviour in the
health care market. However, the econometric results
suggest that it may also be useful to extend and respecify
the underlying theoretical model of choice. Below we
discuss possible extensions to the current model which may
increase the goodness of fit of the estimated model.
The current model has two central assumptions.
The first is that choice is made on the basis of expected
utility of the two prospects in the next period. Although
the value and/or probability of future outcomes may be
affected by past actions (for example, the probability
distribution of future states of health may be a function
of past states, expectations of quality of care may be a
function of past utilisation of the health services) it is
assumed that the decision at time is independent of all
prior and subsequent decisions. The second assumption is
that individuals choose, at time t, between two prospects,
these being the purchase and the non-purchase of health
insurance.
The estimation results suggest consumers may be
rather more bounded in their decision making process.
Rather than base their actions on current events (prices,
income, health status) they may base their actions on past
events, particularly past purchase or non-purchase. In
addition, certain consumers may not perceive that they
have a choice between two prospects. We explore both
these issues below.
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4.1
	
Past Purchase
Past purchase or consumption has been found to be
a determinant of current consumption in demand studies
and may also play a role in the decision to purchase
health insurance. The decision to buy health insurance
requires the evaluation of several unknowns, so the costs
of decision making may be relatively high. If so,
individuals may not reconsider their decision until their
circumstances change considerably. If circumstances
change little in the period following the initial
decision, the perceived costs of re-evaluation may be
greater than the expected gains. If decision makers do
not alter their behaviour as the result of marginal change
in either endowments or the choices they face, we would
expect past purchase to be an important determinant of
present consumption, and the weights on all factors to be
a function of the time elapsed since the initial decision
was taken. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be
tested using the GHS, nor any other data sets to our
knowledge currently in the public domain.
4.2	 Restricted Choice Sets
Restricted choice sets arise if certain
individuals in a sample can choose a prospect from within
only a subset of the full set of possible discrete
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prospects. In the economics of transport literature this
problem is referred to as 'captivity'. In the limit,
captivity confines the demander to only one of the
possible prospects. Captivity in transport economics can
be easy to establish; for example if commuters choose
between public and private transit for the journey to
work and a certain group lives in a locality with no
public transit, this group is likely to be captive to
private modes of transit. In other words, the members of
the group cannot choose a public mode. In the case of
health insurance, there may be some groups in the
population for whom the probability of being captive to
the no-insurance prospect may be high. For example,
there are individuals who do not consider the private
sector as an option for political reasons. 	 These
individuals are unlikely to perceive insurance as an
option for themselves. There are also those individuals
who may be excluded from purchase of health insurance
because of age, for example, those aged 65 and over who
have not bought insurance in the past. There may also be
individuals who feel their medical history is such that
they would not be give insurance cover. These groups may
be captive to the no-insurance prospect.
If captivity is thought to exist, one possible
approach to the problem is to model the purchase decision
as a two stage probabilistic process. Let us assume there
are only two choices, prospects 1 and 2. Individuals can
only be captive to choice 1.
	 In our case, choice 1
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represents the no-insurance prospect, choice 2 the
insurance prospect.
Let pi
 = probability individual i will not be captive
and Fi = probability individual i is not captive and
chooses prospect 2
The probability of choice of prospect 2 is thus
piFi
and the probability of not choosing prospect 2 is
1 - piFi
The likelihood for the process is thus
L = 7 o (1 - 11 +11	 (8)
where 0 denotes those observations with zero purchase of
prospect 2 and + those observations with positive
purchase.
If it is assumed that p i varies across
individuals, but is independent of F i , then the likelihood
function is similar to the 'Dogit' model proposed by
Gaudry and Dagenais (1979) to analyse captivity in choice
of transport mode. If p = p i for all i then the model is
similar to the p-tobit model used by Deaton and Irish
(1984) to analyse household consumption using data in
which there is systematic over- or under-reporting of
expenditure.
Unfortunately, although the idea of captivity is
perhaps a useful way of examining the demand for health
insurance, it is difficult to establish whether or not
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captivity occurs. We do not have detailed data on the
choice process with which we could either support or
refute the theoretical concept of captivity. Nor do we
have the data to empirically test a model of captivity
specified as equation (8). Several factors which may
determine both the probability of captivity and the
probability of choice of insurance conditional on not
being captive are not measured in the 1982 GHS. For
example, there is no data on political attitudes. Nor do
we have detailed data on medical history of potential
demanders to establish whether they might view themselves
as ineligible for cover.
However, despite the lack of detailed data, we
could examine the GHS data set for evidence of the
effects of captivity. Swait and Ben-Akiva (1985) have
shown theoretically that the effect of captivity to one
prospect in a binary logit model is to bias parameter and
variance-covariance estimates. If captivity is ignored,
the estimated coefficients of all terms except the
constant of the model will be downwardly biased and less
significant than in the 'true' model. On the basis of
this result we examined the data for evidence that the
parameters were downwardly biased when captivity was
ignored by trying to identify captive groups and re-
estimating the model without these observations. This
required that we could correctly identify the choice to
which individuals may be captured, and that we could
identify captured individuals.
	
For the purposes of an
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exploratory analysis we assumed firstly, that the
compulsory nature of public health insurance, and the
nature of private insurance contracts meant 'capture' was
possible only to the no-insurance prospect, and secondly,
that the probability of capture was a function of low
income (because insurance is a relatively expensive good
and low income is associated with poor health). As
discussed above there, may be other factors associated
with a high probability of capture, but we did not have
measures of these.
We further assumed that individuals with below
mean income were captive to the no-insurance prospect. We
therefore stratified the sample by mean income and re-
estimated Model 1 for the two groups in the sample
separately. The results are presented in Table 4.4. A
comparison of the coefficients in Table 4.1 and Table 4.4
gives some support for the hypothesis that the low income
group are more likely to be captured. The estimate of the
coefficient of the constant in Table 4.1 (estimated using
the whole sample) is higher, and the coefficients of most
other variables lower, than the estimates in Table 4.4
for the higher income group only. This is the pattern we
would expect if captivity were present.
These results are very preliminary. Although the
idea of captivity is perhaps useful for modelling the
demand for health insurance, several of the factors which
may determine either the probability of captivity or the
probability of choice of insurance, conditional on not
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being captive, are not measured in the 1982 GHS. For
example, there are no data on political attitudes towards
private medicine, which may affect the probability of
purchase of health insurance. Nor are there data on
the medical history of potential demanders which could be
used to establish whether demanders would be given only
limited cover or would even (erroneously) view themselves
as completely ineligible for cover. We have hypothesised
in the above analysis that income might be a proxy for
capture, but it is not necessarily true that all low
income families will not consider health insurance within
their potential choice set. Finally, splitting the sample
on the basis of mean income and estimating the model for
each group separately reduces the number of observations
used in the estimation. This reduces the probability
that the estimated model will be a close fit to the data
and give well-defined parameter estimates.
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Table 4.4
Model 1 re-estimated using segmentation by Mean Income 
Constant
Urban
Above mean income
Coefficient
	 Asymptotic
t - ratios
-2.52	 (-1.056)
-0.458	 (-1.14)
Below mean income
Coefficient
	 Asymptotic
t - ratios
-4.32	 (-2.41)
-0.234	 (-0.45)
South-East 0.4217 ( 1.159) 0.0235 ( 0.047)
Spouse 0.065 ( 0.08) 0.2081 (	 0.23)
Class 1 or 2 0.227 ( 0.568) 0.4739 (	 0.88)
Head in work 1.555 ( 0.995) 1.960 (	 2.52)
Spouse in work 0.602 ( 1.34) 0.844 (	 1.36)
Self-employed head
-0.317 (-0.45)
-0.475 (-0.71)
Overtime, head 0.426 (	 0.94) 0.3115 (	 0.29)
Overtime, spouse
-0.87 (-1.51)
-0.563 (-0.344)
Good health, head
-0.31 (-0.65) 0.195 ( 0.368)
Good health, spouse
-0.54 (-1.33) -0.44 (-0.648)
Chronic illness, head
-0.32 (-0.76)
-0.108 (-0.186)
Smoker, head
-0.097 (-0.27)
-0.436 (-0.893)
Smoker, spouse
-0.53 (-1.37)
-0.364 (-0.483)
Out-patient, spouse
-0.652 (-1.25)
-0.536 (-0.536)
GP consultation,
spouse 0.448 (	 0.8) 0.255 ( 0.32)
Family earned income -1.44 (-1.46)
-0.87 (-1.367)
Family earned income2 0.248 ( 2.07) 0.147 ( 1.12)
Family unearned income -0.049 (-0.11) 0.017 (-0.024)
Family unearned income2 0.093 ( 0.708) 0.135 ( 0.80)
Log - likelihood -197.67
-66.64
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.10
% of sample 33.6 66.4
Heteroscedasticity
in income variables WU 9.484 (9.488) 301.3 (9.488)
11122 0.02 (9.488) 3.23 (9.488)
All variables are 0/1 dummy variables except (gross) income variables which
are in logarithmic form. Variables are defined as a unit response if
household in South-East England for South-East; if spouse (always female)
present in household for spouse; if occupation of head classified as in
socio-economic groups 1 or 2 for class 1 or 2; if head does any regular
overtime for overtime, head; if spouse does any regular overtime for
overtime,spouse; if reported a chronic condition for chronic illness,
head; if reported good health for good health, head; if had a consultation
with a General Practitioner in last 2 weeks for GP consultation.
LM statistics calculated for 10% random sample
121
5.	 CONCLUSIONS
The estimation results indicate the importance of
income and employment status in determining non-corporate
purchase of health insurance. However, the research also
suggests that variables other than those measured in the
GHS may account for some of the variability in the
probability of purchase. This led us to a consideration
of two possible extensions to the current work which
might increase the precision of the estimates and the
explanatory power of the model. These are the inclusion of
data on past purchase into the econometric model and the
extension of the model to allow for captivity.
Unfortunately, the data required for such research is not
collected in the GHS nor in any other large scale national
survey to our knowledge and so would probably have to be
gathered specifically for this research. In the
conclusion to the thesis we return to this issue and
discuss the type of data which might be collected.
Finally, this study provides a basis for comparison with
future research, using either specifically collected
data sets or perhaps a data set such as the FES in
conjunction with the GHS.
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NOTES
1. See Cosslett (1981) for a detailed discussion
of exogenous and endogenous sampling and appropriate
estimators.
2. Efficiency was defined as the minimisation of the
ratio of asymptotic variance under the chosen sampling
scheme to the variance under random sampling.
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATION OF THE INSURANCE CLAIMS OF THE PRIVATELY
INSURED
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we model and estimate the
insurance claims of a sample of the privately insured. The
sample is drawn from subscriber units with individual
cover and with small corporate cover, so this chapter
examines the behaviour of a wider population than the
analyses of Chapters 2 to 4. Ideally, the demand for
private insured health care should be analysed
simultaneously with the demand for health insurance, but
as outlined in the Chapter 1 of this work, the data to
estimate such a model is simply not available in the UK.
We therefore seek to estimate the determinants of the
level of claims, conditional upon insurance. We develop
an econometric model which reflects the structure of the
UK health care market and the utilisation of private
health insurance within this structure.
In the UK context, an analysis of claims is
virtually identical to an analysis of the expenditure on
private secondary health care because of the near full
cover provided by insurance contracts. The leading health
insurance supplier (which provided the data for the
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econometric estimation) estimates that approximately 95
percent of claims are met in full, and this estimate
excludes any ex-gratia payments which can be (and are)
made in the cases of shortfall between cover and
expenditure. It is important to note that the current
research analyses the level of claims/expenditure,
conditional on insurance purchase. We did not attempt to
estimate what the determinants of expenditure would be
were all the population insured. While in principle it
would be straightforward to respecify the econometric
model to undertake such a task, in practice the benefits
of such an exercise would seem extremely limited. If a
majority of the population were covered by private health
insurance, it is unlikely that either the private sector
or the contracts offered by the private health insurance
suppliers would be of the same form as at present.
We begin our analysis with a review of two studies
of the demand for private sector medical care. We focus
primarily upon the econometric specification of these
studies and examine the implications of each model for the
nature of demand. In the second section we discuss the
structure of the claims process in the UK and from this
derive a set of nested likelihood functions, each of which
models the level of claims under different assumptions
about the stochastic structure of the claims process.
This approach serves both to highlight the assumptions
which must be made to estimate expenditure and enables us
to place our own work and the research discussed in
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Section 1 into a common scheme of classification. In
Section 3 we discuss the factors affecting the different
parts of the claims process and the data sources for the
econometric analysis. The estimation results are
presented in Section 4.
1.	 PREVIOUS ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE
There have been many studies of the demand for
medical care (for reviews see Cairns and Snell (1978),
Newhouse (1981), Culyer at al (1988)). We review only two
of these studies. However, for our purposes they are among
the most important. Both consider the nature of medical
care demand; both propose and use an explicit econometric
model. The first is the Rand Two Part Model (Duan et al.
1982,1984), used in the Rand Health Insurance Study, the
second is the Adjusted Tobit Model (ATM) used by van de
Ven and van Praag (1981b) to analyse the claims of the
insured in the Netherlands. In both models the
distribution of annual medical care expenditures is
specified as the outcome of two actions, and both models
can be classified as 'extended Tobit' models (Amemiya
1984).
1.1
	 The Rand Two Part Model (TPM)
The TPM (Duan et al (1982)) is an attempt to
account for the existence of a pro p ortion of the
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population which has zero expenditures in any time period.
The model separates behaviour into two decision. The
first is the decision whether to have any expenditure.
The second is the decision about the level of expenditure,
conditional on expenditure being positive. More formally,
*
thelnodelhastwoeqUations.LietI-be an unobserved1
index of the need for medical care, say an index of
unhealthiness, for individual i. Il is a linear function
of variables x, such that
...*
ii = 5 1xi + ili	 Ui- N(0,1)
The researcher can only observe whether or not II is
*
positive. If I ii s positive then the demander of care
incurs positive expenditure. Letting yi denote the level
of expenditure
log ( yi I It > 0) = 5 2xi + e i	 e- .- N(0,0 2 )	 (2)i
Specification of expenditure as (2) implies that
expenditure must be positive or zero.
Given the distributional assumptions in (1) and
(2), the likelihood function for this model is
LTpm = Tro 1-0(5 1xi )Tr10(5 1xi ) IT1 (1/0)0[(yi-5 2xi )/o]	 (3)
where 0 is the standard normal p.d.f., 0 the standard
normal c.d.f, 0 denotes those observations which have zero
(1)
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expenditure and 1 those observations with positive
expenditure. The distributional assumptions on the error
terms u and e made in the TPM mean that the likelihood
function can be factored into two parts,
LTpm = L(6 1 ) x L(62,02)
where	 L(61) = 70 1-0(51x1 ) 71(51x1)	 (4)
and	 L(52,02) = n i (1/0)0[( y1 - 32x)/o)
	
(5)
the first term of which depends exclusively on parameters
in equation (4) and the second term on parameters in
equation (5). Taking logs, the TPM can be represented as
logLTpm = logLp + logLoLs 	(6)
where Lp denotes a probit likelihood and Lo L s an OLS
(ordinary least squares) likelihood function. Consistent
estimates for 5 1 can be obtained from a probit estimation
of (4) using all observations and consistent estimates of
5 2 from OLS of (5) using only those observations with
positive values for the dependent variable.
In this model it is assumed that the same factors
affect the decision to seek care and the level of
expenditure on care, though the strength of these factors
on these two decisions is not constrained to be equal.
This may or may not be a realistic assumption. A more
important assumption is that expenditure is only defined
if II is positive.
	 To see this, we,can re-express
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equation (2) as
log y i = 5 2x1 + e i	iff I! > 01
undefined	 otherwise
Equation (2) therefore models only actual expenditure,
that which is conditional on medical need, rather than
potential expenditure.
1.2	 Adjusted Tobit Model(ATM) (van de yen and van
Praag 1981b)
The adjusted tobit model is similar in form to the
TPM, but this outward similarity masks an essential
difference:	 the purpose of the ATM is to model potential
rather than actual expenditure. 	 Using the same symbols as
above, the ATM is given by
*
I •	 =	 51
in	 =y-1
u	 and e
•	 +	 •1x 13.	 ui
8
-2x2i + ei	 iff I1 * > 0
- 0,.	 otherwise
are distributed biv.N(0,1)
(7)
(8)
poi
1	 =
[1
Po	 a
2j
where A is	 the	 correlation	 of	 u	 and e and a
2
	is the
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variance of e.
The log likelihood function for this model is
log LATm = E 0 [1-0(5 1x1i )] + 110(51x11)
+ I1g( Yi)u1 -51x1i)
	 (9)
where g(y i lu i  -5 1 x1i ) is the conditional probability
density function of observed expenditure, 0 denotes those
observations with no expenditure, 1 observations with
positive expenditure. (9) can be estimated using a maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator to derive estimates of 6 1 and 52
under the joint normality assumptions made above. Limited
information estimates of 5 2 may be obtained under
different assumptions about the distribution of (e i lui  -
5 1x11 ) using consistent estimators of 5 1
 from the first
two terms of equation (9) to eliminate (asymptotically)
the correlation between x2i and the ui in the observed
sample. van de Ven and van Praag used the two stage
estimator suggested by Heckman (1976). This estimator is
consistent provided the distributional assumptions are
correct, but less efficient than the ML estimator.
The ATM is a specific example of a class of models
referred to as Sample Selection Models (Heckman (1976),
Hay and Olsen (1984)). Sample Selection Models are
designed to correct for missing observations on the
dependent variable. The model specified in equations (7)
and (8) does not require the factors which determine the
need for care to be the same as those which determine the
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level of care received. While the authors do not discuss
the ideas behind the formulation of their model in great
detail, positive need is defined as positive contact with
a doctor in the survey period. However, since van de Ven
and van Praag (unlike Duan et al.) only seek to explain
the level of expenditures on specialist's and hospitals
fees only, their need index is more properly described as
an index of the need for specialist or hospital based
treatment. This obviously is not identical to need for
medical care.
The ATM, like the TPM, assumes that the observed
level of care is always positive if need is positive.
However, unlike the TPM, the ATM permits the researcher to
test explicitly whether u and e are independent. If the
error terms are independent, equation (9) can be factored
into two separate equations; the first a probit model to
explain whether or not need is positive, estimated using
all observations, the second an OLS equation to explain
the level of claims, to be estimated using only those
observations with positive claims.
There has been some discussion of the appropriate
model to use to estimate the demand for health care, for
example, the exchange between Hay and Olsen (1984) and
Duan et al (1984). The debate distinguishes between the
TPM and various SSM specifications. The two types of
model are not nested. In the TPM specification, the
second equation models actual expenditure. In the ATM the
second equation models potential expenditure and because
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potential expenditure and the need for any medical care
may be correlated, unbiased estimates of potential
expenditure can only be derived if this correlation is
taken into account. The ATM has the advantage over the
TPM that is is possible to explicitly test (using
loglikelihood ratio tests) whether e and u are
independent, whereas the estimation of the TPM provides no
such test. Further, although Duan et al. (1984) show one
form the joint distribution of u and e may take, they did
not test this empirically. Duan et al (1984) conducted a
limited test of both models and concluded that empirically
the TPM performed as well or better than the ATM, but the
advantage of the former over the latter model was not
large.
For the purposes of model development, the central
issue is which model is more appropriate for the problem
under consideration. Although Duan et al. (1984) argue
that it is actual expenditure which is of interest, it is
not clear that this is the object of concern, particularly
in the UK situation. Presumably all individuals who buy
health insurance have a latent demand for private health
care; if not, then they would not have bought health
insurance. However, in any one year, some of these
individuals do not use their insurance, either because
they do not need any medical care or because they need
medical care that is not covered by the insurance
contract. Therefore it would seem that it is potential,
rather. than actual, expenditure which is the variable of
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interest.	 Therefore a Sample Selection model (SSM)
similar in spirit to the ATM is the appropriate type of
model. In addition, the SSM approach permits econometric
testing of some of the distributional assumptions of the
model (although van de Ven and van Praag did not do so in
their estimation).
In our research we therefore use a Sample
Selection approach. However, the model developed here is
somewhat more complex than either the TPM or the ATM
because of the nature of the UK health care system. In
addition, rather than just presenting one model, we have
sought to present a number of (nested) models, each based
on different assumptions about the distribution of the
random variables in the process of incurring positive
health insurance claims. Which model is appropriate will
be determined by the econometric estimation.
2.	 MODELS OF HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR THE UK
The nature of the private sector and of health
insurance contracts in the UK has the result that an
insured individual with positive need for medical care
does not automatically have a positive insurance claim.
If an individual is ill, his or her first contact with the
providers of medical care will be with his or her GP.
Primary treatment is provided free under the NHS for all
patients whether covered by insurance or not. The GP may
either provide primary treatment only, which is not
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covered by the insurance contract, or may refer the
patient for further diagnosis or secondary care. At this
stage the demander of care has a choice. He or she can
either ask for this further treatment to be provided
privately or can continue with treatment in the NHS
sector. We assume that if the treatment is covered by the
contract and the demander has not exceeded/does not expect
to exceed any monetary limits on claims set in the
contract, he or she will choose insured care. There is no
financial penalty to this action as future levels of the
premium do not depend on claims. In addition, refraining
from making a claim will not necessarily prevent
imposition of restrictions on future insurance cover.
Restrictions on the cover provided are a function of past
medical care utilisation, but the imposition of
restrictions is not a function of the sector in which
treatment for these conditions was received.
In the models discussed above, a positive claim
was the outcome of one process. In contrast, in the UK a
positive claim in the survey year is the outcome of two
distinct, but not necessarily independent, processes. A
positive claim is observed if the demander has both
positive need for medical care and is referred to the
private sector. A zero claim is observed otherwise. The
statistical model describing the observed level of
claims/expenditure therefore consists of three
probabilistic events; the decision to seek medical care,
the referral decision and the level of claims/expenditure.
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2.1	 The decision to seek medical care
We assume all insured have a latent need for
medical care in the contract period. Denoting this need
as mi * (and dropping the subscripts referring to the
individual for expositional convenience),
mi * = az i + w,	 w - N(0,1)	 (10)
where w is a random error, z 1 a vector of variables
determining need and a a vector of weights. Need is only
observed if the insured presents him/herself to a medical
practitioner. Let d 1 be a dummy variable denoting this
event. Thus
2.2	 Referral to the private sector
Referral can be specified as a latent variable m2*
where
m2 * = Dz 2 + e
	
e - N(0,1)	 (11)
where e is a normally distributed random error, z 2 is a
vector of factors determining referral and 0 a vector of
	
di. = { 1	 iff w  - az 1
	
0	 otherwise
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weights. Again, m2 * cannot be observed directly; we can
only observe whether or not a referral has been made. Let
d2 be a dummy variable such that
d2 = f 1	 if e  -0Z2
2.3	 Level of claims/expenditure
Let y* denote potential expenditure, where
log y* = 1z 3 + u	 (12)
Actual expenditure is only observed if both medical need
and referral occur. In other words,
i
log y =	 log y* iff ml * > 0 and m2 * > 0	 (13)
The assumption of log-normality of health care expenditure
is commonly made in studies of the demand for medical care
and was also made by van de Ven and van Praag (1981b).
A set of sample likelihood functions can be
derived under different assumptions about the statistical
relationships between the different parts of the claims
process, or more formally, about the joint distributions
of w, e and u. We begin by specifying the most complex
model, proceeding from this to simpler models by making a
0	 otherwise
-. otherwise
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succession of assumptions about the distribution of the
error terms.
The most complex model specifies that w,e and u are
all jointly distributed: need and referral are not
independent and the level of claims depends on both need
and referral. In addition, it is assumed that referral is
dependent on medical need. From equations (10), (11) and
(12) the likelihood function is
LO = ff 0 [1-pr(wk-az 1 )pr(ek-pz 2 1wk-az 1 )] x
Tr 1pr(w-az 1 )pr(e -0z 2 Iwk-az 1 ) x
Tr1g(Y1(ek-Oz2Iwk-az1),wk-az1)
	 (14)
where 0 denotes observations with zero claims and 1
observations with positive claims and pr denotes
probability.
We can derive a set of models nested within LO.
First, if we assume independence between referral and
medical need, but maintain the assumption that the level
of claims is dependent upon both need and referral, we
derive the likelihood
Li = 70 [1-pr(w-az 1 )pr(e -5z 2 )] x
ir1pr(wk-aZ 1 )pr(ek-3z 2 ) x
Tr1g(ylek-5z 2 , wk-azi)	 (15)
Second, if the level of expenditure is assumed
independent of the need for medical care (but not of the
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need for referral) then Li can be respecified as
L2 = Tr 0 [1-pr(w-az 1 )pr(e  -13z 2 ] x
ff1pr(w-az 1 )pr(e -13z 2 ) x
Tr1g(Y1e -13z2)
	 (16)
As the private sector provides only a limited set of types
of medical care, this assumption seems reasonable. For
example, individuals with high medical need may be treated
in the private sector, others in the public, depending on
the actual state of ill-health. L2 cannot be estimated
using statistical or econometric computer software
currently widely available in the public domain. However,
if we are able to separate the observations with zero
observed claims into two mutually exclusive groups, those
who have had zero contact with a medical practitioner and
those who have positive contact, but have not been
referred, then L2 can be factored into two parts. This is
referred to as 'sample separation' (see, for example,
Blundell et al. 1986). The first part is
L3(1) = 7ND1-Pr (w-az i ) Tr ippr(w-az i )	 (17)
and the second is
L3(2) = 7_1-pr(e-Dz 2 ) 7+pr(e-13z 2 ) Tr +g(yle-0z2 )	 (18)
where ND denotes those observations who have non-positive
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medical need, D those observations with positive medical
need, - those observations with positive medical need but
no private health care expenditure and + those with
positive expenditure. L3(1) therefore would be estimated
using all observations and L3(2) estimated using only
those observations with positive medical need (i.e. those
who have visited a medical practitioner in the survey
year). Consistent estimates of a can be obtained from a
probit estimation of L3(1) and consistent estimates of 0
and I" from estimation of L3(2) using either maximum
likelihood or a Heckman-type two stage least squares
estimator (Heckman (1976)). Note that L3(1) and 1,3(2) are
not nested within L2, but are different estimators of the
same stochastic process.
If it is assumed that e is distributed
independently of u, L3(2) can be rewritten as
1,4 = 11_1-pr(ek-Sz2)ff+pr(e -13z2)71+g(y)	 (19)
The first two terms of L4 form a probit (or logit) model
estimated using observations who have positive medical
need, the dependent variable being 1 if claims/expenditure
is positive and 0 otherwise. The third term is an OLS
likelihood function in which the dependent variable is
observed claims/expenditure, the function estimated using
only those observations with positive claims.
If it is not possible to observe whether or not
the demander has received primary care, model L3(1) and
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13(2) and model L4 cannot be estimated. In this case, as
in Duan et al.(1982) and van de Ven and van Praag (1981),
the observations can only be grouped into two. The first
group contains those observations with zero expenditure
and the second those observations with positive
expenditure. As for the three part model presented above,
different estimators can be derived under different
assumptions about the stochastic process underlying the
distribution of observed claims. Maintaining the
assumption of a log-normal distribution of expenditure (as
equation (12)) the likelihood function is given by
L5 = w 01-pr(wk-Oz 2 )Tr 1pr(ek-Pz 2 )Tr 1g(yle-0z 2 )	 (20)
where 0 denotes those observations with zero expenditure
and 1 those with positive expenditure. L5 differs from
L3(2) because it is estimated using all observations. L5
is the ATM model. If the level of expenditure is assumed
independent of the level of medical need, then L5 can be
rewritten as
L6 = n 01-pr(e-0z 2 ) f 1yr(ek-Pz 2 ) f 1 g (Y)	 (21)
where the first two terms are estimated using all
observations, and the third term estimated using only
those observations with positive expenditure. A
likelihood ratio (LR) test of L5 against L6 provides a
test of the assumption of independence of e and u. Note
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that is is not possible to derive estimates of the factors
affecting the latent need for medical care separately from
those determining referral by estimating L5 or L6, so that
estimation of the ATM model (i.e. L5) is, in the UK
situation, less efficient than estimation of models which
incorporate sample separation. (For a discussion of the
advantages of sample separation in estimation of labour
supply functions, see Blundell et al.(1986) and in
estimation of cigarette consumption, Jones (1987)).
Finally, although the likelihood function L6 has
the same form as the Rand TPM (equation (3)), the
interpretation of the two models is different. The aim of
L5, and so of L6, is to model potential expenditure by the
insured on health care. The aim of the TPM is to explain
actual expenditure. If statistical tests permit the
researcher to accept L6 as a valid simplification of L5,
L6 still explains potential expenditure. If L6 can be
accepted, it means that it is possible to estimate
potential expenditure, using only those observations which
have positive actual expenditure. In other words, the
estimator of potential expenditure will be unbiased, even
though only individuals with positive actual expenditure
are used to estimate the parameters of the potential
expenditure function. On the other hand, the OLS equation
of the TPM (equation (5)) is used to estimate the
parameters of actual expenditure. Actual expenditure
depends on the institutional arrangements of the health
care market. These determine whether a latent demand for
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expenditure is realised.
Our primary aim is to estimate and test the three
equation model specified in the likelihood functions LO to
L4. However, for comparative purposes we also estimate
the ATM model, given by either L5 or L6. The nested
structure is presented in Figure 5.1. L6 is nested within
L5 and L4, L3(1), L3(2) and Li are nested within LO, but
L5 and L6 are not nested within LO, so that likelihood
ratio tests cannot be used to test the ATM specification
against the three equation model proposed here. However,
comparison of parameters and other specification tests
(such as score tests for normality) provide an informal
test of the relative goodness of fit of the two models.
Before turning to the estimation results, we first discuss
our hypotheses of the determinants of each part of the
claims process and review the data that has been used as
measures of these factors.
3.	 THE DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIMS
In brief, we assume the claims process to have the
following features. The decision to seek care is that of
the demander; the decision to 'go private' is the outcome
of negotiation between demander and supplier, based on
information and advice provided by the supplier of care,
and the level of private health care (once referred to the
private sector) is the decision of the supplier, acting as
the demander's (and perhaps his own) agent.
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3.1	 The decision to seek care
This is made by the insured person, perhaps in
consultation with other family members. For any state of
ill-health, the costs and benefits will primarily depend
on health status, but work or income related factors may
enter the decision and so may factors relating to the
supply of medical facilities (e.g. accessibility of care
providers).
3.2	 Referral to the private sector.
The decision to refer to the private sector is
ultimately made by the medical care provider (the GP), but
patients can have input to this decision. There is
considerable evidence that referral rates to the private
sector differ substantially across GPs (Gillam 1985; Dowie
1983), partly as a function of the GP's information about
public and private facilities, but also perhaps as a
function of attitudes to risk (Dowie 1983) and attitudes
to private care (Gillam 1985). In addition to these GP
related factors, the probability of referral will
obviously depend on the state of health of the demander.
It is also likely to be affected by the insurance cover of
the demander (for example, whether there are restrictions
on cover for certain states of ill-health), although in
general the scale of cover is not likely to affect the
probability of referral as most contracts are designed to
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provide full or near full cover. The probability of
referral is also likely to depend on the relative
availability of private and public sector facilities. For
example, a lower supply of private sector facilities
decreases the probability that a standard of treatment
equivalent to that provided in the NHS can be provided
locally in the private sector and this may increase the
relative access costs of private insured care (relative to
NHS care). Because of the geographical imbalance in the
distribution of private sector facilities, the probability
of referral is likely to be a function of location of the
demander.
3.3.	 Level of expenditure once referred
We assume the level of medical care given to the
sick person is exogenous to the demander and determined by
the supplier acting in response to the medical condition
of the demander, the insurance cover of the demander and
perhaps also to supply side factors unrelated to the
demander, such as the average occupancy rates of the
hospital. It has also been argued that suppliers acting
in a fee-for-service environment (such as the UK health
insurance reimbursement system) have an incentive to
persuade patients to accept more medical treatment than
the patient would have demanded had he or she had full
information. Obviously, the actions that would be taken
under this counterfactual are very difficult to establish,
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so that the existence and precise nature of 'supplier
inducement' is presently a much debated and as yet
unresolved issue (see for example, Parkin and Yule 1984).
There is currently no direct evidence for or against
inducement in the UK private sector. However, the
reimbursement system used by insurance companies does not
appear likely to constrain the activities of physicians to
any great extent. Private hospitals and physicians are
reimbursed by the insurance suppliers on a fee-for-service
basis. Measures to contain costs per case are limited.
Limits on the reimbursement provided within broad
categories of surgical intervention are part of the
insurance contract, and the contracts have limits on total
claims. But these measures are crude in comparison to
those employed in larger insurance based markets (e.g.
USA) and the upper limit on total claims is well in excess
of the average claim. In this situation, the level of
care is likely to be determined by the physician, on the
basis of medical need, but also acting in response to any
supply constraints. If a supply constraint, such as the
number of beds in a hospital, is binding, the incentive
may be to treat patients as quickly as possible to
maximize fee income. If this supply constraint is not
binding, then at the margin, suppliers may encourage
longer stays in hospital. Although not direct evidence of
supply inducement, the comparison made by Williams et al.
(1985a) between lengths of stay for common elective
surgical procedures in NHS beds, NHS pays beds and private
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hospital beds indicated that average lengths of stay in
the private hospital beds were significantly higher than
in NHS pay beds. This may be the result of a binding
supply constraint for NHS pay beds and a non-binding
constraint (the result of over-capacity) in the private
sector. If suppliers do respond in this way to supply
constraints we would expect factors relating to excess
capacity of private facilities, such as the number of beds
per capita in a district or region, to be determinants of
costs and so of claims.
3.4	 Data Sources for Model Estimation
The data for this research were drawn from four
sources; the computerised records of the largest health
insurance supplier in the UK, a postal questionnaire to a
sample of those insured by this company and DHSS and
private sector hospital statistics. None of these sources
could provide very detailed data. The data on claims
provided by the insurance company related to 1984 and the
postal questionnaire was sent to subscribers in early
1986; the retrospective nature of the questionnaire thus
limited the amount of detail that could be usefully
collected. The insurance company could not break down
costs to the level of the individual within a subscriber
unit, nor provide any data on the charges of the private
facilities used in a claim episode. The measures of the
variables discussed in sections 3.1 to 3.3 were therefore
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fairly broad but are similar to those used in the van de
Ven and van Praag analysis. The data and sources are
given in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Sources and Description of Variables Used in Analysis 
1. INSURER FILES
(All variables for 1984)
Variable Abbreviation Type Comments
Total claims in 1984
Age
Persons on registration
Scheme
Scale of cover
Any restriction on cover
Live in south east
Region of treatment
t-cost
age
piir
scheme
scale
restrict
south east
reg
c
c
c
d
d
d
d
d
(derived from date of birth)
B, C or U & S
missing for those with no claims
missing for C, U & S subscribers
derived from postcode
2. QUESTIONNAIRE
(All variables except self-assessed health status variables are for 1984)
Variable Abbreviation Type Comments
No.adults in subscriber unit
No.children
Member's health rated as good
Member worrying about health
Chronic illness member
Spouse's health
Spouse worry about health
Chronic illness spouse
Worry about children's health
Gross household income
Various measures of the
utilisation of health ser-
vices, public & private, by
adults and children
num adult
num children
mhealth good
mworry
msick
shealth good
sworry
ssick
cworry
income
c
c
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d&c
0/1 dummy variable
0/1 dummy variable
0/1 dummy variable
0/1 dummy variable
0/1 dummy variable
0/1 dummy variable
0/1 dummy variable
8 categories
3. DHSS and INDEPENDENT HOSPITAL SECTOR
(All variables for 1984)
Variable Abbreviation Type Comments
Wte NHS specialists in region
Gps in region
Private beds in region
Mean waiting time in region
speccap
GPcap
prbedcap
mwt
c
c
c
c
per 100	 persons
per 100	 persons
per 1000 persons
For all operative
procedures
wte = whole time equivalent
d indicates qualitative variable, c indicates a continuous variable
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From insurance company records we obtained data on
claims and insurance cover in 1984 for 7000 subscribers.
Two types of subscriber were sampled; subscribers with
self-purchased cover and those with cover purchased by an
employer, but the latter only for companies in which under
50 employees were covered. Sampling was proportional to
the size of the two groups. A postal questionnaire was
sent to all the sample, and the response rate was
approximately 45 percent. After exclusion of subscribers
with missing data on key variables, or living outside
England, Scotland or Wales or making a claim outside the
UK, the final sample size was 2893. Various checks for
differences between respondents and non-respondents were
made. The claims rate and level of claims of survey
respondents were compared to the rates for non-
respondents, but no significant differences were found.
There were also no significant differences in terms of
socio-economic characteristics or in mean level of claims
between survey respondents excluded from the final sample
on the basis of missing data and those included in the
final sample.
Claims could not be allocated to any one
particular individual in the subscriber unit without
considerable error, so the chosen unit of analysis was the
subscriber unit (an individual or family).
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4.	 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Our procedure was to estimate the set of nested
models discussed above, using log-likelihood ratio tests
to select between models, and tests of normality and
heteroscedasticity to test for misspecification of
functional form. All models were estimated using the
LIMDEP statistical package (Greene 1985).
Within the two broad types of subscribers in the
sample, there are actually three groups of subscribers;
subscribers with (small) company cover, subscribers with
modern individual cover and a small group of subscribers
who have an older type of individual cover. The first two
groups have essentially the same policies; in fact
purchasers in very small company cover groups (5 persons
in the group) may, in demographic terms, closely resemble
some self-employed individuals who purchase cover for
themselves and their families. The policies of these two
groups offer near full or full cover for permitted
treatments, though the subscriber chooses the scale of
cover. The lowest scale is designed to. fully cover
treatment in a small acute private hospital outside
London, the highest scale to fully cover treatment in a
hospital with the charges of a London teaching hospital.
The policies of the third group (known as Unit and
Standard subscribers) are quite different. These
subscribers may choose their own level of cover and some
of the policies chosen offer extremely little cover. As
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these policies have not been marketed since the mid 1970s
and can only be purchased by those who have been in these
schemes prior to the date of their withdrawal, the
subscribers differ significantly in age (and claims rate)
from other subscribers. Specification tests (reported
below) indicated that inclusion of this group led to
misspecification of functional form, specifically
heteroscedasticity of the error term. Such heterogeneity
in cross-sectional data is not uncommon and in
circumstances where the source of misspecification can be
identified, separate re-estimation for the different
socio-economic groups can improve the efficiency of the
model estimates (Blundell et al. 1986). The full set of
nested models was therefore estimated excluding this group
(278 subscriber units), although the final, preferred
models were re-estimated including this group for
comparative purposes.
The model structure is presented in Figure 5.1.
The likelihood ratio tests for the nested structure are
given on the lines linking the models. These tests
indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis of
independence of the probability of requiring any medical
care from the probability of making a claim (from the LR
test of model LO against model L1). Nor can we reject
independence of the probability of requiring any medical
treatment and the level of claims (from the LR test of
151
1
No sample
separation
I 
112
I
Sample separation
I-
Independence of w and u
I
Fig. 5.1
Nesting of the estimated models and LR tests of model specification 
(a) Three part model 
LO*
[
Independence of w and e
X (1) = 0.1
Li*
I
X(1) = 1.2
1 
1113(1)+L3(2)
I
Independence of e and u
X(1) = 17.4
I 
1113(1) + 114
(b) Adjusted Tobit Model 
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I
Independence of e and u
A(1) = 17
1
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* The claims equations for these models estimated by a Heckman two step
estimator for a bivariate probit model with sample selection
Assumptions on stochastic process given on lines joining models.
A(r) = 2[LogLu - LogLr], LogLu = unrestricted loglikelihood,
LogLr = restricted loglikelihood, r = number of restrictions
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model Li against model L3(1) and L3(2)). However, we can
reject the hypothesis of no sample selection
(equivalently, independence of the probability of making a
claim and the level of that claim) (from the LR test of
L3(1) and L3(2) against L3(1) and L4).
These results indicate that the probability of
requiring any care can be estimated as an independent
probit equation, using all observations in the sample, and
the probability of making a claim and the level of that
claim can be estimated by a model that allows for sample
selection, using only those observations with positive
medical care. The parameter estimates for this model
(equations L3(1) and L3(2)) are presented in Table 5.2
together with diagnostic tests of misspecification. The
test for normality used is that proposed by Bera, Jarque
and Lee (1984), the test for heteroscedasticity that
proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1984) (also used in
Chapter 4). The tests for normality indicate that the
error terms in both the probability of any medical need or
the probability of making a claim equation would appear to
be distributed normally. However, the specification tests
for heteroscedasticity indicate misspecification due to
income and age in the medical need decision equation.
To remove these sources of misspecification it may
be necessary to estimate this equation separately for
different age/sex groups (or equivalently, and perhaps
more powerfully, include interactions between the health
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Table 5.2
Models L3(1) and 13(2) 
Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
(a) Medical need [Model L3(1)]
	
.(n = 2212)
intercept 1.262 0.365 3.45
numadult 0.643 0.132 4.87
numchild 0.167 0.004 3.85
mhealthgood
-0.311 0.102 -3.05
mworry
-0.179 0.087 -2.05
msick 0.521 0.121 4.30
shealthgood -0.157 0.126 -1.24
sworry
-0.265 0.116 -2.28
ssick 0.351 0.159 2.20
age
-0.052 0.015 -3.48
age2 0.0005 0.00015 3.68
income 0.019 0.021 0.89
Loglikelihood - 785
Normality 1.186
	 (5.99)
Heteroscedasticity
income 92.6	 (3.84)
age, age2 94.3	 (5.99)
(b) Referral [Model L3(2)]
(n = 1912)
intercept -0.598 0.312 -1.91
numadult 0.073 0.106 0.69
numchild 0.029 0.039 0.76
mhealthgood -0.212 0.074 -2.89
msick 0.297 0.081 3.69
shealthgood -0.082 0.083 -0.99
ssick 0.199 0.093 2.11
age -0.025 0.013 -2.08
age2 0.00037 0.0001 3.02
income 0.051 0.017 2.89
piir 0.133 0.039 3.35
company scheme 0.209 0.071 2.95
prbedcap 0.004 0.002 1.51
Normality 0.55 (3.84)
Heteroscedasticity
income 7.64 (3.84)
age, age2 7.193 (5.99)
... continued ...
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(c) level of claims
intercept .
adult outpat nhs
adult outpat priv
adult inpat stays
tsnhsd
tsprivd
child outpat nhs
child outpat priv
child inpat nhs
child inpat priv
numadult
numchild
prbedcap
income
company cover
scale
a
Loglikelihood
Table 5.2	 ... continued ...
Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
4.802 0.4119 11.659
0.127 0.047 2.697
0.096 0.025 3.872
0.277 0.120 2.31
-0.443 0.273 -1.62
1.406 0.175 8.203
0.03 0.074 0.411
0.048 0.050 0.96
0.011 0.167 0.067
0.589 0.127 4.26
-0.216 0.1146 -1.884
-0.056 0.045 -1.237
0.00437 0.0039 1.11
0.0091 0.024 0.38
0.287 0.097 2.96
-0.0398 0.083 -0.466
1.157 0.032 35.791
2496.2
critical x2 values given in brackets next to score tests
variable names 
numadults: number adults in family
numchild: number children in family
mhealthgood: good health member
shealthgood: good health spouse
mworry: member hardly ever worry about health
msick: member has chronic illness
ssick: spouse has chronic illness
age: age of member
age2 = age x age, where age = age of oldest member of subscriber unit
income (categorical variable)
piir: number of persons covered by policy
company scheme: company purchased policy
prbedcap: private beds per capita x 1000 in region
adult output nhs: number of adult outpatient visits nhs
adult output priv: total number of adult outpatient visits private
tsnhsd: dummy variable with value 1 if any inpatient stays (adult) in nhs
tsprivd: dummy variable with value 1 if any inpatient (adult) stays in
private sector
scale: scale of cover provided by policy (1 = highest, 3 = lowest).
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variables and age/sex dummies as part of the set of
regressors). This first equation is essentially a single
equation model of the demand for health care. When
estimating such a model using a larger data set from the
General Household Survey, Winter (1987) found evidence of
misspecification when estimating a single model for all
age/sex groups. Further, he found that estimation of the
same model for different age/sex groups separately
resulted in a significant fall in misspecification. As our
interest is primarily to estimate the factors that affect
private insurance claims, rather than to estimate the
demand for any medical care, and the LR tests indicate
independence of the medical need equation from the claims
equations, we did not seek to further model the first
equation. Tests for misspecification of the probability of
making a claim equation show that heteroscedasticity in
income and age does not appear to be a large problem in
this second equation. Thus the parameter estimates for
this equation would appear to be reasonably consistent.
We turn now to a discussion of the parameter
estimates of the estimated model (Table 5.2). To
facilitate the estimation we omitted, in all three
equations, variables with coefficient estimates that were
small in absolute value, poorly defined, which did not
covary with those of other coefficients and which did not
significantly affect the goodness of fit of the model.
Loglikelihood ratio tests indicated that omission of these
regressors did not significantly reduce the explanatory
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power of the model.
4.1	 The determinants of medical need
Approximately 85 percent of subscriber units had
some positive contact with a supplier of medical care in
the survey year. As might be expected, this decision
appears to be associated primarily with measures of health
status. From the first part of Table 5.2 it can be seen
that self rating of health as good and worry about health
as low by both head and (where present) spouse is
negatively associated with the probability of needing
medical care. Either the head or the spouse having a long
term chronic condition is positively associated with the
probability of positive medical care. The relationship
between age and need for care appears to be non-linear.
The coefficient on age (measured in years) is negative,
the coefficient on age2 is positive. The coefficient on
the income terms is small and not significantly different
from zero. Thus the probability of requiring medical need
does not appear to be strongly or significantly associated
with income. This perhaps might be expected, given that
the sample of individuals is primarily drawn from higher
income groups (see the results of Chapter 4) and that
preliminary contact in the health care system is with the
zero money cost NHS. Neither supply side variables nor
features of the insurance contract appear to be
significantly associated with the probability of having
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any contact (estimates presented in Table 5.2 exclude
these variables). Again, given the limited nature of the
insurance cover, the latter result is unsurprising.
4.2	 The probability of making a claim in the survey
year
It was hypothesised that the probability of making
a claim would be associated with both demand and supply
factors. This hypothesis appears to be supported from the
results presented in the second part of Table 5.2. The
signs of the health status measures are of the expected
direction. Those who rate themselves as in poorer health
or are in poorer health as measured by chronic illness
are more likely to make a claim. Even controlling for
health status (as measured in the data set), age of the
demander appears to be significantly associated with the
probability of making a claim, though again the effect is
non-linear. Interestingly, income is significantly and
positively associated with the probability of making a
claim, though the coefficient is not large.
As expected, the probability of making a claim is
significantly associated with features of the insurance
contract. The results show, as might be expected, that
the more persons covered by this insurance contract the
more likely it is that the subscriber unit will make a
claim. But the results also show that those subscribers
with company cover are significantly more likely to make a
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claim. The reason for this difference in probability of
making a claim between company covered and self-covered
individuals with similar insurance policies is not clear.
It may occur because self-covered individuals think that
they may face restrictions on their cover in future years
as a result of current claims, whilst those covered by
their company do not expect (or even have knowledge of)
the use of restrictions. It may be the case that
individuals covered by corporate cover are of higher risk
(or rather, of higher risk in terms of the type of cover
provided by health insurance). As perhaps some evidence
of this difference in risk, the claims rate rose in the
late 1970s/early 1980s as the private health insurance
companies extended their sales to the corporate sector.
For the three leading provident associations (BUPA, PPP,
WPA) benefits paid out as a proportion of subscriptions
rose sharply from an average of about 70% in the years
1977-1979 to 95% in 1981. This ratio in 1984 was 82%
which is close to the long term average (Laing (1987)).
It was thought that this sharp rise might have been due to
the higher than expected claims rate of the dependents of
the employer covered individuals. As we could not
identify the source of a claim within a subscriber unit we
could not use our data to further explore this hypothesis,
but differences in risk might be one explanation for the
higher claims rate of subscriber units with corporate
cover.
Finally, we hypothesised that the claims rate
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might be affected by the relative availability of private
and public health care facilities. The model indicates a
positive association, significant at the 10 percent level,
between the number of specialists per capita in the health
region and the probability of having a positive claim.
Unfortunately, the geographical imbalance in the
distribution of private sector facilities means that it is
not possible to separate the effect of private sector
availability from any other factors which are also
geographically unevenly distributed and are not measured
in the data (for example wealth).
4.3	 The level of claims (conditional on a claim being
made)
From the results presented in the third part of
Table 5.2 the principal correlates of the level of claims
appear to be the extent of utilisation of the private
sector by both adults and children in the household, and,
to a smaller extent, the utilisation of NHS facilities by
adults, and the source of purchase of the insurance.
Measures of utilisation of medical care reflect
health status, but measures of private sector utilisation
are also, by definition, one component of expenditure. To
avoid the problem of regressors simply being
definitionally associated with the regressand (rather than
being determinants of the regressand), two dummy variables
were created, the first with value one if any inpatient
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stays were in the private sector, the second with value
one if any inpatient stays were in the public sector.
These were used as regressors together with continuous
variables measuring the total number of inpatient stays
and out-patient visits. Children's and adults' stays and
visits were treated as separate variables.
The results indicate that subscriber units with
higher use of the private sector have higher claims. The
positive signs of the coefficients measuring private
utilisation were expected. However, it is interesting to
note that NHS inpatient utilisation is also positively and
significantly associated with the level of claims. Adult
NHS out-patient utilisation/visits to specialists is also
positively associated with the leel of claims, though the
coefficient is not well determined. The negative
coefficient of the NHS inpatient stay dummy variable does
not indicate that NHS utilisation is negatively associated
with claims; rather, it indicates that those with
inpatient stays have lower claims if the stay has been in
the NHS rather than the private sector. The positive
association between measures of NHS utilisation and claims
suggests that private sector utilisation may be co-
temporaneous with the use of NHS secondary care. We
cannot know from the analysis whether this is because
patients move from NHS secondary care to private sector
secondary care or vice versa. It is also interesting that
utilisation by children of the NHS is not associated with
the level of claims. Perhaps adults are prepared to move
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between sectors for their care, but do not move children.
It may also be the case that the nature of a child's
health care episode is different from an adult's episode.
Such differences cannot be easily inferred from the data
here.
There appears to be no significant association
between self-assessed health status, having a chronic
illness, age or income and the level of claims. The last
result is interesting, given the association between
income and the probability of making a claim. The
negative (but poorly defined) coefficient on presence of a
second adult in the household may indicate that those
subscribers who do not live on their own have a shorter
duration of treatment, perhaps because there are
individuals in the home who can provide substitutes for
the nursing care provided in hospital.
The association between scale of cover and level of
claims is in the expected direction, indicating that those
with higher scale cover have higher claims, but perhaps
surprisingly, the parameter estimate is small and not
well-defined. This lack of association might occur
because the different scales really only apply to the
inpatient stay component of a claim, so that the costs of
all other parts of a claims are similar across different
scales of cover. The data was such that we could not
further investigate this. It is interesting that company
cover is associated with higher levels of claims, as well
as a higher probability of making a claim. Finally, there
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would appear to be no significant association between the
number of private facilities in a region (and so perhaps
average occupancy rates) and the level of claims. If the
cost of stay is related to supply side factors the measure
used in the present analysis are too crude capture this
effect.
4.4
	 Re-estimation including Unit and Standard
subscribers
The probability of having any medical care and the
probability of having a claim equations were re-estimated
including observations with Unit and Standard
subscriptions (these subscribers having been omitted from
the earlier analysis on ground of the lower coverage of
their policies. Estimation was carried out under the
hypothesis of independence of the two decisions. The same
equations were also estimated using only Unit and Standard
observations. The results are presented in Table 5.3.
A comparison of the estimates of the probability
of having any medical care derived with and without this
group of observations (the first equations of Tables 5.3
and 5.2 respectively) indicates that the coefficients are
of similar sign and magnitude. A comparison of the
score statistics for misspecification indicates
misspecification in this equation whether estimated with
or without the U and S subscribers. A loglikelihood ratio
test indicates that inclusion of the U and S subscribers
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Table 5.3
Estimation including unit and standard subscribers 
All observations including U & S 	 U & S only 
coefficient standard error 	 coefficient standard error
a) medical need
intercept 0.927 0.33 2.85 2.11
numadult 0.664 0.12 0.72 0.33
numchild 0.111 0.039 -0.18 0.11
mhealthgood -0.293 0.093 -0.24 0.25
mworry -0.191 0.081 -0.189 0.25
msick 0.486 0.105 0.47 0.23
shealthgood -0.117 0.117 0.23 0.36
sworry -0.251 0.109 -0.23 0.36
ssick 0.334 0.144 0.23 0.37
age -0.032 0.013 -0.077 0.068
age2 -0.00031 0.00013 0.0005 0.0005
income 0.0065 0.019 -0.11 0.057
loglikelihood -914.4 -114.61
normality 4.49 (5.99) 10.29 (5.99)
heteroscedasticity
income 84.06 (3.84) 3.52 (3.84)
age, age2 87.9 ( 5 .99) 4.569 (5.99)
n 2490 278
b) probability of claims
intercept	 -0.59 0.312
numadult -0.073 0.1055
numchild 0.029 0.039
mhealthgood -0.21 0.073
msick 0.29 0.080
shealthgood -0.08 0.083
ssick 0.199 0.095
age -0.0025 0.012
age2 0.00036 0.0001
income 0.059 0.018
piir 0.133 0.04
schl 0.281 0.07
sch2 -5.08 13.74
prbedcap 0.0039 0.0026
loglikelihood -1233.9
normality 37.54 (5.99)
heteroscedasticity
income 190.5 (3.84)
age, age2 190.9 (5.99)
n 2139
... continued ...
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Table 5.3	 ... continued ...
critical x 2 values given in brackets next to score tests
variable names 
numadults: number adults in family
numchild: number children in family
mhealthgood: good health member
shealthgood: good health spouse
mworry: hardly ever worry about health, member
msick: member has chronic illness
ssick: spouse has chronic illness
age: age of member
age2 = age x age
income (categorical variable)
piir: number of persons covered by policy
company scheme: company purchased policy
prbedcap: private beds per capita x1000 in region
adult output nhs: number of adult outpatient visits nhs
adult output priv: total number of adult outpatient visits private
tsnhsd: dummy variable with value 1 if any inpatient stays (adult) in nhs
tsprivd: dummy variable with value 1 if any inpatient (adult) stays in
private sector
scale: scale of cover provided by policy (1 = highest, 3 = lowest).
does not significantly improve the goodness-of-fit of this
equation. The parameter estimates of this equation for the
U and S subscribers only are poorly defined. This is
not surprising given the small size of sample.
To estimate the probability of making any claim
using all observations the dummy variable for company
cover was replaced by two variables. The first was
positive if the subscriber unit had company cover, the
second positive if the subscriber had a U and S
subscription. (These dummies are variables schl and sch2
respectively). The parameter estimates of this equation
estimated with all subscribers are virtually identical to
those of the model estimated without the U and S
subscribers. The parameter estimate of the dummy variable
for U and S subscription is very large and negative,
though poorly defined. The sign and size were expected
given the zero claims of the latter group. However,
inspection of the score tests for misspecification for
this equation, given in Table 5.3, indicates that
inclusion of the U and S group significantly increases
model misspecification. For this reason, observations
with U and S subscriptions were omitted from the main
analysis.
4.5
	
Comparison with ATM specification
The difference between the ATM specification and
the three part model presented above is that the ATM does
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not distinguish between the probability of having positive
medical need and the probability of having a claim.
Therefore, under the ATM, the probability of having a
positive claim is estimated using all observations in the
sample. For the three part model the parameters of this
likelihood are estimated using only those observations
with positive medical need. However, as only 15 percent
of the sample did not have medical need, we would perhaps
not expect the parameter estimates for the ATM to be very
different from the parameter estimates of the second two
equations of the 3 part model discussed above.
Estimates of the ATM model are presented in Table
5.4. The loglikelihood ratio test for the Sample
Selection Model against an independent probit and OLS
specification of the ATM rejects the latter
specification, although, as in the van de Ven and van
Praag analysis, the estimated correlation coefficient
between the error terms of the two equations is not
significant. (Van de Ven and van Praag did not carry out
the LR test for independence). The parameter estimates for
the probability of making a positive claim are similar in
both the ATM and our 3 part model when both models are
estimated without the U and S subscribers. The
specification tests indicate heteroscedasticity is a
problem for the probit equation of the ATM model.
Heteroscedasticity is a problem in the first probit
equation of our proposed three equation model, but not in
the second (which corresponds to the only probit equation
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Table 5.4
Adjusted Tobit Model 
Coefficient Standard error t -ratio
(a) probability of any claims
(n = 2212)
intercept -0.728 0.297 -2.45
numadult 0.169 0.101 1.681
numchild 0.054 0.037 1.488
mhealth -0.267 0.0705 -3.788
msick 0.369 0.077 4.769
shealth -0.11 0.0807 -1.369
ssick 0.246 0.092 2.66
age -0.033 0.116 -2.85
age2 0.00044 0.00011 3.83
income 0.05 0.016 3.01
piir 0.137 0.038 3.55
company cover 0.206 0.067 3.06
prbedcap 0.0047 0.0025 1.89
Normality 2.19 (5.99)
Beteroscedasticity
income 21.3 (3.84)
age, age2 21.4 (5.99)
(b)	 level of	 claims
(n = 813)
intercept 4.808 0.39 12.15
adult outpat nhs 0.127 0.044 2.88
adult outpat priv 0.095 0.024 3.916
total inpat stays 0.277 0.123 2.24
tsnhsd -0.44 0.25 -1.79
tsprivd 0.41 0.17 8.27
child outpat nhs 0.304 0.073 0.412
child outpat priv 0.048 0.046 1.028
child inpat nhs 0.011 0.12 0.091
child inpat priv 0.589 0.157 3.736
numadult -0.212 0.116 -1.906
numchild -0.056 0.043 -1.26
prbedcap 0.0043 0.0038 1.136
income 0.085 0.024 0.35
company cover 0.284 0.097 2.93
scale -0.039 0.08 -0.485
a 1.13 0.031 36.75
p(1,2) 0.0686 0.158 0.432
Loglikelihood -2610
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Table 5.4	 . continued ...
critical x2 values given in brackets next to score tests
variable names 
numadults: number adults in family
numchild: number children in family
mhealthgood: good health member
shealthgood: good health spouse
mworry: hardly ever worry about health, member
msick: member has chronic illness
ssick: spouse has chronic illness
age: age of member
age2 = age x age
income (categorical variable)
piir: number of persons covered by policy
company scheme: company purchased policy
prbedcap: private beds per capita x1000 in region
adult output nhs: number of adult outpatient visits nhs
adult output priv: total number of adult outpatient visits private
tsnhsd: dummy variable with value 1 if any inpatient stays (adult) in nhs
tsprivd: dummy variable with value 1 if any inpatient (adult) stays in
private sector
scale: scale of cover provided by policy (1 = highest, 3 = lowest).
of the ATM). As the three equation model and the ATM are
not nested, we cannot test the appropriateness of the two
models using LR tests. However, the collapse of two
different decisions into one equation in the ATM, the
resulting loss of information and the test results
indicating misspecification of functional form of the
probability of claims equation all suggest that on both
theoretical and empirical grounds our three part model is
more appropriate for the UK market.
CONCLUSIONS
The estimation results indicate that the level of
claims/expenditure in the UK private health insurance
market can be modelled as a three equation process, with
independence of the first equation and weak dependence of
the second and third. The analysis supports the
hypothesis that the three different processes are
associated with different (though overlapping) sets of
variables. Parameter estimates give some support to prior
hypotheses. Health status appears to be a significant
determinant of the probability of having any medical care,
health insurance and financial status appear to be
determinants of the probability of having a claim and the
level of claims appears dependent upon utilisation of the
NHS, proxies for health status, and the extent of
utilisation of the private sector. Further, tests suggest
that the three part model is more appropriate in the UK
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context than the ATM model.
Further investigation is required to examine the
effect of supply-side factors on the claims process.
Although the coefficients on supply side variables were of
the expected sign, none of these were well determined. It
may be the case that the variables used were too crude a
measure of the supply side factors which affect claims,
but it may also be the case that the demander is an
inappropriate unit of analysis for an investigation of the
impact of supply side factors on claims. An alternative
approach would be to select a sample of suppliers (private
sector hospitals) and to examine the relationship between
claims and characteristics of the suppliers (for example
occupancy rates, organizational aims, market position).
More research is also required to investigate the
relationship between the type of cover provided and claims
or expenditure. The current analysis has indicated that
there are significant differences in claims rate between
the three groups of subscribers in the sample. The lower
claims rate of the United and Standard subscribers can be
explained by the limited cover provided by these
contracts. But the difference between individual and
company purchase cannot be explained by differences in
cover. The two latter groups have essentially the same
policies, although the cost for corporate subscribers is
lower (or zero). We have offered reasons for this
difference in the discussion above; it would seem a
subject worth investigating in greater depth.	 Finally,
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because of missing data, we were not able to fully
investigate the effect on the probability of making a
claim or on the level of claims of restrictions on the
insurance cover. For individual purchasers with full
cover, having one or more restrictions did not appear to
be significantly associated with either the probability of
making a claim or the level of claims. However, without
better data it is not possible to know whether this result
is specific to this group, is due to the small size of the
sample, or is applicable to all subscriber groups.
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CHAPTER 6
ESTIMATION OF THE VALUE OF WAITING TIME
One of the recurrent themes of this thesis is the
effect of time costs on the choice between public and
private health care. However, there is little published
data on the cost of time spent in receipt of, or waiting
for, health care. In our simulation of the model of
Chapter 2, we had to rely on values based on hourly wages;
in our econometric estimation of the same model, we used
proxies for the value of time.
	
As we noted in the
discussion of the estimation results, the use of proxies
is not a desirable approach. In the present chapter, we
seek to remedy, in part, this lack of data. We present
research designed to provide estimates of the monetary
value of the disutility of time spent on waiting lists for
non-urgent medical treatment in the NHS (hereafter
referred to as 'waiting list time'). The aim was to derive
these estimates from trade-offs made by demanders between
waiting time and money. The nature of the health system
meant that these trade-offs could not be observed with
sufficient precision to permit estimation from revealed
preference data, so instead we used data derived from
stated intentions.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. We
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begin with a discussion of the different types of cost
that may be associated with the use of waiting lists in
the NHS. In the second section we review the theories of
time proposed in economics, outline an extension to these
theories which permits estimation of the value of time
using discrete choice data and discuss the applicability
of these approaches to our aim of estimation of the value
of waiting list time. We end this section with a
discussion of the data requirements for an estimation of
the value of waiting list time. This involves examining
those data which are currently available and outlining the
relative merits of data based on stated intentions and
data based on observed actions. In the third section we
look in more detail at the issues that have arisen in the
collection of 'intentions' data for the current study.
The issues include the choice of type of question, the
choice of a context within which respondents are asked to
make choices and the choice of population from which to
draw respondents. In section 4 we present the precise
specification of the econometric model which was used to
derive estimates of the money value of a unit of waiting
list time. The estimates from this model are discussed in
section 5. We conclude with a brief discussion of issues
which would have to be considered in any application of
the methodology or the study findings.
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1.	 THE COSTS OF NHS WAITING LISTS
As we noted in the introductory chapter to this
thesis, it is widely recognised that time has an important
role in the allocation of medical care, particularly, but
not exclusively, in health care systems in which
allocation by money price is relatively unimportant.
Various aspects of this 'generalized cost' of medical care
have been studied, and recently attention has been drawn
to the specific role and costs of waiting lists (Lindsay
and Feigenbaum 1984; Cullis and Jones 1985, 1986; Iversen
1987). As outlined in Chapter 1, Lindsay and Feigenbaum
(LF) have argued that the costs associated with waiting
per se are zero; the costs of a waiting list arise from
the effect of delay in receipt of treatment on the value
of the medical care. We considered a number of arguments
against this assumption in Chapter 1; in this chapter we
wish to consider in more detail the types of cost that may
be associated with waiting lists.
It is useful to separate out the costs (and the
concomitant disutility) which arise from treatment from
those which arise from the wait itself. The first category
corresponds to the type of costs enveloped into the LF
'decay rate'. Such costs include, presumably, the impact
of a wait on the difficulty of treatment and the attendant
risks of medical complications, the pain and discomfort
associated with treatment and the effect of a wait on the
efficacy of treatment, as measured by future health
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status. In the LF analysis, decay in patient health is
seen as a factor which makes the eventual treatment worth
less, but it is unclear whether the costs of time spent in
ever poorer states of health whilst waiting is a component
of the decay rate. However, it is clear that in the LF
framework there are no costs associated with waiting for
treatment for a disease with zero deterioration over the
period of wait other than those induced by a positive rate
of time preference. But it would seem that there are
other costs which arise from waiting per se. First,
depending on the state of ill-health, the person waiting
for care may be restricted in his or her ability to
perform work and/or leisure activities. This may have
direct financial consequences, but even if there is no
financial cost, may be a source of disutility. Second,
the wait may be associated with anxiety over both the
nature of treatment and the outcome. The longer the wait,
the longer the waiter will have these anxieties. Third,
if the length of wait is not known at the outset, there
may be disutility associated with the uncertainty of date
of treatment. Finally, a wait may result in costs for
individuals associated with the person on the waiting
list. For example, the costs of providing care for the
sick person, or loss of income for those dependent on the
sick person for financial support or the costs of living
with an anxious person.
The aim of the present analysis is to estimate the
monetary value of the disutility that may result from this
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second category of costs, i.e. those which arise from the
wait itself. Specifically, we wish to derive from
demanders the monetary value of the disutility (to
themselves) of a unit increase in the length of wait for
an illness with zero decay rate. The advantage of a
monetary figure is that is can be used in analyses in
which the unit of measurement is money or income. For
example, it can be used to derive an estimate of the total
costs of waiting lists for demanders, or as an input to
social cost benefit analysis. (The use of a monetary
figure based on private calculus in social costs benefit
analysis is discussed at the end of this chapter).
To date, there has been only one estimate of the
costs of NHS waiting lists and this used the LF framework
(Cullis and Jones 1986). The authors argued that the
maximum cost to consumers of waiting is the price of
private sector care (for the treatment for which the
consumer is waiting) and the minimum cost is zero. Their
argument is as follows. For the marginal joiner, the
benefits of joining the lists are equal to the (fixed)
cost of joining i.e. the wait dissipates all benefits of
treatment above the cost of joining the queue. If the
benefits of treatment are marginally lower, the individual
will not join the list, but instead would seek private
treatment. The maximum cost of being on the list is
therefore the price of private treatment. Specification
of the minimum cost as zero hinges on the assumption that
waiting per se imposes no costs. 	 Using this argument,
177
they calculate the total annual costs of waiting lists to
be equal to the number of waiters multiplied by the mean
wait multiplied by half the average cost of private sector
treatment. (The distribution of costs across waiters is
assumed uniform, with a maximum of the price of private
sector care and a minimum of zero. Therefore the mean cost
is 0.5 times the average private sector cost). Using this
approach they derive an estimate of the cost of waiting
lists of between 9.1 and 16.2 percent of the NHS total
budget.
The aim of this research is to derive estimates of
the value of time spent on waiting lists from trade-offs
made by individuals between waiting list time and cost.
These values can be used to derive estimates of the costs
of waiting lists by multiplying the estimate of the
average value of waiting list time by the average wait.
2.	 MEASURING THE VALUE OF WAITING TIME
To estimate a monetary value of the disutility of
waiting list time three separate strands of research have
to be brought together. First we have to establish the
economic basis for measures of the value of time. Second,
the model used has to have properties which permit
empirical estimation in the health care context which
leads to the formulation of the model in terms of the
'random utility' theory of discrete choice. Third, we
have to consider the statistical requirements for the
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estimation of the model.
2.1	 Micro-economic theory of the value of time
We do not intend to review the general discussion
of time allocation within a utility framework in any
detail, but rather wish to use some of the ideas in this
literature to discuss the nature of waiting list time and
how the disutility of waiting time may be estimated.
In an early discussion of the economics of time, Becker
(1965) proposed that the standard direct utility function
of the consumer, with commodities as the arguments, be
respecified in terms of activities, each of which has a
certain requirement in terms of both commodities and time.
Consumers face a total time constraint of 24 hours per
day, so time enters the indirect utility function, but is
not an argument of the direct utility function. Models
more recently proposed in transport economics (e.g. Truong
and Hensher (1985)) follow de Serpa (1971) who modelled
time as an argument of the direct utility function as well
as a constraint on utility maximization.
De Serpa (1971) assumed that direct utility is
derived from a vector of commodities, plus a vector of
time spent in various activities (the effect on utility of
the components of the time vector can be either negative
or positive). The individual maximises utility subject to
a set of constraints. First, there are budget constraints
on income and the total amount of time. Second, de Serpa
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introduces the idea of a 'technologically' fixed amount
of time required for the consumption of each commodity.
Formally , the model is as follows (we follow MVA et al.
(1987) in our outline):
max U =
	 (1)
x,t
subject to
w.tw + y 2 p.x
T	 2 1 .J t . + tw J
t i	 2 t*J
tw	 2 t*w
where
x = vector of goods,
t j = unit of time spent in activity j, j =
tw = time spent at work,
p = price of goods,
t* = technologically defined minimum amount of timeJ
spent in activity j,
y = income
The Lagrangean is given by
L = U(x,t) + X(w.tw + y - p.x)
+ p(T - It i - tw ) +
Ø( tw - t) + 1 yti - tI)
	 (2)
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and differentiating with respect to x, t and t w
 we get
611/5x j - Xp j 	= 0
bU/Ot i - p + iiii	 =0
SU/5tw - p + . Xw + 0 = 0
From these first order conditions, de Serpa obtained
expressions for the 'marginal valuation of time' spent in
any activity. For activity j, this is the ratio of the
marginal utility of time spent in activity j to the
marginal utility of income and is given by
(51J/6t
J
-)/X = p /X - tpi/X
	 (3)
The marginal valuation of time in activity j therefore
represents the consumer's willingness to pay for a unit of
time in activity j. It is a function of the difference
between the opportunity cost of time per se (from the
constraints on total time available to the consumer) and
the marginal value of saving/reducing time spent in
activity j (from the technological constraints).
In transport economics, interest has focused upon
the value of reduction of time spent on transit mode j.
From equation (3) this is given by
value of time saved in activity j = resource value
of time - valuation of time spent in activity j.
There has been some discussion as to whether it is
possible to distinguish between the two separate
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components that make up the value of time saved in
activity j (Bates 1987; Truong and Hensher 1987). In
this analysis we follow Bates in arguing that the resource
value of time (the value of pure leisure) and the marginal
valuation of time spent in activity j are theoretical
constructs that can not be separated in empirical
estimation. In estimation, the analyst can only derive
estimates of the value of reducing time spent in activity
j. For activities which give disutility, the marginal
valuation of time will be negative, so the value of time
saved will be greater than the resource value of leisure
time.
The de Serpa model provides a basis for estimation
of the value of the marginal unit of time saved in the
context in which the demander can choose any level of the
arguments of the utility function. In our case (and for
the analysis of the use of time spent in a transit mode),
the possibilities of empirical measurement of the value of
time are confined, almost entirely, to situations
involving choices between discrete alternatives. For
example, an individual in need of medical care can either
choose to wait on a list until called into hospital or to
'go private', in which case the wait is zero. He cannot
trade off units of waiting time and units of money at the
margin. Given this type of data it is necessary to use a
model appropriate to situations of discrete choice.
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2.2	 Extension to discrete choice
Truong and Hensher (1985) (hereafter TH) extended
the de Serpa analysis to situations of discrete choice.
The consumer's problem is given by
max IP(G,q,t1,...,tn)	 (4)
subject to
y  pG + ljdjcj	 (5)
T  q + Edjtj	 (6)
t i  tl
	 (7)
where G is the quantity of a generalized consumption good,
q is time spent in a 'generalized' activity (including
work) and tj and cj are the time and money costs of the
alternatives, j = 1,...,J and the d j are dummies
indicating which choice is made, suchthatd-=1 if3
choice j is made and 0 otherwise. 	 The Lagrangean is
given as
L = U'(G,q,ti,...,tn) + X(y- pG - Idc)
4- P(T - q - Ed i t i ) + li liTyt i - t3)
and the first order conditions as
6U'/Ox = Xp	 (8)
6U 1 /6q = p	 (9)
61P/5t j = dj p - djq)j	 ( 1 0)
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From equations (4) to (10) a conditional direct
utility function can be derived using a first order
approximation to the direct utility function and
substituting in the first order conditions and the total
income and time budget constraints. An indirect utility
function is specified because it is assumed that when a
consumer chooses between alternatives only the best of an
alternative is compared to the best of another
alternative. This indirect utility function is given by
U' = a + X(y - c j ) + pT - tli j t j 	 (11)
Once the indirect utility function is defined, a
probabilistic choice model can be formulated to permit
estimation. Following the economics of transport
literature, we adopted the random utility model (McFadden
1974). In this model it is assumed that the (indirect)
utility of individual i of option j can be specified as
Uij = Vij + eij
where Vij is a deterministic component and e ij a random
error, assumed uncorrelated with V. The stochastic
specification of Uij means that is is possible to speak of
the probability that alternative j is chosen, as a
function of the relative values of V ij (j = 1,...,J) and
the assumed distribution of the stochastic term.
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Specifically, the probability that alternative j is chosen
rather than any other alternative, say j', can be
expressed as
= Pr[(Vij + eij ) > (Vij , + e)]
The assumptions made about the distribution of the
error term determine the type of model to be estimated. In
the case of choice between two alternatives, two
distributions are commonly used. The errors are specified
as i.i.d. with either a normal or Weibull distribution.
Using the first assumption the binomial probit model can
be derived, using the second, the binomial logit model.
It is generally assumed, though not necessary for
estimation, that Vij is a linear function of the
attributes of alternative j and choice-maker i, i.e.
Vij	 = xi 'j
where xij = are the attributes of choice j as perceived
by choice maker i
g_ = vector of weights, fixed across individuals
We assume that the deterministic component of
utility of each choice can be specified as equation (11)
i.e. for individual i and choice j, Vij = U', where U' is
as in (11). When making a choice between two
alternatives, terms common to both alternatives are
irrelevant and can be omitted.	 Therefore, at its
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simplest, the deterministic element of the random utility
formulation of the problem given in equations (4) to (11)
is given by
Vi =- - Aci - 11)jti	 . (12)
where c j and t j
 are the cost and time attributes of
activity j respectively. As in the continuous model, the
ratio of the time and cost coefficients can be interpreted
as the value of the utility of saving time in activity j.
We have used this framework to analyse the value
of time saving in health care. We have adopted the
assumption that the deterministic element of the random
utility model for the choice between two health care
alternatives which have different waiting times and costs
can be specified as
17.=--AcJ--11).t-J 
	 J J
where c j is now the money cost of alternative j, and Tj
the length of waiting time. The coefficients A and 11)j
are derived from estimation and can be interpreted as
scale transformations of the marginal utilities of cost
and time respectively (Fowkes and Wardman 1988). The
ratio of the time and cost coefficients can be interpreted
as the value of saving waiting time in health care choice
J.
The Becker and de Serpa analyses and extensions
(13)
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thereto all assume that the uses of time are mutually
exclusive. These models do not address the question of
non-exclusive uses of time. Waiting for care on a waiting
list is a non-exclusive use of time. However, as an
individual on a waiting list for medical care is in a
state of health that is less good than his normal state,
being on a waiting list does have an effect on the
individual's allocation of time. Being ill may both
decrease the utility of some uses of time and/or actually
prevent the individual from undertaking some of his normal
uses of time at all. Using the de Serpa framework, the
effect of being on a waiting list can be modelled as both
decreasing the utility of time spent in any activity and
increasing the number of technological constraints that
are binding. Thus the de Serpa framework can be extended
to incorporate non-exclusive uses of time. Thus, while
being on a waiting list is not directly analogous to that
of time spent on a transport mode (transit time), in the
absence of an economic theory which specifically addresses
the issue of allocation of non-exclusive uses of time, we
have made the assumption that non-exclusive waiting time
can be incorporated into a de Serpa type framework and so
treated in a similar manner as transit time. Therefore
we have assumed that a valuation of a unit of waiting time
can be derived from the estimation of a model of discrete
choice between alternatives characterised by different
monetary costs and different lengths of waiting list time.
(It is worth noting that transit time is not necessarily
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an exclusive use of time either; for example, individuals
may read whilst travelling to work. Assuming they derive
positive utility from reading, this will decrease the
disutility of each unit of travel time).
2.3	 Statistical requirements
To estimate the opportunity cost of time spent on
waiting lists we require data from which we can infer the
time and money attributes of the alternatives faced by
consumers. In addition, the variables considered relevant
(waiting time and money cost) should show a fair degree
of variation. To identify the most important sources of
any variability in waiting list time, we need background
socio-economic data on individuals making these trade-
offs. Further, to estimate the model with any degree of
precision, we require a sample in which a reasonable
proportion of observations choose each alternative.
Unfortunately, there is little observed (also
referred to as revealed preference) data which can be used
as a basis for the estimation of the value of waiting list
time. Individuals cannot be observed making choices from
which we can deduce their values of waiting time, because
of the type of choices faced by consumers in the UK health
care market. For illnesses for which waiting lists are
used to allocate care, demanders either have to go on
waiting lists or they may opt out of the NHS into the
private sector. They cannot make trade-offs between
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small amounts of money and time.	 The most the observer
could infer from choices between waiting and 'going
private' is that the total costs of waiting on a list are
less than the costs of private treatment for the
demander who stays in the NHS and the obverse for the
demander who chooses to go private. However, even this
inference may not be possible. From the behaviour of
demanders the observer cannot know how long the waiting
list would have been for those who chose to leave. In
addition, the demander who chooses to stay in the NHS may
not have had information at the outset on the length of
wait. If he/she underestimated the length of the wait,
he/she may have preferred, ex-post, to have 'gone private'
at the beginning. It therefore does not seem possible to
infer the value of time from the observed actions of
health service users with any great precision or
confidence.
The alternative approach is to ask
respondents to make choices between alternative courses of
action within a hypothetical context and use the responses
as measures of preference. In the current research, the
alternatives put before the respondents would be
designed to elicit measures of preference over time and
money. From respondents' choices estimates of the value
of waiting time could be derived. In seeking measures
of preference in a hypothetical choice context, two types
of method are commonly used.	 The first, labelled by
Tversky et al.	 (1987) as 'matching', requires the
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respondent to state the amount of an attribute (such as
money) which will make him/her indifferent between the
two alternatives he/she has been asked to choose between.
The second method requires the respondent to rate or rank
pre-specified alternatives. This is commonly referred to
as 'Stated Preference' (hereafter referred to as SP).
The analyst designs a set of hypothetical alternatives
based on a limited set of attributes considered to be
important and obtains from the respondent an indication
of his/her relative preference for each of the
alternatives. The simplest indicator of preference is
the selection of one alternative from a two options
(labelled 'choice' by Tversky et al. 1987). The exercise
is then repeated a number of times, systematically
altering the values of the attributes.
Stated Preference methodology has been widely
used in the economic analysis of the value of transit
time. The Journal of Transport Economics and Policy,
volume 22, 1 (Jan 1988) carries extensive discussion on
its use in this field . The methodology has been used in
the health care field to determine the preference of
demanders about the location and type of supplier of
health care (Parker and Scrinivasan (1976); Wind and Spitz
(1976)). The advantages of an experimental design are that
the researcher can collect information which is closer to
that required by the research than the information which
can be derived from revealed preference data. In addition,
the researcher may use the questionnaire design to
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minimise the variance of the parameters of interest, so
reducing the size of sample required. The disadvantages
are primarily those associated with other questionnaire
methods, such as reliability and validity, and the
difficulty of inferring actual behaviour from answers
given to hypothetical choices. In the current context,
the lack of revealed preference data from which trade-offs
between waiting time and cost could be inferred meant that
reported, rather than observed, actions were the only
possible sources of data.	 Of the hypothetical options,
the stated preference methodology was chosen in
preference to the matching approach on the grounds that
the choice task was probably easier for the respondents,
so increasing the likelihood of reliable and valid
responses.
3.	 STATED PREFERENCE DESIGN
The research aim was to derive estimates of the
value of time spent on waiting lists for diseases with
zero decay rates, using data from trade-offs between money
and waiting time made by respondents within a
hypothetical, but hopefully not unrealistic, context. The
core of the experimental design was the specification of a
set of pairs of alternatives, each alternative
characterised by a particular level of waiting time and
money cost and any other attributes considered important.
The key issues in the design were the selection of
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attributes for the alternatives, the numerical values for
these attributes, the hypothetical context and the
selection of respondents. These issues are interrelated;
for example the choice of hypothetical context is in part
determined by and determines the choice of attributes and
the value of attributes.
3.1	 Choice of attributes
The number of attributes which can be incorporated
in each alternative is limited by the ability of
respondents to distinguish between different alternatives.
In addition, there is a trade-off between the number of
attributes and the number of numerical values that each
attribute can take. The number of pairs of alternatives
(also referred to as replications) is given by
K
r = 7 levels of attribute k
k=1
To keep the number of replications to a minimum we
restricted our focus to three attributes. As the aim of
the research was to estimate the money value of a unit
reduction in waiting list time, two of the attributes were
obviously time and cost. These were specified in months
and in pounds respectively. Additionally, since we wished
to investigate whether the value of waiting time was
systematically related to uncertainty over the length of
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the wait, we included a third attribute, uncertainty of
date of admission. This was specified as a dummy variable
with value 1 if the date of admission was uncertain and
value 0 otherwise.
3.2
	 Numerical values of attributes
Choice of the numerical values of the attributes
was determined by a number of factors. First, as this
study is, to our knowledge, the first to attempt to
measure the value of waiting time for non-urgent medical
treatment in the UK, we wished to allow for a wide range
of values of time to be implicit in the choices
respondents would make. Second, we wished to take
advantage of the experimental situation and to design the
alternatives given to respondents to limit the variance in
the parameters of interest. Third, we felt it necessary
to limit the number of choices each respondent would be
faced with (each choice required the respondents to
indicate preference for one of two alternatives). After
considerable piloting the final set contained 14 pairwise
choices. Fourth, we wished to be able to investigate non-
1 inear i ties	 in	 the	 choice	 making process.
Research using the stated preference approach in transport
has indicated that utility differences might not be linear
in attribute differences, but may also be a function of
the levels of the attributes (Bates and Roberts 1983).
This non-linearity has been termed a 'threshold' effect.
193
It was thought that threshold effects might arise in the
context of a choice between waiting time and monetary cost
because individuals might not feel able to trade off
between time and cost at high level of cost. In other
words, at .high values of cost, choice would become
lexicographic, alternatives being rated in terms of their
money values rather than all their attributes. To permit
investigation of lexicographic choice and other possible
departures from the choice making process assumed in the
random utility model underlying this research, two sets of
replications were used. Two sets were used in the survey,
but each respondent was allocated, at random, only one
set. The two sets (referred to as the 'Pink' and 'White'
sets respectively) are presented in Table 6.1. The ratio
of waiting time to money cost in the pairs of alternatives
(replications) in two sets is similar, but the levels of
both time and cost attributes are higher in Pink Set. The
cost and time values of replications 1-8 in this set are
50 percent higher than the cost and time values for the
same replications in the White Set. This subset of
replications was used to examine whether threshold effects
are present. Replications 8-11 were identical in the two
sets. Replications 12-14 had three functions; to make the
average ratio of time to money similar in the two sets, to
attempt to capture very high or very low values of time
and to provide data for further tests of lexicographic
choice.
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Table 6.1
Values used in StatedPreference Replications 
Replication Cost
'White' Set
Time	 Uncertainty Cost
'Pink' Set
Time	 Uncertainty
1 100 4 1 75 3 1
2 100 6 1 75 5 1
3 100 12 0 75 9 0
4 200 4 0 150 3 0
5 200 6 1 150 5 1
6 400 4 1 300 3 1
7 400 6 0 300 5 0
8 400 12 1 300 9 1
9 800 4 0 800 4 0
10 50 6 0 50 6 0
11 770 11 1 770 11 1
12 75 2 1 600 6 1
13 160 5 0 160 4 0
14 530 8 0 480 12 0
Cost in E, time in months, uncertainty has value 1 if exact admission date
not known, 0 otherwise.
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3.3	 Hypothetical Context.
If the present health care market were used as the
context, the individual would be asked to choose between
immediate private care at a money cost and NHS care with
either a definite or an indefinite wait. In this case the
money cost attribute of one alternative (the NHS) is
always zero and the time costs and uncertainty of the
other is always zero. (This differs from the
specification generally adopted in the transit SP models
in which both alternatives have are specified as having
positive time and cost attributes). The advantage of the
above context is its familiarity, but it has serious
drawbacks. These arise primarily because waiting time is
not perceives as the only difference between the two
options. Extensive piloting showed that respondents
appeared to associate the two alternatives with
differences in attributes which were not part of the
research design. For example, respondents stated in pilot
interviews that they considered that the private option
provided more privacy and had better hotel facilities.
Choice between alternatives therefore could have been made
on the basis of these attributes, rather than on the basis
of a trade off between time, uncertainty and cost.
Additionally, some respondents felt that the cost values
were too low to be realistic costs of current private
sector treatment, so rendering the choice process
unrealistic.
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To overcome these problems, it was decided to set
the trade-offs in a framework of choice between immediate
treatment at some positive cost in an NHS hospital, and
treatment after some positive wait in the same NHS
hospital at zero money cost. The scenario within which
respondents were asked to make their choices explicitly
stated that treatment, nursing care and recovery were
identical in both alternatives. It was specified that the
cost of the first alternative was not intended to finance
the total cost of care, but simply a sum that could be
paid to avoid the queue. To examine the effects of
uncertainty over the date of admission on the value of
waiting time, the wait was specified as either known or
uncertain. If uncertain, the length of wait had a known
mean and a uniform distribution around that mean. The
pilot work showed that respondents appeared to understand
the context and that the two options differed only in
terms of cost, time and uncertainty.
The choice of one of the two alternatives had to
be made within the context of a need for non-urgent
medical treatment. We had the option of either specifying
a particular medical condition or describing the features
of an unspecified condition. The second course was
chosen. Use of a specific condition as the context has
the advantage that the researcher can be sure that
respondents are making the trade-offs in a known context
only if he or she can be sure that all respondents have
the same understanding of the context.	 If some
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respondents have no experience of the named condition
and/or some respondents have different experiences to
others, the advantages of a specific named condition are
lost. It was felt this might occur in this case,
particularly as the type of conditions which could be
named (i.e. for which waiting lists exist) can be fairly
sex specific (e.g. hernias, varicose veins).
The hypothetical context was specified along the
following lines. The respondent was asked to imagine that
he/she had a medical condition which required an
operation. Prior to this operation (implicitly the only
treatment possible) the respondent would not be able to
perform all his/her normal activities and would have to
take a specified amount of time off work or from household
duties. The condition would not deteriorate during a wait,
but neither would it improve. Once the operation was
performed, the respondent's health would return to normal.
It was hoped that respondents would view this situation as
associated with minimum anxiety over the possibility of
deterioration of health status during the wait. As a
check of understanding of the context, the respondents
were asked whether they had made their choices with a
specific condition in mind, and if the response was
positive, to name the conditions. The scenario and the
checks are presented on pp. 8-10 of the questionnaire in
Appendix 4
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3.4	 Selection of respondents
It was expected that the value of the disutility
of waiting time would vary across respondents, for
example, with income, socio-economic status, past or
present health care, health status and political views as
to the proper role to be played by the private sector in
the provision of health care. Details on all these
factors were collected as part of the survey and we
consider hypotheses about variation in estimates of the
value of waiting time across respondents in more detail
below. Here we consider the choice between selection of
respondents from individuals currently on waiting lists or
from the whole population. The value of waiting time of
the former group is essentially an ex-post valuation. In
cost benefit analysis generally and in the valuation of
'goods' which are conceptually difficult to value, such as
life, there is a view that the correct valuation is the ex
ante valuation. Accordingly, we drew a sample from a
random cross-section of the population of England and
Wales. (A professional survey organization drew the
sampling frame and conducted all the fieldwork l ). It was
thought that ex-post valuations would probably be higher
than ex-ante valuations, but as we collected detailed data
on recent and current utilization of the health care
services, we could examine this hypothesis directly. To
avoid inclusion of individuals who have no knowledge or
experience of waiting lists and to whom the hypothetical
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choices could be meaningless, we excluded individuals
under 25. Individuals over 70 were also excluded, as it
was thought that this age group might include some
individuals who found the task too difficult and so give
unreliable responses.
4.	 MODEL SPECIFICATION
4.1	 Segmentation
The basic model to be estimated is an extension of
equation (13) incorporating the attribute uncertainty over
date of admission. For any individual i, the
deterministic component of random utility of option j is
given by
	
V .. = sa.	 pc. 4-• 4- ylq.lj	 3	 3	 IPT3	 3
where aj is a constant reflecting aspects of the option
considered important by the respondent which are omitted
in the rest of the model, and C j , Tj and Wj represent the
cost, time and uncertainty over date of admission of
option j (fixed by design across respondents). On the
basis of the theory outlined above, the ratio of the time
and cost coefficients in this model can be interpreted as
the utility value of a unit reduction in the time spent on
a waiting list.
In moving from the individual specification of
(14)
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equation (14) to an aggregate specification, it is
reasonable to expect non-random variation in the
parameters. For example, different individuals face
different cost and time budget constraints and so are
likely to have different coefficients p, 11) and Y . To
allow for non-random variation in the model parameters it
is necessary to segment the model on the basis of those
characteristics of the individual believed to account for
differences in the coefficients. The simplest form of
segmentation is to estimate a given model separately for
each group or segment in the sample. (In the limit, if
respondents were given sufficient choices, one model could
be estimated for each observation in the sample).
However, this approach not only requires large sample
sizes to obtain well defined coefficient estimates, but
also introduces unnecessary distinctions between segments
if some of the coefficients do not differ across segments.
The alternative approach is to estimate a single model
using all observations, but to reformulate the form of the
model to permit different coefficients for different
segments.
We can define a set of dummy variables such that,
d- = [1 if individual i is in segment sis
10 otherwise
These dummies are used to modify the explanatory variables
to produce segment-specific variables and so segment-
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specific coefficients. Reformulated, model (14) becomes
SV .. = 1= 1 d . S (a- S + 0 c . + 11) T . +lj	 S	 1	 j	 S j	 S 
where S = total number of segments.
The variables and coefficients are interpreted as
variables and coefficients for individuals in specific
segments of the sample.
Using this framework, it is possible to test both
whether the segmented model gives a better fit than an
unsegmented (or less segmented model) and to test whether
the coefficients on different segments are significantly
different from each other. In principle, each variable in
the SP design matrix could be segmented by one or more
factors. For example, the time coefficient could be
segmented by three factors, having K, L and M levels
respectively. From this, as many as KxLxM segment specific
coefficients could be identified. Estimation of such a
large set of parameters is fairly onerous, and we adopted
the simplifying assumption that there are no interaction
effects between the different factors on which
segmentation is based. In the terminology of general
linear models we only consider additive effects (McCullagh
and Nelder 1983). In the example given here, we would
estimate only K+L+M segment specific coefficients.
(15)
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4.2
	 Identification of segments
The decision to segment certain variables and the
selection of the individual attributes by which segments
are defined should be based on theoretical hypothesis
about the nature of likely variation of the coefficients
within the sample. In the current research, we have
segmented the data to reflect the likely impact of budget
constraints on the choices individuals can make. We have
assumed that the marginal utility of income falls as
income increases and therefore have segmented the cost
coefficient by income. We have assumed that the time
variables varied non-randomly with the opportunity cost of
time spent on waiting lists, and so segmented the time
variable on the basis of socio-economic activity and
household responsibilities (defined as a single composite
factor, rather than two separate factors). The time and
cost variables were therefore each segmented by one factor
(with K and M levels respectively).
The uncertainty variable was segmented on the basis
of several additive factors, chosen to measure the
disutility an individual might derive from uncertainty
over the date of admission for hospital treatment. These
factors include current and past health care utilization
and health status, which allows us to investigate whether
those in poorer health would get more disutility from
uncertainty over the date of receipt of treatment. Health
insurance cover was also included on the grounds that
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those who currently buy health insurance are more likely
to dislike the uncertainty imposed by waiting lists than
those who do not have insurance.
The constant term of the model is an indicator of
the respondent's willingness to pay to avoid a wait. It
should not be interpreted as a measure of the relative
benefits of private care over NHS care in the present
health care system, as the scenario explicitly states that
medical treatment and nursing care are identical whether
the respondent choose to pay or to wait. Pilot work
indicated that this appeared to be clear to respondents in
the pilot samples. We expected the constant term to vary
systematically with factors that might predispose
individuals to avoid waiting, specifically, income and
beliefs about the role that should be played by the
private sector in the provision of health care. Thus the
constant term was segmented by these two factors (again
assuming no interaction between the factors).
Under these assumptions equation (14) was
reformulated in the general form of equation (15) as
follows. Dropping superscripts for the individual for
convenience, the contribution of pc i in (14) was replaced
by
dm P m Cj
where m indexes an income group and M = 3 (i.e. three
income groups were identified). The contribution of Tj
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in equation (14) was replaced by
dk Ili k Tj
where k refers to socio-economic activity and household
constraints on time. Initially, K was set equal to 6,
the groups being the full-time employed, part-time
employed with children, part-time employed without
children, housewives with children, housewives without
children and the retired.
The uncertainty variable was segmented by the
variables discussed above, each factor defined as having
two levels, but in order to maintain reasonable numbers of
observations in each segment, the tests of segmentation on
the uncertainty variable were carried out separately from
tests of segmentations on the cost, time and intercept
variables. Therefore segmentation on the uncertainty
variable is excluded from the model formulation presented
here. However, the model estimated, presented in equation
(16) below, can easily be extended to allow for segment
specific coefficients on the uncertainty variable.
Finally, the contribution of the constant term in
equation (14) was replaced by
(dm am
 + dp ap ) + aj
where p indexes views about the role of the private
sector, P = 3 and m indexes income as above. To avoid
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linear dependencies, as the constant term (as) was not
constrained to equal zero, only M-1 and P-1 dummies could
be defined. The base categories were agreement with the
statement that 'private medical practice should be allowed
both inside and outside NHS facilities' and gross
household income of over 350 pounds per week.
With these segmentations the deterministic
component of the model is given by
P-1	 M-1
V .i • =	 • + E da.	 + I d- aj	 aj ip p	 im m
p=1	 m=1
+ I dimOmCs + I dik lpkTs -
m=1	 k=1
where j indexes the option, and i the individual.
4.3	 Specification of random error
The random utility function we seek to estimate is
given by
U ..	 = V ..	 + e..ijr	 ijr	 ijr
where the subscript i references the individual, j the
option and r the replication. For each replication and
for each individual V... is specified as in equation (16).
The error term in the SP case has a different
interpretation from that of RP error term. In the
standard RP interpretation of the discrete choice model,
(16)
(17)
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the random element e ijr is hypothesised to be due to
'unobservables' in the utility function which influence
individual i's choice of alternative j in state r. In
other words, a random element is associated with each
alternative, each individual and each state. In SP the
same individual is presented with a set of choices between
alternatives; all that changes between replications is
values of the attributes of the alternatives. Thus there
seems no a priori reason for expecting the random element
to vary across replications for one individual. In other
words, the utility of alternative j in replication r for
individual i can be specified as
U ..	 = V ..	 + e..ijr
	
ijr
	
ij	 (18)
In this case, we cannot treat the random element as being
identically and independently distributed across all
observations, an observation defined as a single
replication for a single individual.
Bates (1988) has suggested that the SP response can
be treated as having an implicit error term. In the
current case, this error term arises because individuals
can only indicate their preferences by selecting one
alternative of a pair. Under binary choice, equation (18)
can be respecified in terms of differences. The
difference in utility between alternative j and j' is then
A Uir = A. + Aei	 (19)
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where
A .Ult.. = Uijr - Uijir
AV-ir = Vijr - Vii,r
Ae i	= eij -
For each choice, say of alternative j in replication r,
the researcher cannot know the exact difference between
the utility of the two alternatives, AUir . Instead,
he/she must make an approximation to the value of AUir,
inferred from the (0,1) choice. Treating the responses as
having an implicit error term air' the estimation problem
can be written
Is
AUir = AUir + nir	 (20)
and since from (19)
AUir = AVir + Aei
this means the observed response is specified as
AUir = AVir + nir + le i
	(21)
TallEma irin	 is randomly distributed across replications and
individuals and (nir+e i ) is treated as a composite error
term. The error term can then be specified as i.i.d.
across observations.
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5.	 MODEL ESTIMATION
5.1
	
Checks for Violations of Underlying Behavioural
Model
The model assumed to underlie the choice between
alternatives permits only random error. Error that is
correlated with one or more of the attributes will result
in inconsistent estimates of the value of waiting time.
It is therefore important to attempt to identify
individuals whose choice process might depart from that
assumed by the random utility model, and to test for
misspecification by estimating the model with and without
this group. The questionnaire was designed to allow the
researcher to make checks for different types of error.
First, after completion of the Stated Preference exercise,
respondents were asked two 'Transfer Price'(TP) (or
'matching') questions. These were questions Q19 and Q20
of the questionnaire. Both questions referred to the same
scenario as the SP questions. In Q19 respondents were
given a waiting time for treatment and asked to state the
minimum sum of money they would be prepared to pay to
avoid this wait. Q20 was the reverse of Q19; respondents
were presented with a monetary sum and asked to state the
minimum wait which they would be prepared to accept rather
than pay 2 . Second, as noted above,the SP set was designed
to allow the researcher to search for evidence of
lexicographic choice.
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From patterns in their responses to the SP and the
TP question, certain respondents appeared to violate the
behavioural assumptions of the choice model. The first
group were respondents who gave the response 'couldn't
pay' or 'wouldn't pay' to the TP questions. Of these, the
former were perhaps indicating that they did not have the
income to play the SP game; the latter that they would not
play the game. Data collected as part of the survey
indicated that the former group had significantly lower
incomes than all other respondents in the sample, while
the latter group were significantly more likely to agree
with the statement that no private health care should
permitted.
The second group were those respondents who
appeared to be making lexicographic choices. Each set of
SP trade-offs contained two pairs of replications in which
the ratio of time to cost was identical in each pair of
replications, but one replication in each pair had higher
absolute levels of both attributes. Respondents who
appeared to be making lexicographic choices in both of
these pairs might not have been making trade-offs between
time and money, but choosing on the basis of one attribute
only (probably money). In addition, respondents who chose
the pay alternative for the replication which had the
highest ratio of time to cost, but chose the wait
alternative for more than one other replication, and those
respondents who chose the wait option for the replication
with the lowest ratio of time to cost, but chose to pay in
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more than one other replication, also might not have been
trading between attributes.
At most, approximately 30 percent of the sample
were identified as possibly choosing on some basis which
did not conform to the random utility model. Most of
these were individuals who did not complete the TP
questions: 5 percent were excluded on the basis of the
response 'couldn't pay' to the TP questions, 25 percent on
the basis of the responses 'wouldn't pay', 'don't know' or
'not answered' to the TP questions, and 4 percent on the
basis of lexicographic choice as defined in the discussion
above. Some of those who did not give a response to the
TP question did choose both pay and wait alternatives in
the SP exercise; others always chose the wait option.
Comparison of the models estimated using and not using the
data from this group provides a test of the violations of
underlying behavioural assumptions.
5.2	 Model Estimation
All models were initially estimated using only one
of the two SP data sets (the White set). Several
specifications of the segmentation variables were tested,
and estimation was undertaken using nested data sets
derived by omission of some of the pairs of replications.
In addition, the models were estimated with and without
those observations that appeared to be violating the
behavioural model. Estimation of a preferred model using
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the data from one set of SP questions and applying this
model to the data from the other set is one test of model
stability; comparison of the models estimated using a
subset of the SP questions with those estimated using all
SP questions is another. Model selection was made on the
basis of formal and informal tests. These included score
tests for normality (Bera, Jarque and Lee 1984),
likelihood ratio tests of nested models and pairwise
comparison of coefficients.
The results indicate that models with segmentation
on the time, cost and intercept variables fit
significantly better than those with no segmentation (in
terms of both explanatory power and departure from the
assumption of normally distributed errors), and the
assumption of a normal distribution of errors is violated
slightly less for models estimated using all observations.
These results hold for different definitions of the sample
of observations, for subsets and the full sets of SP
replication, and for different specifications of the
parameters of the model. The proportion of correctly
predicted responses is about 70% for most of the data
subsets. The parameter estimates for both sets of SP
replications (White and Pink) are similar in magnitude and
pattern across segments. The coefficients, with the
exception of those for uncertainty, are generally well
defined, of the expected sign and similar in all the data
subsets.
The preferred estimates are given Table 6.2 for
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Table 6.2
White Set: Non-choosers on TP 
Questions and Lexicographic Choosers Omitted 
(n = 341)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Ratio Mean of Variable
ONE 1.015 0.941 E-01 10.78 1.0000
D1
-1.085 0.965 E-01 -11.23 0.25806
D2 -0.5091 0.920 E-01 - 5.53 0.52786 E-01
P1 -0.4369 0.911 E-01 - 4.79 0.46334
P2
-0.1924 0.416 E-01 - 4.62 0.46334
C12
-0.2748 E-02 0.108 E-03 -25.39 240.55
C3 -0.2390 E-02 0.190 E-03 -12.52 65.523
Ti 0.1133 0.790 E-02 14.34 3.6950
T2 0.9602 E-01 0.978 E-02 9.81 1.0557
T3 0.5447 E-01 0.979 E-02 5.56 0.99916
T4 0.1161 0.112 E-01 10.36 0.67868
U -0.8203 E-02 0.405 E-01 - 0.20 0.50000
Loglikelihood -2575.3
Normality 15.07 (5.99)
Skewness 14.58 (3.84)
Kurtosis 3.19 (3.84)
D1 dummy variable with value 1 for lowest income group;
D2 dummy variable with value 1 for middle income group;
P1 dummy variable with value 1 if believe no private health sector
should exist;
P2 dummy variable with value 1 of believe private sector should
only operate outside NHS;
C12 cost x lowest and middle income group dummy;
C3	 cost x highest income dummy;
Ti	 time x fulltime employed dummy;
T2	 time x part-time employed dummy;
T3	 time x housewife dummy;
T4	 time x retired dummy;
U	 uncertainty dummy with value 1 if there is no certain admission
date
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Table 6.3
Pink Set: Non-choosers on TP 
Questions and Lexicographic Choosers Omitted 
(n = 344)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Ratio Mean of Variable
ONE 1.042 0.888 E-01 11.73 1.0000
D1 -1.023 0.905 E-01 -11.30 0.31319
D2 -0.4473 0.880 E-01 - 5.07 0.46703
P1 -0.3989 0.806 E-01 - 4.95 0.68681 E-01
P2 -0.1354 0.408 E-01 - 3.31 0.49176
C12 -0.2684 E-02 0.103 E-03 -25.97 238.80
C3 -0.2223 E-02 0.177 E-03 -12.52 67.268
Ti 0.9712 E-01 0.786 E-02 12.34 3.3693
T2 0.1154 0.101 E-02 11.38 0.93407
T3 0.8791 E-01 0.929 E-02 9.46 1.2510
T4 0.1155 0.121 E-01 9.48 0.51707
U -0.1667 E-01 0.391 E-01 0.42 0.50000
Loglikelihood -2777.9
Normality 47.85	 (5.99)
Skewness 43.28	 (3.84)
Kurtosis 1.85	 (3.84)
D1 dummy variable with value 1 for lowest income group;
D2	 dummy variable with value 1 for middle income group;
P1	 dummy variable with value 1 if believe no private health sector
should exist;
P2	 dummy variable with value 1 of believe private sector should
operate outside NHS;
C12 cost x lowest and middle income group dummy;
C3	 cost x highest income dummy;
Ti	 time x fulltime employed dummy;
T2	 time x part-time employed dummy;
T3	 time x housewife dummy;
T4	 time x retired dummy;
uncertainty dummy with value 1 if there is no certain admission
date
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the White set and and Table 6.3 for the Pink set. These
were derived omitting those observations which could have
been violating the underlying behavioural model. Research
in the transit literature has indicated that inclusion of
respondents who appear to be violating the assumptions of
the behavioural models may result in biased estimators
and/or poorly defined coefficients (Fowkes and Wardman
1988). Our analysis indicated that inclusion of those
respondents discussed in section 5.1 resulted in a better
fitting model on some criteria, but a poorer fitting model
on others. The results from estimation with all
respondents are presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The
score tests for normality indicate slightly lower
misspecification in the models of tables 6.4 and 6.5.
However, the differences in the score test statistics are
not large and although the coefficients on the time and
cost variables are higher in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the ratio
of these coefficients, which gives the value of time, are
very similar in the two sets of estimates. The main
difference between the estimates derived with and without
these observations is in the size of the constant term and
in the variance covariance matrix of the parameter
estimates. The constant terms and the standard errors of
the estimates are smaller in the estimates of Tables 6.2
and 6.3 than in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The differences in
the constant terms indicate that the excluded group are
more likely to choose the wait option, which was expected
given that many of the excluded group only chose this
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option. The stability of the value of time estimates
between the two sets of estimates, together with the
differences in the intercept terms, perhaps indicates that
the source of misspecification reflected in the score
tests for normality in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 may be the
result of omission of variables which measure the
propensity to choose the wait option. As our primary
interest was in the time and cost coefficients, we thought
it was not necessary to further model these differences in
the intercept term.
As our preferred estimates, we selected those with
the best fit in terms of the estimates of the value of
time. This model was that with the smaller variance
covariance matrix and was therefore the model estimated
without the respondents discussed in section 5.1 above.
The discussion below therefore applies to the estimates
presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. However, it is worth
stressing that in the main the estimates of Tables 6.4 and
6.5 are not dissimilar in magnitude, are of the same sign
and are similar in precision.
5.3	 Cost coefficients
The pattern of coefficients of the cost variable
indicated that those with a higher income have a lower
marginal valuation of cost. The segments were defined by
gross household income of less than 150 pounds per week,
between 150 and 349 pounds per week and 350 pounds and
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Table 6.4
White Set: All Observations 
(n = 491)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Ratio Mean of Variable
ONE 0.812 0.796 E-01 10.20 1.0000
D1
-1.29 0.795 E-01 -16.31 0.35234
D2
-0.547 0.767 E-01 - 7.13 0.47658
P1
-0.785 0.680 E-01 -11.53 0.87576 E-01
P2
-0.264 0.349 E-01 - 7.54 0.46436
C12
-0.226 E-02 0.908 E-04 -24.97 253.71
C3
-0.195 E-02 0.167 E-03 -11.70 52.363
Ti 0.935 E-01 0.636 E-02 14.71 3.3910
T2 0.700 E-01 0.791 E-02 8.85 1.0474
T3 0.485 E-01 0.809 E-02 5.99 0.0998
T4 0.668 E-01 0.860 E-01 7.77 0.89031
U 0.247 E-01 0.337 E-01 0.73 0.50000
Loglikelihood -3705.7
Normality 6.2712 (5.99)
Skewness 5.9639 (3.84)
Kurtosis 4.5462 (3.84)
D1	 dummy variable with value 1 for lowest income group;
D2	 dummy variable with value 1 for middle income group;
P1	 dummy variable with value 1 if believe no private health sector
should exist;
P2	 dummy variable with value 1 of believe private sector should
operate outside NHS;
C12 cost x lowest and middle income group dummy;
C3	 cost x highest income dummy;
Ti	 time x fulltime employed dummy;
T2	 time x part-time employed dummy;
T3	 time x housewife dummy;
T4	 time x retired dummy;
uncertainty dummy with value 1 if there is no certain admission
date
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Table 6.5
Pink Set: All Observations 
(n = 517)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Ratio Mean of Variable
ONE 0.777 0.743 E-01 10.46 1.0000
D1 -1.25 0.738 E-01 -16.95 0.39072
D2 -0.636 0.724 E-01 - 8.79 0.42940
P1 -0.546 0.617 E-01 - 8.85 0.90909 E-01
P2 -0.213 E-01 0.335 E-01 - 0.63 0.46809
C12 -0.296 E-02 0.854 E-04 -24.13 251.01
C3 -0.175 E-02 0.154 E-03 -11.35 55.057
T1 0.714 E-01 0.653 E-02 10.92 3.2060
T2 0.940 E-01 0.833 E-02 11.28 0.91600
T3 0.696 E-01 0.771 E-02 9.03 1.20356
T4 0.820 E-01 0.963 E-02 8.52 0.64590
U 0.227 E-012 0.323 E-01 0.70 0.50000
Loglikelihood -4122.7
Normality 32.0	 (5.99)
Skewness 29.6	 (3.84)
Kurtosis 9.83	 (3.84)
D1	 dummy variable with value 1 for lowest income group;
D2 dummy variable with value 1 for middle income group;
1, 1	 dummy variable with value 1 if believe no private health sector
should exist;
P2 dummy variable with value 1 of believe private sector should
operate outside NHS;
C12 cost x lowest and middle income group dummy;
C3	 cost x highest income dummy;
Ti	 time x fulltime employed dummy;
T2	 time x part-time employed dummy;
T3	 time x housewife dummy;
T4	 time x retired dummy;
U	 uncertainty dummy with value 1 if there is no certain admission
date
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over. Pairwise tests of coefficients for different
segments indicated that differences between all three
income groups were not statistically significant in all
models, and the segmentation could be reduced to
distinguish between respondents with household incomes of
below and above 350 pounds per week 3 . Individual income
was also used to define segments on this variable, but
loglikelihood ratio tests indicated a better fit when
household income was used .
5.4	 Time coefficients
Initially, the time coefficient was segmented by a
factor with 6 levels. In the estimation process, this was
reduced to four, these being the full-time employed, the
part-time employed, full-time housewives and the retired.
Segmentation on the time variable generally seemed to
reflect the extent of alternative uses of time spent on a
waiting list whilst in a state of health below the normal
level. The coefficient for the employed was higher than
the coefficients for housewives. Healthy time may be more
important to those who have to work in both household and
market production. The presence of children in a household
did not appear to affect the coefficient of the time
variable. In the White set (Tables 6.2 and 6.4), the time
coefficient for the part-time employed is smaller than,
although not significantly different from, the time
coefficient for the full time employed. 	 In the Pink set
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(Tables 6.3 and 6.5), the higher coefficient for the part-
time employed is rather surprising. This result may stem
from the presence in the part-time employed segment of a
group of self-employed. In other analyses of the data (not
shown here) the self-employed had a significantly higher
time coefficient than the employed.
The high (relative) coefficient on time for the retired
contrasts with studies of value of time savings in
transport, in which the retired are found to have lower
time variable coefficients (MVA et al. 1987). This may
be the result of the different nature of the two goods.
The disutility of extra time in a transport mode is low to
the retired, who generally do not have fixed schedules or
face many constraints on their daily allocation of time.
However, when time is measured in units of months rather
than minutes and waiting is associated with a lower health
status, the retired may place a higher value on each month
because their expected stock of months is smaller than
that of younger individuals. The retired may therefore
derive greater disutility from being on a waiting list
than other individuals with the same income.
It is interesting to note that the students in the
sample (who were excluded from the main analysis on the
grounds of small numbers) had high values of time relative
to housewives. Again, this result contrasts with findings
in the economics of transport and again, the result may
stem from the difference between transport and health
care.	 Students have relatively few time constraints on
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the uses of their time on a daily basis, but do have
periods of the year in which time loss probably has a high
disutility (such as the examination period). Hence, they
may place a high value on short waiting times. In
addition, because good health may be desired for the
future as well as the present, students may consider the
income constraint they face to be that of their
families/parents, or related to their future expected
income, rather than that defined by their current income.
The model was also specified with segmentation on
the time variable by income (rather than socio-economic
status). Whilst the results indicated that the
coefficients for two of the three segments on the time
variable were statistically different, the model fitted
less well than that using segmentation on the basis of
socio-economic status. To have segmented by both income
and socio-economic status on time would have resulted in
very small numbers in some of the segments (particularly
the retired segments), so this possibility was not
explored further.
5.5	 Uncertainty coefficients
The coefficient on the uncertainty variable was
insignificant in almost all specifications of the model.
The uncertainty variable was segmented by various measures
of health status (current health rating, worry about
health, recent utilization of in- or out-patient hospital
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services) and by health insurance cover (whether or not
the respondent had cover) to identify those groups which
might derive different amounts of disutility from
uncertainty. None of the estimated segment-specific
coefficients were significantly different from zero. This
may reflect the relative unimportance of uncertainty of
admission date in a situation in which individuals are
faced with choices which involve large sums of cost or
long waits. In other words, whether or not the actual
admission date is known or only known to within a two
month range is irrelevant. The choice is dominated by the
values of the time and cost variables. However, this
result may also be due to the particular specification of
the uncertainty variable in the SP design.
Uncertainty was specified as the wait option
having an uncertain date of admission, within a known two
month band. So, for example, respondents would be told
that under the wait option they could be admitted at any
time between four and six months hence. Technically,
uncertainty was specified as a random admission date from
a uniform distribution which had a range of one month
either side of the mean. However, respondents might have
differed in the way they interpreted this variable. Some
might have assumed that they would not be admitted until
the end of the range, others might have assumed that they
would be admitted at the earliest possible date. If the
distribution of respondents' interpretations were random,
then the assumption made in model estimation that the mean
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date of admission was the mean of the distribution given
in the SP replications would be correct. However, if the
1
distribution of assumptions about the length of wait under
uncertainty were not random, then the specification used
in model estimation would be incorrect. Pilot work showed
that respondents appeared to be able to distinguish
between a known and an unknown admission date and that
respondents did make different assumptions about the
length of wait within a given range. More thought that
they were more likely to be admitted later (i.e. towards
the end of the range) rather than sooner. But there
appeared to be no clear patterns of association in the
pilot studies between socio-economic variables, health
status or health utilization and the perceived length of
wait implied by the uncertainty variable, so this finding
could not be incorporated into the analysis.
5.6
	 The alternative specific constant
There are significant differences in the
propensity to choose to pay rather than wait between
respondents. The dummy variables on the intercept term for
political attitudes indicates that those who agreed with
the statement that no private care should be permitted
were significantly less likely to pay than those who
agreed with the statement that private care should only be
allowed outside the NHS. The latter group were in turn
significantly less likely to pay for care than those who
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felt that the private sector should be allowed to operate
both inside and outside the NHS (the omitted dummy). The
signs of the dummy variables for income indicate that the
lowest income group were significantly less likely to
chose the pay alternative than the middle income group,
who were in turn less likely to choose this alternative
than the highest income group (the omitted dummy).
Correlation between insurance cover, income and attitudes
to private medicine resulted in high covariance between
the estimates of the coefficients for the alternative
specific dummies when the model was specified with all
three sets of segmentation, so segmentation by the
insurance status of the respondent was dropped. Other
analyses indicated respondent self-rating as not being in
poor health appears to be associated with a greater
propensity to choose the pay alternative and it is likely
other socio-economic variables will also be associated
with the propensity to choose this alternative. However,
it was not thought that the variables would account for
non-random variation in the coefficients of cost, time or
uncertainty, so these issues were not explored further.
5.7	 Estimates of the Value of Time
The estimates of the values of the utility of a
unit reduction in waiting list time derived by the models
of Tables 6.2 to 6.5 are presented in Table 6.6. This
table indicates that the value of time is significantly
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Table 6.6
Estimated Value of Waiting List Time (E/month) 
Segment Al]. individuals Excluding non-respondents
to TP Questions
White set	 Pink set White set	 Pink set
Weekly household
income below £350
Full time employed 41.3	 34.63 41.90	 36.51
(2.78)	 (2.95) (2.75	 (2.69)
Part-time employed 30.9	 45.6 35.70	 43.07
(3.44)
	 (3.89) (3.45)	 (3.56)
Housewife 21.4	 33.7 20.40	 32.93
(3.49)	 (3.53) (3.97)	 (3.22)
Retired 29.49	 39.8 43.43	 43.32
*	 * (3.97)	 (4.28)
Weekly household
income above £350
Full time employed 47.8	 40.7 49.43
	
44.73
(4.82)
	 (4.69) (4.81)	 (4.64)
Part-time employed 35.8	 53.6 42.11	 52.75
(4.81)	 (6.27) (5.09)	 (5.92)
Housewife 24.8	 39.7 24.06	 40.33
(4.47)
	 (5.26) (4.41)	 (5.02)
Retired 34.2	 46.8 49.90	 53.01
*	 * (5.04)	 (6.67)
Average across 36.02	 37.7 37.69
	 38.17
all segments (2.79)	 (2.97) (2.70)	 (2.68)
Standard errors in parentheses (* indicates s.e. could not be calculated
from first order approximation given below)
Note
Standard errors calculated from Taylor series approximation to the
variance of a function of random variables. Letting
var(b 1 /b 2 ) = 1/14 [var(b i ) - 2(b 1/b 2 )cov(b1 ,b2 ) + hi/14 var(b2)]
If b l = coefficient for time variable, b 2 = coefficient for cost
variible, b 1 /b 2 = VoT, then
var(VoT) = 1/14 (var(b i ) - 2 VoT cov(b 1 ,b 2) + VoT 2 var(b2))
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different from zero for all segments. The value of time
of the lower income groups in both sets is below that of
the higher income groups and the value of time of
housewives below that of the retired and the employed.
The standard errors of the estimates indicate that the
estimates from the Pink set do not differ significantly
from the estimates from the White set of replications.
The standard errors indicate that the value of time for
the full time employed, the part-time employed and the
retired do not differ significantly from each other in
either set. However, it was felt that the stability of the
direction of the estimates was some indication of a
pattern across segments and the large standard error for
the higher income, retired group was in part a consequence
of the small numbers in this segment. Accordingly, the
segmentation between the employed, the retired and
housewives was retained although it appears that the
employed could be treated as one, rather than two, groups.
Collapsing all segments, we obtain a single value
of waiting time from each set of replications (presented
at bottom of Table 6.6). The estimates for each set
differ significantly from zero, but do not differ
significantly between the two sets. The average cost per
month for the four groups considered here ranges between
32.39 and 42.99 pounds in the White set (95 percent
confidence interval around the mean). Comparison of the
estimates of the model using all observations with those
derived from estimation excluding those respondents who
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may have been violating the behavioural assumptions of the
random utility model, indicates that the estimates from
the smaller sample are slightly, but not significantly,
higher. As many of the excluded group selected the wait
option in all replications, this result is as expected.
As discussed above, students, the sick, the
unemployed and those looking for work were excluded
because there were too few in each category to create a
segmentation and it was felt that it was incorrect to
group together these different groups into an 'other'
category. How inclusion of this group would affect the
value of time is not clear, as although they have lower
income, the value of time appears to be a function of both
income and the constraints on time and the constraints on
this group are not necessarily lower than those of richer
groups. Finally, this research has estimated the
disutility of waiting list time in the least costly
waiting situation; the wait for treatment of a medical
condition with a zero decay rate. To the extent that
waiting lists exist for conditions which have a positive
decay rate, this figure could be an underestimate of the
value of time spent waiting.
5.8	 Comparison with Previous Estimates
Cullis and Jones (1986) assumed that there are
38.64 million weeks of waiting on non-urgent list in the
NHS per annum. Using the Lindsay and Feigenbaum
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framework and the 1985 prices of private medical care,
they estimate the cost of waiting to be between 1,205 and
2,155 million pounds per annum. Taking their figure for
weeks of waiting on the NHS, assuming 4 weeks in a month,
and equating the value of time saving estimated here with
the costs of time spent on a waiting list, the current
approach suggests a total cost in the order of 370
million pounds per annum. Our results indicate that the
Cullis and Jones 'ballpark' is perhaps too high. One
reason the Cullis and Jones figures are high is they
assumed that distribution of costs of waiting to be
uniform with a lower bound of zero and a upper bound
equal to the full cost of private care. However, given
that purchase of private care depends on ability to pay
and so income, and that income has a log-normal rather
than a uniform distribution, it might be expected that
the distribution of the values that individuals are
willing to pay is rather skewed towards zero. The
estimates from the current research would appear to
support this hypothesis. The implied cost per month in
the Cullis	 and Jones 'ballpark' figure is between 110
(their lower estimate) and 220 (their higher
estimate) pounds. Very few respondents in the current
survey choose the pay alternative for the replication with
a ratio of time to cost of 200 pounds. The numbers
choosing this alternative for the replication with a ratio
of 100 pounds was also small.
228
6.	 CONCLUSIONS
The coefficients of the estimated models are
generally well defined and of a priori expected sign. The
estimates of the value of waiting time are consistent
across the two different sets of SP replications. They
are similar to those derived from a series of SP
questionnaires carried out as part of the pilot phase of
the project using different sets of replications with
different ranges of time to cost ratios and different
methods of administration 4 . The results seem to indicate
that some individuals do make trade-offs between time and
cost and that these trade-offs could be used to give some
indication of the value of time saved if certain types of
waiting list were reduced. Unfortunately, we are not able
to check the validity of our results by comparison with
the findings of research other than the Cullis and Jones
result. Few other researchers have attempted to measure
the costs of waiting lists or to estimate the value of
time spent waiting for medical care. None, to our
knowledge, have used a Stated Preference Approach. As
noted above, our estimates are considerably lower than
those given by Cullis and Jones but, as mentioned, there
are grounds for believing the latter to be rather high.
The research has raised many issues, some of which
still remain unresolved. We consider briefly two of
these. The first concerns the design of SP questionnaires
to estimate the value of non-traded goods in the NHS, the
229
second the applicability of such valuations to decisions
about resource allocation. The first is important for
future applications of the SP methodology in estimation of
values of time, the second central to the use of such
values.
While around 70 percent of the respondents in the
sample appeared to complete the SP task in a manner
consistent with the assumption that individuals would
trade off time against cost, a significant minority of the
sample might not have been making these trade-offs. While
this has not resulted in substantially different estimates
of the value of time, inclusion of this group increases
the standard error of the estimates. The size of this
group is important for future use of this methodology in
the field of health care. For the purposes of
questionnaire design, two distinct groups can be
identified in this minority. The first group are those who
may not have the income to be able to play the game as it
was designed. We were well aware of this problem during
the design stages of the research. However, the design
was restricted by the need to place the choices within a
framework which was close to that which respondents either
have experienced or could see as possible. The nature of
the health care system in the UK means that waiting lists
have a duration of weeks or months rather than days, and
that the costs of care outside the NHS is in terms of
hundreds rather than tens or units of pounds.
Specification of the alternatives as characterised by
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short waits and low cost, while overcoming the problem of
those respondents who 'could not' pay, would set the SP
choices within a framework which is a long way from
current practice. This would only increase any problems
of reliability and validity of responses. The pilot
stages seemed to indicate that respondents felt that
situations in which waits were short and costs low were
less realistic than those characterised by longer waits
and higher costs. The payment of money to avoid only the
queue appeared comprehensible to most respondents in the
pilot phase. (As patients can choose to see consultants
privately and then be referred back into the NHS, this
form of payment is perhaps not that far from current
practice).
Nevertheless, within this framework, it was
inevitable that certain individuals would not be able to
afford to pay to avoid some of the waits. In a first
attempt to use an SP methodology, it was not possible to
divide respondents into groups on the basis of different
values of time and administer two sets of trade off, one
to each group, as there was no previous research on values
of time on which to draw. To have segmented on income
would have been imposing the assumption that the value of
time was determined by income, an hypothesis we wished to
test, rather than an assumption we wished to make.
However, on the basis of the results of the current
research, it might be desirable in future to divide the
population into finer groups and design a different
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questionnaire for each group. As an example, in the SP
work in transport, business travellers have been given SP
replications with higher ratios of cost to time than
leisure travellers (MVA et al (1987)).
This approach will not overcome the problem of
those who do not wish to trade because they believe
medical care should be free at the point of demand. The
funding of the NHS by taxation, coupled with the
importance of the NHS in UK political debate, means this
problem is likely to be encountered whenever attempts are
made to ask individuals to place a monetary value on
aspects of the health system. One partial solution might
to be to set the wait/pay tradeoff within a context of
paying to cross boundaries and get treatment in another
NHS region. However, in this case the responses could be
affected by respondents' evaluation of the costs of being
in hospital some distance from their home.
The second issue we wish to consider briefly is the
applicability of values derived from the current type of
research to the evaluation of projects within the NHS.
All the empirical results derived from the current
research relate to behavioural costs. They are values
which, given certain assumptions about the nature of
preferences, best account for the reported behavioural
intentions of the respondents. A behavioural value of
time represents the money that an individual would be
prepared to pay to save a unit of time for him/herself. As
such, like values from revealed preference demand studies,
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the value is based upon ability to pay. The values are
therefore derived within the particular normative
framework of individual consumer sovereignty and private
calculus. Other discussions of the costs of NHS waiting
lists to demanders are also set within this framework and
it is therefore useful for this research to have used the
same framework. Our estimates can also be compared with
the values of other types of time estimated by researchers
using the same methodology and normative framework in
different fields.
In contrast, an 'evaluation' value of time
represents the amount of money a public agency would be
prepared to pay to save a unit of time for an individual.
The behavioural and evaluation values will differ whenever
the welfare function used by the public agency differs
from the sum of individual utility functions. Generally,
the Social Welfare Function takes into account elements in
the valuation which are not considered by the individual.
Such elements include misperception of costs and benefits
by the individual, factors which will lead to a divergence
between private and social cost and differences between
individual and social rates of time preference. The
divergence between behavioural and evaluation values will
depend on the number and extent of these elements and upon
the notions of equity and distribution embodied in the
SWF. We do not intend by our research to defend the
consumer sovereignty approach on the grounds of equity.
Rather, the private welfare calculus is often used as a
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starting point for valuation in cost-benefit analyses of
public sector projects, so the behavioural valuation of
waiting list time derived here could be used as one
starting point for the estimation of the evaluation value
of waiting list time.
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NOTES
1. All fieldwork was undertaken by a professional social
survey organization, Social and Community Planning and
Research (SCPR). Details of the survey are given in
Appendix 4.
2. We were aware that the unfamiliarity of the second
question could make it more difficult for respondents than
the first.
3. Segmentation of the cost variable by two income groups
defined by the median income resulted in similar model,
but with a poorer fit as measured by the loglikelihood.
4. The SP set in the pilot questionnaires had a smaller
range of implied value of time.	 In some of the pilot
questionnaires time was specified in weeks rather than
months.	 All were self rather than interviewer
administered. They were completed by two groups of
employees in the York region and by various types of
conference delegates and holiday visitors at York
University in late 1985.
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CONCLUSIONS
• The research in this thesis has examined three aspects
of consumer behaviour in the mixed private-public UK
health care market. The starting point for each analysis
has been either an analytical or an econometric model of
behaviour. To test these models we have employed computer
simulation, estimation using revealed preference data from
both secondary sources and surveys conducted specifically
for the research and estimation using data collected by
means of quasi-experimental SP techniques. In this
conclusion we review the principle results of each part of
the research. For each part, we examine of a number of
issues which have been raised in this work but are as yet
unresolved. We also outline a research project which has
begun to examine some of these issues, using the research
reported here as the starting point.
This thesis began with an examination of the
demand for private health insurance in the UK. An
analytical model of demand which explicitly takes into
account the limited nature of both the private health care
sector and the contracts offered in the private health
insurance market was developed. A computer simulation of
this model confirmed and extended the analytical
predictions: econometric estimation using the GHS as the
data base indicated the importance of income and
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employment status in determining purchase. The estimation
results also suggest that it is appropriate to view the
decision making unit as the family rather than the
individual.
The econometric analysis indicated that there may
be other factors which are associated with the purchase of
private health insurance which the research has not been
able to take into account. In addition, the research has
led us to question the appropriateness of an analytical
model which posits that consumers perceive the decision to
purchase health insurance as a one period decision and
reassess their decisions in the light of marginal changes
in their circumstances. Estimation of such a model has
indicated that variables measuring current period income,
employment, family composition, health status and recent
utilisation of the health services account for only part
of the variance in the decision to purchase health
insurance. In part, the relatively poor fit of the
econometric model may be due to the limited nature of the
data, a problem hardly unique to the current study.
However, it may also be the case that a model which
assumes consumers take a one period view of health
insurance which covers (some) medical care costs for only
one period is an incorrect representation of behaviour.
There would seem to be a case for developing a model of
the demand for health insurance which incorporates rather
stronger bounds on rationality than the one period
expected utility model proposed in Chapter 2. The expected
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utility framework was used, not because it is the only
description of behaviour under uncertainty, but because it
was felt that other alternatives to expected utility are
currently too embryonic to be applied to an analysis of
health insurance purchase. However, the current research
results suggests that it would be useful to explore a
model which gives greater weight to the effect of past
decisions and incorporates the notion of restricted choice
sets. As discussed in Chapter 4, there is currently no
data with which to explore these issues. However, on the
basis of the research reported here, we have initiated a
project to explore these issues. We have carried out a
small national survey to investigate the reasons for both
purchase and non-purchase of health insurance. Using a
mixture of precoded and open-ended questions, the survey
focused upon the role of past decisions, life cycle
events, such as marriage and retirement, the monetary
costs of purchase, attitudes to risk and political
attitudes to private sector health care.
The survey netted approximately 1300 individuals.
Preliminary analysis of the data suggests that individuals
do not appear to reconsider their health insurance
purchase decision annually. Rather, the decision to
consider insurance purchase appears to be associated with
changes in financial circumstances and with life cycle
events, such as retirement. The data also seem to
support the captivity hypothesis discussed in Chapter 4.
For some individuals, private health insurance does not
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ever appear to have been part of their choice set, because
of their income, or their health status (either good or
poor) or their political attitudes towards private health
care. For other, health insurance is a good to be
considered seriously only in •the future, when health or
financial circumstances change. Future research will use
this data to explore the issue of captivity, using it to
estimate the parameters of a model which explicitly takes
into account the effect of restricted choice sets.
A demand for health insurance in the UK context
implies a demand for private health care. As a complement
to the analysis of the demand for health insurance, we
analysed the determinants of the expenditure on private
health care (or equivalently, the insurance claims) of a
sample of the insured. The investigation began with a
discussion of the nature of the claims process in the UK.
From this we developed a model of claims as the outcome of
three distinct decisions, each determined by a separate,
though possibly overlapping, set of factors. The
likelihood function for this process was specified under
different assumptions about the extent of statistical
dependence between the three decisions. The econometric
results indicated that the decision to seek medical care
is statistically independent of the other two decisions
and that the level of claims is weakly dependent on the
probability of making a claim. The parameter estimates
indicated that the three stages are associated with
different factors. The decision to seek care appears to
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be, as would be expected, a function of health status.
The referral decision appears to be a function of the
nature of the insurance contract and also of income, which
is interesting given the high level of cover provided by
the health insurance contracts. The level of claims is
primarily associated with health status, as measured by
the utilisation of health care facilities, but also
appears to be associated with the corporate or non-
corporate nature of the insurance cover.
The estimation results suggest that there are
differences in the claims patterns of different subscriber
types. The significant difference in the probability of
making a claim between those with the older Unit and
Standard cover is easily explained in terms of the lower
cover offered by the older policies. The significant
difference in both the probability of making a claim and
the level of claims between those subscribers with
corporate cover and those with non-corporate cover is less
easily accounted for, but suggests either that the two
groups differ in terms of risk (of having medical care
conditions which can be treated in the private sector) or
differ in their propensity to make a claim. It would be
interesting to explore such issues further. However, such
an exploration would require more detailed information on
respondents' knowledge of their health insurance cover and
of their health status than was available for the current
research. It is unlikely that such data can be collected
re gularly from subscriber files or even by postal
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questionnaire, the two sources used in the research
reported here. Similarly, rather more detailed data than
could be collected in the current research would seem to
be required to investigate the extent and nature of co-
temporaneous use by the insured of private.and public
facilities. Better understanding of these issues is
important for analysis of the impact of increased private
sector provision of health care in the UK. For example,
it is required to analyse the effectiveness of measures to
restrict the level of claims or of policy changes which
allow individuals to 'opt out' of NHS tax contributions
and entitlement to NHS provided care.
We stated in the Introduction to the thesis that,
ideally, the demand for private health care and the demand
for health insurance should be modelled and estimated
simultaneously. Our results suggest that this approach,
whilst theoretically elegant, would be unlikely to lead to
well defined parameter estimates unless a larger and more
detailed data set were to be made available.
The third topic examined in this work was the
cost, to the consumer, of the allocation of certain types
of care by waiting list. Specifically, we sought an
estimate of the monetary value of the disutility of a
month of time spent on a list waiting for treatment for a
medical condition with a low decay rate. As in the rest
of the research discussed here, our starting point was an
analytical model and a specific econometric specification
of this model. However, there were no data sets in the
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public domain which could be used to estimate this model.
Thus we sought to collect data for our specific purpose.
We adopted the Stated Preference methodology to elicit
preferences for time over money and used these to estimate
the disutility of a unit of time spent waiting. . The
overall response rate to the questionnaire was high. A
high proportion of the respondents appeared to complete
the Stated Preference task in a manner not inconsistent
with the assumptions of the theoretical model we sought to
estimate. The estimates of the value of time derived from
the data were fairly stable and indicated systematic
differences in the value of time for different socio-
economic groups in the sample.
The nature of the health care system in the UK
means that it is not always possible to provide answers to
important policy questions using data on observed actions.
For example, in a health care market in which almost all
primary care and most secondary care is provided free at
the point on demand, there exists little revealed
preference data with which to estimate, say, the monetary
price elasticity of demand. Using revealed preference
data, the response of demand to price can only be assessed
for services for which price is positive. Hence, perhaps,
the interest in the demand for prescriptions and for
dental care (e.g. Lavers (1983); Ryan and Birch (1988)).
However, the data in such cases often has serious
shortcomings (Lavers (1983)) and it seems almost
inevitable that there will be some questions which cannot
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be answered using revealed preference data. In such cases,
the researcher is forced to examine other means of
collecting data. Revealed preference data from laboratory
type experiments may be one avenue: however, the work
presented here seems to indicate that data derived from
responses to choices made within a hypothetical context
may also be an avenue worth exploring.
First, the SP technique has been extensively
tested in transport economics. This provides the
researcher with knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses
of the methodology at the design, rather than the end,
stage of the research. Second, the present research has
explored some of the issues that may be particular to SP
work in the UK health care field. For example, we have
tested whether individuals will make trade-offs at high
values of time and money. We have explored the
possibility of lexicographic choice. We have identified
groups who appear not to be able to make trade-offs and
have drawn attention to the association between
willingness to choose to pay for medical care and
political attitudes. Third, the SP approach has the
advantage that the researcher can simultaneously collect
data and test the the assumptions underlying the model he
or she is trying to estimate. As decision making in the
health care field is characterised by uncertainty, and our
understanding of the process of decision making under
uncertainty currently extremely limited, such tests would
seem both appropriate and useful. In conclusion, the
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research reported here suggests that it would be worth
exploring the Stated Preference methodology in more depth.
Given the lack of revealed preference data, our work
suggests data derived using this methodology could be a
useful input for the analysis of policy issues in the UK
health care market.
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APPENDIX 1 
Simulation Programme for Chapter 3 
As outlined in the chapter, several variants of the basic
model were used in the simulation exercise. The functions
which differed between programmes were the utility
function, the nature of the distribution of sickness, f(s)
and the specification of the premium. The appended
programme listing is therefore representative of the
various simulations, but not the only version of the
programme. In the appended listing, utility is specified
as an exponential function, f(s) is truncated lognormal
and the premium is actuarially fair.
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PROGRAM SIMLOG
prog simlog is same as sim except distribution of
sickness is truncated lognormal with params mu and variance sig2
include 'sim_def.for'
real para(21)
equivalence (para(1),alph),(para(2),bet), (para(3),gam),
1 (para(4),a), (para(5),mean),
	
ara(6), max), (para(7), w),
2 (para(8),t), (para(9), e), (para(10),O, (para(11)/P),
3 (para(12),ma), (para(13),mb), (para(14),mc), (para(15),1a1),
4 (para(16),1b1), (Para(17), 1b2), (para(18),1c2), (para(19),ui),
5 (para(20),mu), (para(21),sig2)
open (unit=10, file='siml.dat',status='old',err=998)
open (unit=20, file='sim.res.,status=tnew',err=999)
read (10,100) alph,bet, gam
read (10,100) a, mean,max
read (10,100) wit,e,r,13
read (10,100) ma, nib, mc, la1, 1b1, 1b2, 1c2, ui, mu, sig2
read (10,200) symb, start, end, rinc
write (20,800) '5IMLOG1: lognormal f(s), exp U, fair prem'
write (20,400) symb(1:4) ,start,end,rinc
ifail = 1
write (* ,300) alph, bet, gam, a, mean, max, w, t, e, r, p, ma, nib,
1 mc, la1, 1b1, 1b2, 1c2, ui,mu,sig2
write (20,300) alph, bet, gam, a, mean, max, w, t, e, r, p, ma, mb,
1 mc, la1, lbl, 1b2, 1c2, ui, mu,sig2
j =0
call symbol(j,symb)
do 2 z = 0,10
dummy=start+(end-start)*z/rinc
para(j) = dummy
call star(sstar)
call hat(shat)
call prem(shat)
call compare(sstar,shat,eno,eins, diff)
write (*,600) dummy, sstar, shat, sub,eno, ems, cliff
2	 write (20, 600) dummy, sstar, shat, sub, eno, ems, diff
stop
	
998	 write (20,700) 'data'
	
999	 write (20, 700) 'output'
stop
	
100	 format (5x,f7.2)
	
200	 format (a4,1x, 3f6.0)
	
300	 format (//, ' Initial Parameter Values',/,
1	 ' alph= ', f10.5,/, ' bet =', f10.5 ,/, ' gam = ',.f10.5 ,/,
2	 ' a	 =', f10.5,/,
3 ' mean= ', f10.5,/, ' max =', f10.5, /, ' w
	 =', f10.5,/,
4	 ' t	 =', f10.5,/,
	 e	 =', f10.5, /, ' r
	
=', f10.5,/,
5	 ' p	 =', f10.5,/, ' ma =', f10.5, /, ' mb =', f10.5,/,
6	 ' mc =', f10.5,/,	 la1 =', f10.5, /, ' 1b1 =', f10.5,/,
7	 ' 1b2 =', f10.5,/,
	
1c2 =', f10.5, /, ' ui =', f10.5,/,
8	 ' mu =', f10.5,/,	 sig2= ', f10.5,/)
	
400	 format(/,1k,	 parameter ,4x, 'minValue', 5x, 'maxValue',5x,
1	 'Step',/, lx, a4, 13x,3(f10.4,7x))
	
600	 format (lx,	 param', 5x, ' sstar',6x, 'shat',7x, 'sub',
1	 8x, 'eno s , 8x,'eins', 7x, 'cliff in EU',/, lx, f8.4, 6f11.4,/)
	
700	 format (/, ' error opening', a8)
	
800	 format (/, ' program type', a50 )
end
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Select param to be changed
subroutine symbol(j,symb)
include 'sim_def.for.
if (symb(1:4) .eq. 'alph') then
j = 1
else if (symb(1:4) .eq. 'bet ') then
j = 2
else if (symb(1:3) .eq. !gam') then
j =3
else if (symb(1:1) .eq. 'a') then
j = 4
else if (symb(1:4) .eq. 'mean') then
j = 5
else if (symb(1:3) .eq. 'max') then
j =6
else if (symb(1:1) .eq. 'w') then
j =7
else if (symb(1:1) .eq. 't') then
j = 8
else if (symb(1:1) .eq. 'e') then
j = 9
else if (symb(1:1) .eq. 'r') then
j = 10
else if (symb(1:1) .eq. 'p') then
j =11
else if (symb(1:2) .eq. 'ma') then
j=12
else if (symb(1:2) .eq. 'mb') then
j = 13
else if (symb(1:2) .eq. 'mc') then
j = 14
else if (symb(1:3) .eq. '1a1') then
j = 15
else if (symb(1:3) .eq. '1b1') then
j = 16
else if (symb(1:3) .eq. '1b2') then
j = 17
else if (symb(1:3) .eq. '1c2') then
j = 18
else if (symb(1:2) .eq. 'ui' ) then
j = 19
else if (symb(1:2) .eq. 'mu' ) then
j = 20
else if (symb(1:4) .eq. 'sig2')then
j = 21
end if
return
end
money costs of treatment
function m(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
m = ma + mb*s + mc*s**2
return
end
time loss due to illness, NHS treatment
function t11(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
t11 = la1+1b1*s
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return
end
c ********** ****** ******* ************* ******* * ****** ***** ******** **********
time loss, due to illness, private treatment
function t12(s)
include Isim_def.for'
t12 = 1b2*s+1c2*s**(3/2)
return
end
lognormal distribution of sickness
function f(s)
include isim_def.for'
ifail = 0
pi = 3.14159
if (s .1e. 0.0) goto 100
d1 = 1.00/(s*sqrt(sig2)*sqrt(2.0*pi))
d2 = (alog(s) - mu)/(sqrt(sig2))
d2 = d2*d2*(0.5)
d2 = exp(-d2)
d3 = d2*d1
x = (alog(max) - mu)/sqrt(sig2)
g = 1.00 - s15ace(x,ifail)
f = d3/g
return
100	 f = 0.0
return
end
Utility of NHS
function u1(s)
include .sim_def.for'
y = ui+(w*e) - (e*a*t11(s))
h = t - w - (1.0 - a)*t11(s)
if (h .1e. 0.0) goto 200
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u1 = u
return
200	 h = 1.1
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u1 = u
return
end
Utility of private pay as you go
function u2(s)
include isim_def.for'
y = ui+(w*e) - (e*a*t12(s))- m(s)
h = t - w - (1.0 - a)*t12(s)
if (h .1e. 0.0) goto 200
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u2 = u
return
200	 h = 1.0
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u2 = u
return
end
Utility of insurance in private sector without sub
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function u3(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
y = ui+(w*e) - (e*a*t12(s))
h = t - w - (1.0 - a)*t12(s)
if (h .1e. 0.6 goto 200
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u3 = u
return
200	 h = 1.0
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u3 = u
return
end
Utility of insurance in public sector without sub
function u4(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
y = ui+(w*e) - (ea*t11(s))
h = t - w - (1.0 - a)*t11(s)
if (h .1e. 0.0) goto 200
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u4 = u
return
200	 h = 1.1
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u4 = u
return
end
Utility of insurance in private sector
subroutine ru3(s,u3r)
include 'sim_def.for'
y = ui+(w*e) - (e*a*t12(s))-sub
h = T - W - (1.0 - a)*t12(s)
if (h .1e. 0.0) goto 200
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u3r = u
return
200	 h = 1.0
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u3r = u
return
end
Utility of insurance in public sector
subroutine ru4(s,u4r)
include isim_def.for'
y = ui+(w*e) - (e*a*t11(s))-sub
h = t - w - (1.0 - a)*t11(s)
if (h .1e. 0.0) goto 200
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u4r = u
return
200	 h = 1.1
u = alph*(1.0 - exp(-bet*y*h))
u4r = u
return
end
Difference between private and nhs utility
subroutine dnoins(s,d1)
include Isim_def.for'
d1 = u2(s) - u1(s)
return
end
Difference between insured and NHS (for those with ins)
subroutine dins(s,d2)
include 'sim_def.for'
d2 = u3(s) - u4(s)
return
end
Find s* at which indifferent between public and private
subroutine star(sstar)
include 'sim_def.for'
rinc = 100.0
S	 =0.0
	
'100	 call dnoins(s,d1)
if (dl .eq. 0.0) goto 300
if (dl .lt. 0.0) goto 200
if (s .gt. max) goto 400
s = s+rinc
goto 100
	
200	 if (rinc .lt. 0.0001) goto 300
if (s .lt. 0.0)
	
goto 500
S = s-rinc
rinc = rinc*0.1
goto 100
	
300	 sstar = s
return
	
400	 sstar = max
return
	
500	 sstar = 0.0
return
end
Find shat at which indifferent btween pub and pr insured
subroutine hat(shat)
include 'sim_def.for'
rinc = 100.0
s	 =0.0
100	 call dins(s,d2)
if (d2 .eq. 0.0) goto 300
if (32 .lt. 0.0) goto 200
if (s .gt. max) goto 400
s = s+rinc
goto 100
200	 if (rinc .lt. 0.0001) goto 300
if (s .lt. 0.0)	 goto 500
s = s-rinc
rinc = rinc*0.1
goto 100
300	 shat = s
return
400	 shat = max
return
500	 shat = 0.0
return
end
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c************** ************** ************* **********************************
c	 Evaluate insurance premium
subroutine prem(shat)
include Isim_def.for'
external fn5
rint = 0.0
epsr = 0.001
nlimit = 10000
ifail = 0.0
rint = d01ahe(0.0,shat,epsr,npts,relerr,fn5,nlimit,ifail)
sub = (1.00+0*p*rint
return
end
C
c	 Expected utility of NHS
function fn1(s)
include 'sim def.for'
f1 = u1(s)*f(s)
fn1 = f1
return
end
c
c	 Expected utility of private pay as you go
function fn2(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
f2 = u2(s)*f(s)
fn2 = f2
return
end
c
c	 Expected utility of insured in pr sector
function fn3(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
call ru3(s,u3r)
fn3 = u3r*f(s)
return
end
C
c	 Expected utility of ins in public sector
function fn4(s)
include 'sim_def.for'
call ru4(s,u4r)
fn4 = u4r*f(s)
return
end
c
c	 Ins payout in each state
function fn5(s)
include isim_def.fore
fn5 = m(s)*f(s)
return
end
C
c	 Difference between Expected utility of no insurance and insurance
subroutine compare(sstar, shat, eno,eins, diff)
external fn1, fn2, fn3, fn4
include 'sim_def.for'
rint1=0.0
rint2=0.0
rint3 = 0.0
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rint4 = 0.0
u3 = 0.0
u1 =0.0
eno = 0.0
ems = 0.0
epsr = 0.001
nlimit = 10000 •
ifail =0
rint1 = dO1ahe(0.0, sstar,epsr, npts, relerr, fn2, nlimit, ifail)
rint2 = dO1ahe(sstar, max, epsr, npts, relerr, fn1, nlimit, ifail)
y = ui +(w*e)
h = t -w
u1 = alph*(1.0 -exp(-bet*Y*h))
eno = (rint1 + rint2)* p + (1.0 - p)*u1
rint3 = dO1ahe(0.0, shat,epsr, npts, relerr, fn3, nlimit, ifail)
rint4 = d01ahe(shat, max, epsr, npts, relerr, fn4, nlimit, ifail)
y = ui+ (w*e) - sub
h =
 t -w
u3 = alph*(1.00-exp(-bet*y*h))
ems = (rint3 + rint4)* p + (1.0 - p)*u3
diff =ems - eno
write (*, 100) rint1, rint2,rint3,rint4,u1,u3
write (20,100) rint1, rint2,rint3,rint4,u1,u3
return
100	 format (13x, 'rint1',6x, I rint2 1 , 6x, 'rint3',6x, 'rint4', 6x,
1	 'u1', 8x, ' u3',/, 8x, 6f11.4)
end
C
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SIM DEF.FOR
character *4 symb
common alph, bet, gam,a, mean, max, w,t,e,r,p, ma,mb,mc,,
1 la1, 1b1, 1b2, 1c2, ui, mu, sig2, sub
real mean, max, ma, mb, .mc, mu, la1, 1b1, 1b2, 1c2
SIML.DAT
alph= 300.0
bet = 0.0001
gam = 0.0
a =0.5
mean= 0.1
max = 100.0
=8.0
t	 =24.0
e	 = 15.0
r	 =0.12
p =0.5
ma = 50.0
mb = 5.0
mc = 3.0
la1 = 5.0
1b1 = 1.0
1b2 = 1.0
1c2 = 0.5
ui = 2000.0
mu = 1.6
sig2= 0.1
bet =0000.10.0005	 10
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APPENDIX 2 
An extensive analysis of choice between two
certain alternatives, McFadden (1974, 1981) has shown that
the econometric estimation of discrete choice between
certain alternatives has a foundation in utility
maximisation if utility is specified as a random function
which is additively separable in a deterministic and a
random component. Further, under certain specifications
of the form and distribution of the error component this
model of utility maximisation can be estimated by either
probit or logit statistical models.
Although it has been shown that decisions makers
make errors in assessment of choice under uncertainty, the
appropriate way the model this randomness is as yet
unresolved (Machina, 1983). One possible approach is to
try to apply the idea of random utility as defined by
McFadden to choice under uncertainty between two or more
discrete alternatives. However, the extensions of random
utility to choice under uncertainty is less than
straightforward. In this brief note, we outline
McFadden's argument and then attempt to extend the
specification of randomness to choice under uncertainty.
We basically attempt to introduce some notion of
randomness into an expected utility framework. We show
that if the error process is assumed to have a
particularly simple, and perhaps not very plausible form,
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the coefficients from the statistical model be interpreted
as in the McFadden model ie. as the parameters of the
deterministic component of utility.
A.2.1. Random Utility Model 
McFadden assumed utility is a random function of
the form
U(xj , ․ ) = V(xj, ․ )+e(xj, ․ )	 (Al)
where U j (.) is the random utility derived from the jth
choice, Vj (.) is the deterministic component and reflects
the 'representative' tastes of the population and e j (.) is
stochastic and reflects the effect of individual
idiosyncrasies in taste, errors in judgement and/or errors
of measurement by the analyst. The arguments of the
utility function V j (.) are the attributes of the choice,
xj
 and the socio-economic characteristics of the choice
maker, s (fixed across options for each choice maker).
The individual will choose the option which
maximises random utility; since utility is stochastic, the
even that an individual will choose option i is stochastic
and will occur with some probability pi , written as
pi = Pr[U(xi, ․ )>U(xj, ․ ) for j 0 i, j = 1,..., J]	 (A2)
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For simplicity of exposition let U(xj, ․ )=Uj, V(xj, ․ )=Vj
and e(xj, ․ )=ej.
Substituting (Al) into (A2) and rearranging
pi = Pr[e j -e i )<(Vi-V) for j 0 i, j = 1, ..., J] 	 (A3)
The choice of estimator depends on the
specification of the probability distribution of U j and so
(e j -e 1 ). It is assumed that e j are i.i.d. and independent
of any of the factors which determine Vj.
Two probability distributions for (e j -e 1 ) are
commonly assumed. These are the logistic and the normal,
which result in the estimation of the logit and probit
models respectively. The two models are virtually
indistinguishable except at arguments yielding
probabilities close to zero or one, where the probit model
approaches the extreme values more rapidly.
If the deterministic component V(x j , ․ ) can be
specified in the general linear form,
V(xj , ․ ) = Z(x3 , ․ )'13	 (A4)
where the Z(xj , ․ ) are known functions of the attributes of
the choices and socio-economic characteristics of the
choosers and 13 is a vector of unknown parameters, the 5 s
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have the simple interpretation of the weights attached to
the Z(.) functions in the calculation of utility. These
weights are implicitly the same in all states of the
world. In an estimation of a logit model where the
dependent variable is L if the individual is observed to
choose option i, 0 otherwise, O k is the estimate of the
effects of a unit of change in Z k on the log of the odds
ratio pi/(1-pi).
A.1.2. Choice under uncertainty
The widely used expected utility theory of choice
under uncertainty argues that expected utility of option
i, EUi is given as
iEUi = I t pt Ut
where i indexes the choice, t the state and
iUt = utility of i in state t
pt = (subjective) probability of state t occurring
and I tpt = 1
Expected utility theory does not permit error on
the part of the decision maker. To estimate a statistical
model of choice between prospect i and prospect j when
(A5)
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expected utility is defined as in equation (A5) requires
an assumption of errors in measurement by the observer.
The problem of this approach for discrete choice is that
errors in measurement must account for movement between
non-choice and choice of option i, rather than
intramarginal changes in the amount of a good consumed.
In addition, there is a growing body of literature (for a
review see Machina, 1983) which indicates individuals do
make errors of judgement in situations of choice between
uncertain prospects. However, although there is evidence
of behaviour which violates expected utility maximisation,
there is no general consensus as to the nature of the
error process.
If error can be modelled as entering only the
calculation of the utility of a choice i in state t and
not into the assessment of the probability state t occurs,
then the expected utility framework can perhaps be
extended to incorporate random utility as modelled by
McFadden. An extension that is perhaps most in keeping
with McFadden is to respecify the utility of choice i in
state t as stochastic, of the form
Ut = Vt+e t	(A6)
where V i is a deterministic component and e i  a randomt
component, assumed independent of V.
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Substituting equation (A6) into (A5) the 'random'
expected utility of choice i is
EUi = I tPt (Vei+ i)t t
and substituting this definition of expected utility into
(A2) and rearranging the probability an individual will
choose i rather than j is
pi= Pr[Ipt(e1-4)<Ipt(14-Vb
for j	 j = 1, ..., J]	 (A8)
The differences between the errors and the differences
between the deterministic components are now state
weighted differences. If the deterministic component of
utility of choice i in state t is specified as in equation
(A4), i.e.as a linear component of known attributes to
vary across states, the deterministic component of utility
for choice i in state t is given as
= Z(4, ․ ) 1 0 t	(A9)
Substituting (A9) into (A8) and rearranging the
probability of choice of prospect i becomes
pi = Pr[Ipt(4-4)<Ipt004-4)
for j
	
i, j = 1, ..., J)	 (A10)
(A7)
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From equation (A10) it is clear that the parameters of
either a logit or probit model can be related to the
weights attached to each of the attributes of the choice
if the weights are state independent ie. 4 = pk , k=1,
•1 J. This, in turn, implies state independent utility
functions.
. -
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APpFNDIX 3 
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BUPA
CONFIDENTIAL
HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT IN 1984
This questionnaire asks you to provide a few details about yourself
and your family's health and employment in 1984. It can be filled in
by yourself or, if more convenient, by your husband or wife. It
should take no more than 15-20 minutes to complete.
You need only provide details for members of your immediate family
(yourself, your husband or wife and your children) who were living
in your household in 1984. Questions should be completed for all
such immediate family members whether or not they were covered by
your BUPA policy.
Section 4 is only applicable for those with child dependants in
1984. If not applicable for you, go straight to section 5 after
completing sections.
 1, 2, & 3.
The questions 'should be answered by circling the number
corresponding to the appropriate answer or by writing the answer in
the space provided.
270
FOR
OFFICE
USE
ONLY
III
III
III
II I Li
Lii
SECTION 1
HOUSEHOLD CCMPOSITICG IN 1984
This section to be completed for all members of the BUPA member's family
living in the same household in 1984.
1. Please could you supply the following details for yourself and other
members of your immediate family.
Age	 Sex
(State in	 (Enter M if male;
years)	 F if female)
BUPA
member 	
Husband/
wife of
BUPA member 	
Eldest child 	
Second child 	
Third child 	
Fourth child 	
Subsequent
children
	
2. Has the composition of your household changed since the end of
1984?
Yes 	 	 1
No 	 	 2
If yes, please specify how 	
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3. Have you moved to another town or city since the end of 1984?
Yes 	 	 1
No 	 	 2
If yes, please specify the town/city and county in which you
lived in 1984.
TOwn/City (or nearest town/City)
County
4. Please indicate with a tick which members of your household were
covered by your BUPA subscription in 1984. (Leave blank if not
covered).
BUPA member
Husband/Wife
Eldest child
Second child
Third child
Fourth child
Subsequent
children
5. For how many years prior to 1984 had you had private health insurance?
Please include policies other than BUPA. (If 1984 was the first year
you had health insurance please record as C>)
Number of years
Co to Section 2
El
272
BUPA
	
Husband/Wife
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SECITCN 2
EMPLOYgENT IN 1984
This section should be ccapleted for the BUPA member and for the husband
or wife of the BUPA member only if he/she was part of the hcusehold in
1984.
6. Please indicate which of the following categories best describe your
employment status in 1984. Circle all that apply.
Full time (over 30 hrs per week)
self employed 
	
Part time self employed 	 	 02	 02
Full time (over 30 hours per
week) employee 
	 	 03	 03
Part time employee 	 	 04	 04
In full time education 	 	 05	 05
Retired 	 	 06	 06
Permanently unable to work
because of illness 	 	 07	 07
Unemployed 	 	 08	 08
Keeping House 
	 	 09	 09
Other (please specify)
If not working full or part time in 1984, go to Section 3
7. Which of the following categories best describes your main job.
Circle only one.
BUPA
Member
Husband/Wife
Clerical 	 1 1
Manual 
	 2 2
Managerial/Professional 	 3 3
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8. For your main job in 1984, after what length of time would your
earnings/income have been affected if you were unable to work
because of illness?	 Please circle as appropriate.
BUPA
Member
Husband/Wife
Less than 1 week 	 1 1
1 - 2 weeks 	 2 2
3 - 4 weeks 	 3 3
1 - 3 months 	 4 4
4 - 6 months 	 5 5
More than 6 months 
	 6 6
Co to Section 3
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Member
Husband/Wife
Yes
No
BUPA
Member
1
2
Husband/Wife
1
2
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SECTION 3
HEALTH OF BUPA MEMBER AND HUSBANEATFE
Answers to the questions in this section should be provided for the
BUPA member and the husband or wife.
9. Thinking about your health in the last three years, how would you
rate it for someone of your age? Please circle as appropriate.
Very Good 	 1 1
Fairly Good 	 2 2
Not Good 	 3 3.
10. Do you currently have any long standing illness, disability or
disease (by long standing, we mean something that has troubled you
over a period of two years of more)? Please circle as appropriate.
11. How often do you worry about your health?
Please circle as appropriate.
BUPA
Member
Husband/Wife
Not at all 	 1 1
Not very much 
	 2 2
Fairly often 	 3 3
A great deal 
	 4 4
V-
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Now, please could you think about your health in 1984
12. In 1984, which of the following forms of health care did you make
use of? Please circle all that apply.
BUPA	 Husband/Wife
Member
Visit to GP 
	 	 1	 1
Dental care 
	 	 2	 2 .
Visit to hospital casualty 	 3	 3
department 	
A specialist consultation 
	 	 4	 4
Other visit to hospital out-
patients 
	 	 5	 5
Hospital in-patient stay 	 	 6	 6
Other consultation/
treatment (please specify)
	
If you have circled either 4 and/Or 6, go to Question 13.
Otherwise, go to to Question 19.
13. In 1984 how many visits did you make on your own behalf to a
specialist for consultation? Please state.
BUPA
Member
Number of visits
If none, go to question 16
Husband/Wife
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14. How many of these visits were as an NHS patient?
Please state number of visits.
BUPA
Member
Number of visits as
an NHS patient
H
15 • How many of these visits were as a private patient?
Please state number of visits.
BUPA
Member
Number of visits as
a private patient
HI
16. How many hospital inpatient stays did you have in 1984?
Please state number of in-patient stays
BUPA
Member
Number of in-patient stays
Husband/Wife
H
If none, go to Question 19
BUPA
	
Husband/Wife
Member
rUA
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17. For each of your first 3 hospital in-patient stays in 1984, please
specify briefly what treatment you received and the name and town of
the hospital in which you were treated and whether you received
treatment as a private or NHS patient.
First
	
Treatment
In-patient
	
Hospital
Stay	 Town
Private or
NHS
Patient
Second	 Treatment
In-patient
	 Hospital
Stay	 Town
Private or
NHS
Patient
Third	 Treatment
In-patient
	
Hospital
Stay	 Town
Private or
NHS
Patient
If you were an NHS patient for all in-patient stays, go to Question 19.
Otherwise, go to Question 18.
18. For each in-patient stay, please can you indicate whether or not
you used your BUPA health insurance to meet the costs of any part
of your treatment.
	 Please circle as appropriate.
BUPA	 Husband/Wife
Member
First Used BUPA insurance 1 1
Stay Did not use BUPA insurance 2 2
Second Used BUPA insurance 1 1
Stay Did not use BUPA insurance 2 2
Third Used BUPA insurance 1 1
Stay Did not use BUPA insurance 2 2
111
-D
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19. Prior to 1984, how many times had you stayed in hospital overnight or
longer? Please exclude hospital stays that resulted from childbirth.
BUPA
Member
Number of in-patient
stays
Husband/Wife
Hi
If you had no children in your household during 1984, plese go to
section 5 - otherwise please go to Section 4
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SECTIal 4
HEALTH OF CHILDREN
Please complete only for children who were living in your
household in 1984.
20. How would you rate the general health of each child in your
household? Please circle as appropriate.
Very
Good
Fairly
Good
Not
Good
Eldest Child 	 1 2 3
Second Child 
	 1 2 3
Third Child 	 1 2 3
Fourth Child 
	 1 2 3
Subsequent Children 	 1 2 3
21. Earlier in the questionnaire you stated how much you worry about
your own health. Would you now please indicate how much you worry
about the health of your children? Please circle as appropriate.
Not at all 	 1
Not very much 	 2
Fairly often 	 3
A great deal 	 4
Now please could you think about your children's health in 1984.
22. In 1984, how many times did your children have to visit a
specialist? Please exclude visits to Accident and Emergency
Departments. Please state the total number of specialists visits
by all children.
Total number of visits
If none, go to Question 25
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23. How many of these visits were as an NHS patient? Please state the
number of specialist visits as NHS patients by all children.
Total number of visits
24. How many of these visits were as a private patient? Please state the
number of specialist visits as private patients by all children.
Total number of visits
25. In 1984, how many times did any of your children have to stay in
'hospital overnight or longer? Please exclude stays in hospital in
relation to childbirth. Please state the total number of in-patient
stays by all children.
Total number of in-patient stays
If none, go to Cuestion 28
26. How many of these in-patient stays were as an NHS patient?
Total number of stays by all children
27. How many of these were as a private patient?
Total number of stays by all children
28. Prior to 1984, how many times did any of your children have to stay in
hospital overnight or longer? Please exclude stays in hospital in
relation to childbirth. Please state the total number of in-patient
stays by all children.
Total number of stays by all children
Go to Section 5
28 1
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SECTICN 5
HOUSEHOLD INOOME IN 1984
29. Could you please indicate into which band your gross household income
fell in 1984.
Under	 £ 5,000 	 	 1
	
£5,000 - £ 9,999 	 	 2
	
£10,000 - £14,999 
	 	 3
	
£15,000 - £19,999 	 	 4
	
£20,000 - £24,999 
	 	 5
	
£25,000 - £29,999 	 	 6
	
£30,000 - £34,999 
	 	
7
Over	 £35,000 	 	 8
-l ease put the questionnaire into enclosed envelope and return to BUPA
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATICN
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SOCIAL AND ICOMMUNITY PLANNING RESEARCH
Head Office
35 Northampton Square,
London, EC I V OAX.
Telephone: 01-250 1866
P.932	 March - April 1987 
CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE 
SCPR is carrying out a survey about choices in health care. We are
interested in your experiences of the health services and in views
about waiting for hospital treatment. We want to talk to people who
have had to wait and to those who have not had that experience.
The survey is bieng carried out for the Centre for Health Economics
at the University of York. The Centre does research on all aspects
of health policy and health services. This piece of research is being
funded by the Health Promotion Research Trust.
Your address was selected at random from the electoral register.
Your participation is, of course, entirely voluntary, but we hope you
will spare a little time to talk to our interviewer. Any information
you give will be treated as strictly confidential and will only be
seen by people directly involved in the research at SCPR and York
University. The results of the survey will be summarised in such
a way that no one person's views or household details can be identified.
Thank you for your help. If there is anything more you would like to
know, please contact me at the above address.
Catrin Morrissey
Project Researcher
Director Roger Jowell. Deputy Directors Colin Airey, Barry Hedges. Fieldwork Director Jean Morton-Williams.
Director, Survey Methods Centre Much Cdlirm Menne, CWLafftaMtve Reseanh Unit Jane Riutlic
Research Directom Gitian Courtenay. Julia Field, Denise Uevesley. Patricia Prescott-Clarke, Douglas Wood.
nutaPnocesaincoirectoraWynedem	 *gored as a away No 255139
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COMMUNITY PLANNING RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
I work for SCPR, an independent research institute. We are conducting a study for
the University of York about health and choices in health care. This address has
been selected at random from the electoral register. Can you help me check which
person I should interview at this address ... READ OUT FULL ADDRESS FROM ARF.
(This will only take a minute or two).
One
More than one
Whole address
Dwelling unit
NUMBER
RING 'DU' CODE
TO INDICATE
SELECTED UNIT
GO TO e) BELOW
CARD 1
CONT'D
(122)
1 Q.2
A b)
Q.2
(123-124)
125-26)
3 c)
INTERVIES.
THAT PER-
SON
(1 ' 3	 1
	
> END
Head Office. 35 Northampton Square London EC I V OAX. Tel: 01-250 1866
Northern Flew Office: Charazel House Gainford Darlington Co. Durham OL2 3EG. Tel: 0325 730 888
NHS WAITING LISTS
	
March	 1987
RESPONDENT SELECTION SHEET 
1.a)
CONSTITUENCY I	 I	 I	 ADDRESS SERIAL NO. I	 I	 1	 []*—SELECTIONDIGIT
COMPLETE AND RETURN RESPONDENT SELECTION SHEET (RSS) FOR EACH ADDRESS CONTACTED
(CODE BB ON P.2 OF A.R.F.)
Can I check first, is there one household at this address,
or more than one? By household, I mean people who use the
same living room or share at least one meal a day.
IF 'MORE THAN ONE' - CODE 2 AT a) 
b) Select from • WHOLE ADDRESS
OR	 CODE WHICH
• DWELLING UNIT
IF I DWELLING UNIT' - CODE 4 AT 0 
c) RECORD TOTAL NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS AT ADDRESS
d) LIST EACH BELOW IN LOCATION ORDER. USE GRID OVERLEAF TO
MAKE SELECTION (SELECTION DIGIT AND NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS)
LOCATION OF DWELLING UNIT 'DU'
CODE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
VISIT SELECTED UNIT AND ASK: 
I. ) Including yourself, how many people aged 1 person only 01
18 to 69	 live in this part of this
Number of personsaddress?
CODE
OR
aged 25-69
ENTER
None
	 25-69aged 00
28 5
FIRST NAMES
PERSON
CODE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
REMEMBER TO
RING PERSON
CODE OF
SELECTED
PERSON
a)
b)
c)
IF 10 OR MORE
SEE PROJECT
INSTRUCTIONS
2. IF	 'ONE HOUSEHOLD'	 (Q.la CODE 1) OR 'WHOLE ADDRESS SELECTION (Q.lb
Col./
Cade
Skip
to
(127-28)
01 —WINTER-
CODE 3)
Including yourself, how many people aged
25	 to 69	 live at this address?	 1 person only 
VIEW
THAT
ERSON
CODE
OR
Number of persons aged 25-69
ENTER
None aged 25-69
]
00
Q.3
END
3. IF	 TWO OR MORE PERSONS AGED 25-69 (SEE Q.le AND Q.2)
LIST BELOW ALL PERSONS AGED 25 TO 69 IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF THEIR
FIRST NAMES
USE GRID TO SELECT. GO DOWN COLUMN REPRESENTING TOTAL PERSONS  AGED
25-69 UNTIL YOU COME TO THE ROW FOR THE SELECTION DIGIT. THE NUMBER
GIVEN WHERE COLUMN AND ROW MEET IS THE PERSON CODE  OF PERSON TO
INTERVIEW. RING PERSON CODE ABOVE TO INDICATE SELECTED PERSON.
ENTER FULL NAME OF SELECTED PERSON ON ARF SLIP. INTERVIEW THAT
PERSON ONLY
SELECTION GRID 
SELECT ION DIGIT (LAST	 'TOTAL PERSONS 25-69 IN HOUSEHOLD (ADDRESS) 
(total number of Dwelling Units)DIGIT OF SERIAL NUMBER
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 3 3 2 1 5 4 7
1 2 1 1 4 3 6 5 9
2 1 2 2 5 4 3 1 4
3 2 1 4 3 5 7 6 8
4 1 3 2 1 6 2 1 6
5 2 1 3 5 1 7 4 2
6 1 2 4 3 2 5 3 1
7 2 1 3 2 4 1 7 5
8 1 3 2 1 3 4 2 6
9 _	 2 2 1 4 5 6 8 3
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SERIAL NUMBER REGION I	 1	 1
CARD SET Pink (odd)
White (even) 1TIME AT START:
1
2
INTRODUCTION:
We are conducting a study for York University about choices in health care.
We are interested in your experiences of the health services and your views
about waiting for hospital treatment.
UMALAAD
P.932 
Head Office: 35 Northampton Square London EC1V OAX. Tel: 01-250 1866
Northern Field Office: Charazel House Gainford Darlington Co. Durham 0L2 3EG. Tel 0325 730 888
—
' COMMUNITY PLANNING RESEARCH
COSTS OF WAITING FOR HOSPITAL TREATMENT
'
Col. Skip'SECTION A	 I
ASK ALL Code to
1.a) Firstly, can I check how many people live
in your household altogether?
(129-301
INCLUDE ALL CHILDREN
CODE NUMBER I
(131-321
b) And, of these, how many are children •
under 18 years of age? CODE NUMBER I
(133)
2.a) CODE SEX
Male 1
b) What was your age last birthday?
Female 2.
(1 3 VI
CODE ONE ONLY 25-34 1
35-44 2
. 45-54 3
55-64 4
65-69 5
Under 25/70+ A + TERMI
• NATE
INTER-
c) Are you married (or living as married)
or single, widowed, divorced or separated?
. VIEW
(1351
Married 1
Single 2
Widowed 3
Divorced 4
Separated 5
3. Now could you think about your general state (1361
of health. Would you say that for your age
it is	 ...	 READ OUT ...
very good,
good,
average,
below average,
or rather poor?
I
2
3
4
5
Q.4
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(137)
2
3
4
5
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
b) Does this condition limit your activities ... READ OUT...
CODE ONE ONLY
almost all the time
quite often
from time to time
hardly ever
or not at all?
1
2
3
4
b)
c)
Q . G
(1)
Q.6
Q.6
2
Col./
Code
Skip
to
ASK ALL 
Do you worry about your health
	 READ OUT
CODE ONE ONLY	 almost all the time,
quite often,
from time to time,
hardly ever,
or not at all?
ASK ALL 
At the present time do you have a medical
condition that requires you to go to the
doctor or attend hospital on a regular
basis?	 WOMEN: Please exclude pregnancy
4..a)
(138)
Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) 
(139)
IF NO (CODE 2 AT a) 
c) Have you ever had such a condition?
Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 AT c) 
d) How long ago was that?
2
CODE ONE ONLY. 
IF MORE THAN ONE OCCASION,
CODE MOST RECENT, IF OVER
LONG PERIOD CODE FOR END
OF ILLNESS/CONDITION.
Less than . 5 years ago
5 years, less than 10 years
10 years less than 20 years
20 years or more
288
23
4
5
6
b)
•2-7
Spouse
Child
(144)
1
2
3 Col./	 SkipCode	 to
6.a)
ASK ALL THAT DO NOT LIVE ALONE (CHECK Q. 1a) = 2 OR MORE 
OTHERWISE CODE 6 (142)
Do you worry about the health of anyone
else in your household ... READ OUT ...
almost all the time,
quite often,
from time to time,
hardly ever,
or not at all?
(Live alone)
IF CODES 1-5 AT a)
Yes
(143)
1
b) Does anyone else in this household have
a medical condition that requires them
to go to the doctor or attend hospital
on a regular basis?
EXCLUDE PREGNANCY No 2
b)
Q.7
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) 
c) Who is that? (PROBE: 'Anyone else')
CODE ALL THAT APPLY
(146)
Parent/in law 3
(142)
Other (SPECIFY)	 4
During the last year, that is since March/April
1986, which of the following forms of medical care
have you had? (WOMEN: Please exlude care related
to childbirth)
READ OUT EACH BELOW AND CODE; FOR EACH
'YES' CHECK:
7.
'Was that as an NHS Patient?'
i) visits to or from your GP
ii) dental treatment
iii) treatment at the casualty 
department of a hospital
iv) treatment as an out-
patient at a hospital
Yes No
NHS Other
1 2 3 (1,81
1 2 3 (148)
1 2 3 (150)
1 2 3 (151) Q.8
289
b) Was that as an NHS patient?
IF MORE THAN ONE STAY, CODE FOR MOST RECENT 
c)
Q.9
Yes, NHS
No, other
CODE NUMBER:
CODE ONE ONLY
Q.15
Q.10
Q.15
01 102
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
98
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) 
How long were you told?
CODE ONE ONLY
8.a)
-4 --
ASK ALL
Col./
Code
Skip
to
(152)
1
2
b)
d)
And in the last three years, that is since
March/April 1984, have you been in hospital
as an inpatient for treatment, surgery or	 Yes
tests? No
EXCLUDE CHILDBIRTH
INCLUDE DAY-PATIENT TREATMENT IN A DAY-WARD
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) (153)
(1 5 4-55)
c) How many separate stays in hospital
as an inpatient (or daypatient) have
you had since March/April 1984?
IF HAVE NOT HAD HOSPITAL STAY IN LAST 3 YEARS (CODE 2 AT a) (156)
d) Have you had an inpatient (or daypatient)
stay in hospital in the last ten years? Yes 1
No 2 Q.15
IF MOST RECENT STAY NOT NHS (CODE 2 AT Q.8b) RING CODE 01 
ASK ALL WHO HAVE HAD NHS HOSPITAL STAY IN LAST 3 YEARS (CODE 1 AT 0.8b)
SHOW CARD A
9. Thinking about your most recent time in hospital,
how long was it from when you were first told you
would have to go into hospital until the time you:
were actually admitted?
(157-58)
(Treated as private patient)
Admitted in emergency
Less than 1 month
1 month, less than 3 months
3 months, less than 6 months
6 months, less than 1 year
1 year, less than 2 years
2 years or more
(You chose to wait)
(Can't remember)
10.a)
Yes
No
b)
Less than 1 month
1 month, less than 3 months
3 months, less than 6 months
6 months, less than 1 year
1 year, less than 2 years
(Can't remember)
ALL WHO WAITED FOR TREATMENT (CODES 03 - 08 AT Q.9)
When you were first told you would have to be
admitted to hospital were you told how long you
were likely to have to wait?
(159)
b)
Q.11
e1601
2
1
3	 Q.11
4
5
8
2
29 0
11.a)
7 5 -
ASK ALL WHO WAITED FOR TREATMENT (CODES 03-08 AT Q9)
Col./
Code
Skip
to
Were you told your exact date of admission
quite soon after you knew you 	 had to have
the treatment, or was it some time before you were (161)
.given an exact date?
Given exact date in advance 1 Q.12
Had to wait some time 1- b)
IF HAD TO WAIT (CODE 2 at a)
b)	 Did the uncertainty about when you
would go in make you anxious at all
(162)
while you were waiting?	 Yes 1 c)
No 2 Q.12
IF YES (CODE 1 at b) (163)
' c) Were you.. .READ OUT... 	
.	
very anxious,
fairly anxious
1
2 (.12
or just a little anxious 3
12.a) During the period that you were waiting
to be admitted to hospital, were you in
any pain at all?
(164)
Yes 1 b)
,	 No 2 Q.13
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
b)	 Was this pain fairly constant
or did it only affect you from time
to time?
(165)
Fairly constant 1
Time to time 2
..
Q.13
13.a) While you were waiting were you at all
anxious about the hospital treatment
itself? (166)
'	 Yes 1 b)
No 2 Q.14
IF YES (CODE 1 At a) (1671
b)	 Was	 that	 ...	 READ OUT ...
for most of the time you were waiting,
from time to time,
1
2 .	 4Q1
or only just before you were due to have the treatment? 3
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14.a)
6
C.ol./	 Skip
Code	 to
ASK ALL WHO WAITED FOR TREATMENT (CODES 03 -08 AT Q.9)
And while you were waiting, were you
anxious at all about what your health
might be after your hospital treatment? (169)
1
2
b)
Q.15
Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 at a)
(169)
1
2
3
b)	 Were you	 ...	 READ OUT ...
very anxious,
fairly anxious,
or just a little anxious?
15. ASK ALL
(170)
1
2
b)
Q.13
Now thinking about members of your
family and close friends. During the last
year, that is, since March/April 1986, has anyone
close to you been in hospital as an inpatient
(or daypatient?)
	
Do not include stays related
to childbirth.
Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
b)	 Who has been in hospital in the last year?
PROBE:	 Anyone else?
CODE ALL THAT APPLY (171)
1Spouse or partner
Parent (inc.	 in-law)
Own child
Other child
Other relative
Other/Non-relative
c)	 Did any of these people go into
(1721
2
(1731
3
Q.16
(174)
4
(175)
5
(176)
6
(177)
1
2
hospital privately (including
privately within an NHS hospital)?
	 Yes
No
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Col./
Cade
1
2
Yes
No
16.a)
ASK ALL
Can I just check:	 are you currently ... READ OUT 0 -
and CODE:
0	 Waiting for a bed for an inpatient
	
stay
Yes No Co l.
1
1
2
2
2
(178)
(179.1
(180)
as an NHS patient
ii) Waiting to get an outpatient appointment
for diagnosis or tests as an NHS patient
iii) Waiting to begin a course of treatment at a
hospital outpatient department as an NHS
patient?
IF ANY YES (CODE 1 at ai) ii) or iii)
b) How long have you been waiting?
CARD 02
(207)
IF MORE THAN ONE YES
AT a),	 CODE LONGEST Less than a month, 1
WAIT 1 month less than 3 months,
3 months,	 less than 6 months,
6 months,	 less than 1 year,
I year,	 less than 2 years,
2 years or more?
2
3
4
5
6
Are you currently booked for any inpatient or
outpatient medical care as a private patient?
17.
(208)
7
SECTION
B.
293
8SECTION B
ASK ALL 
READ OUT 
18.	 We'd like you to imagine yourself in the following situation. As /'ZZ be
asking you to make some choices based on the situation, please stop me
if there's anything you don't understand.
Imagine you are in the same general situation as you are in now. You have
the same family circumstances, the same general state of health, and the
same income and savings. However, you have just been diagnosed as having
a medical condition for which you will need treatment in hospital. This
condition is not dangerous and will not affect your future health, and once
you have the treatment your health will be back to normal. However, until
you get treatment your condition will mean that you'll be in moderate pain
and may often feel 'under the weather'. You will have to take a few days
. off from your normal day-to-day work each month; will be able to do less
around the house and may also have to cut down on your usual leisure and
social activities. There is a hospital waiting list for the treatment you require.
In this situation you have to choose between two options, Option A and Option B.
FOR OPTION A	 You will have to wait for treatment, but you do not have to
pay anything. You will either be told a definite date when you will be admitted
to hospital (for example, say, in exactly 5 months time) or you will be told
only the earliest possible date and the Latest possible date on which you could
be admitted (for example between 4 months time and 6 months time - in practice
you could be admitted at any time between these 2 dates.)
FOR OPTION B You will have to pay a certain amount of money but then you can
go into hospital as soon as you want. If you have medical insurance you would
not be able to use it on this occasion.
Whichever option you choose, you will get the same treatment and the same nursing
care in the same NHS hospital. The two options do not represent a choice betweel
public and private care, but rather a choice between waiting, or paying in order
to avoid the wait. If you are able and willing to borrow the money for Option B,
you may do so.
The options are written on this card:
SHOW CARD B 
RESPONDENT READS CARD
READ OUT 
Is there anything that is not clear? IF NO PROBLEM, CONTINUE.
Now keeping in mind that you have the type of medical condition I just described.
I'm going to ask you to choose between Option A and Option B using a set of
cards. On each card is, firstly, the amount of time you would have to wait
under Option A and whether or not you would be given a definite date of admissi.,n,
and secondly the amount of money you would have to pay to get immediate admission
for Option B.
294
Cal./
Code
Skip
to
.(209)
2
SECTION B;CONTD. 
9
Here is an example:
SHOW CARD C: READ OUT 
So for Option A you will have to wai
for treatment.
t between three and 5 months
For Option B you can go in whenever y
equal to your normal household income
u like but must pay a sum
for a week.
Which option would you choose?
RESPONDENT MARES CHOICE
IF ANY UNCERTAINTY APPARENT: Can I just check, you mean you would/
. wouldn't be prepared to pay a week's income to avoid a wait of
between 3 and 5 months if you had the type of medical condition I
described?
RING WHICH SET OF CARDS TO BE USED 
DOUBLE CHECK AGAINST PAGE 1 AND THE C
Pink
WhiteARD COLOUR
SHUFFLE SET OF TRADE OFF CARDS. HAND IRST CARD TO RESPONDENT.
READ OUT 
So please look at the cards and tell me
you would choose.	 Make your choice based
and family circumstances.
	 Remember that
money or time on the card, the medical
the same in each case.
WHEN CHOICE IS MADE TAKE CARD
BACK, CHECK CARD NUMBER AND
CODE CHOICE.
HAND NEXT CARD AND REPEAT
UNTIL ALL 14 CARDS SEEN AND
CODED.
in each case which option
on your	 current income
whatever the amount of
condition you have is exactly
(210)
(211)
(212)
(213)
(2110
(215)
(216)
(217)
(218)
(7-19)
(220)
(221)
(222)
(223) Q.19
CARD NUMBER A
1 1 2
2 1 2
3 1 2
4 1 2
5 1 2
6 1 2
7 1
8 1 2
9 1 2
10 1 2
11 1 2
12 1 2
13 1 2
14 1 2
295
ENTER AMOUNT TO NEAREST Ei I 
None/Not prepared to pay	 0000
ENTER IN MONTHS OR WEEKS 
MONTHS il l
 
WEEKS
1 0 Cal./
Code
Skip
to
19.
ASK ALL 
Now still imagining you had the medical condition
I described, if you were told you'd have to wait six months
before you could go into hospital, what is the most money
you would be prepared to pay to avoid this wait?
(2 2 412) •
If you were told you would have to pay £300
to get immediate admission and that otherwise
you would have to wait, what's the longest time
you would be prepared to wait to avoid paying the
£300?
20.
Couldn't pay anything
Wouldn't pay anything
Don't know
21.a) When you made all these choices did you have a
specific illness or condition in mind?
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
Yes
No
(2 31)
1
2
b)
SECTION
C .	pll
b) What was that?
WRITE IN
SECTION
C: p11
96
97
98
1
296
Col./
Code
(232)
1
1
2
8
Skip
to
b)
Q.24
Q.23
0
Q.23
Q.24
d)
Q.24
(235)
2 1
ISECTION C 1
ASK ALL
I would now like to ask you some questions about
your experience of private health insurance, that is an
insurance policy that covers you for private medical
treatment (for example BUPA, PPP, WPA?)
(IF UNCLEAR TO RESPONDENT, EXPLAIN: You pay an annual
premium to a company and you then can obtain private
medical care at no charge during;that year, should
you need it.)
Is anyone in your immediate household covered
by an insurance policy of this kind?
	
Yes
No
(Don't know)
.IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) 
b) Who is covered by such a policy?
CODE ONE ONLY 	 Self only
Self and spouse/partner
Self, spouse /partner and children
Spouse/partner only
Spouse and childreri only
Self and parent(s)
Parent(s) only
(233)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
B 1Other person(s)
IF SPOUSE COVERED, BUT RESPONDENT NOT (CODES 4 OR 5 AT b)
c) Who pays the premium for that policy? (234)
Self 1
CODE ONE ONLY
Partner 2
Self and partner jointly 3
Partner's employer pays part,
you (and/or your partner) pay part 4
Partner's employer pays all 5
Other person 6
.
1
d) Why are you not covered by the policy?
Company covers employee only,
would have to pay for self
Other reasons (SPECIFY)
297
12
ALL WHO ARE COVERED BY A POLICY (CODE 1-3 OR 6 AT Q.22b) 
SHOW CARD D 
Who pays the premium for that policy?
(236)
1 },
4
5
6
2
3
SECTION
C1:p.13
SECTION
C2:p.15
Q.24
(237)
1
2
Col./
Code
Skip
to
23.
*Self
Partner
Self and partnerjointly
Own employer (or spouse's employer pays part),
you (and/or your partner) pap part
Own employer (or partner's employer) pays all
Ocher person( SPECIFY
	 .
24a)
IF DO NOT HAVE POLICY THAT COVERS SELF (OR OTHER PERSON PAYS) 
(CODE 2 OR 8 AT Q.22a) pz CODE 4, 5, 7,8 AT Q.22b DR CODE 6 AT Q.23) 
Have you ever been covered by a private health insurance
policy which you paid for yourself ( yes), either wholly
or in part?
Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) 
b) Why do you no longer have the policy?
PROBE FULLY, RECORD VERBATIM. 
b)
Q.25
c)	 And have you (and/or your partner)
(239)
SECTION
considered taking out such a policy again?
	 Yes 1 C3:p.13
No 2 SECTION
C4:p.21
25. Have you (and your partner) ever seriously considered
taking out a private health insurance policy yourself(ves)? (239) SECTION
Yes 1 C3:p.18
No 2 SECTION
C4:p.21
298
26.
Q.28
13 Cal./
Code
Skip
to
SECTION Cl
ALL THOSE WHO HAVE NON-COMPANY COVER PHI (CODES 1, 2, 3 AT Q.23) 
For how many years have you held your current
health insurance policy?
CODE TO NEAREST YEAR. IF LESS
THAN SIX MONTHS CODE 00 (240-41::
YEARS
SHOW CARD E
27a) Here is a list of factors that may or may not have been
important in your decision to take out the policy .
Which three of these factors were the most important
to you?	 Just tell me the numbers on the card.
(242..47'
CODE THE THREE
THAT APPLY	 The state of your own health at the time 01
The health of your partner and/or
children at the time 02
The expected health of yourself, your
partner or your children in the future 03
Having a choice of hospital 04
Having a choice of consultant 05
The comforts of private hospitals 06
The possibility of getting more information about your treatment 07
The quality of medical treatment at private hospitals 08
The quality of medical treatment at NHS hospitals 09
Being able to choose a time to go into hospital 10
Being able to avoid having to wait for treatment 11
b) Were there any other reasons, not on the card, that were
important in your decision to take out the policy?
(2 48 1
Yes 1 c)
No 2 Q.28
1 AT b)
c) What were they? PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM.
299
(249)
2
3
4
CODE ONE ONLY
Yes
No
Q.29
Q.29
(250)
1 }.
2 b)
3
SECTIO .
D:p.22
- 14 - Skip
to
Col./
Code
28a)
SECTION Cl: NON-COMPANY COVER (CONTD) 
Do you think you will continue to take out private
health insurance for the rest of your life or might
you give it up at some time?
Plan to keep for life
May give up at some time
Don't know/It depends
(Will not renew subscription next time)
b)
29a)
IF CODES 2-4 AT a) 
b) When might you stop taking out
health insurance?
PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM
c) And why would you stop then?
PROBE FULLY IF NOT COVERED AT b; RECORD VERBATIM.
IF PLAN TO KEEP (CODE 1 AT a) 
d) 'Why do you plan to keep taking out health
insurance for life? PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM 
ASK ALL WITH NON-COMPANY COVER
As an alternative to paying for a private health
insurance policy each year, youldyouever consider
just paying for private medical care if and when
you needed it?
Don't know/It depends
b) Why do you say that? PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM
300
Yes
No
(251)
S
(252)
1
2
Q.32
b)
d)
(2531
21}
3
15
ISECTION C2
ALL THOSE WHO HAVE COMPANY COVER PHI (CODS 4 OR 5 AT Q.23) 
Before you were covered by your (spouse's) employer,
did you ever pay for private health insurance
yourself (yes)?
Q.31
Col./
Code
Skip
to
30.
31a) If you present cover were to stop for any reason,
would you seriously consider paying for a policy yourself?
Yes
No
IF NO (CODE 2 AT a) 
.b) For what reasons would you not consider paying for
health insurance? PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM.
c) You've said you would not consider paying for a
private health insurance policy where you pay
an annual premium. Would you ever consider just
paying for private medical care if and when you
needed it?	 Yes
No
It depends/Don't know
.d) Why do you say that? PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM
SECTION
D , p.22
30 1
16
Col./	 Skip
Code	 to •
Q.34
SECTION COMPANY COVER (CONTD)C2:
32.
(254)
IF WOULD CONSIDER PAYING (CODE 1 AT Q.31a)
Would you consider taking out a policy
to cover	 ... READ OUT	 ...	 ... yourself only,
yourself and your partner,
or yourself, your partner and your children?
1
2
3 Q-33
Other: PLEASE STATE: 4
SHOW CARD E
33a) Listed on this card are factors which may or may not
be important should you consider taking out your own
private health insurance policy. 	 Which three factors do
you think would be of most importance to you? (255 -60'
CODE THE THREE	 The state of your own health at the time 01
THAT APPLY
The health of your partner and/or
children at the time 02
The expected health of yourself,
your partner or your children
in the future
03
Having a choice of hospital 04
Having a choice of consultant 05
The comforts of private hospitals 06
The possibility of getting more information about your treatment 07
The quality of medical treatment in private hospitals 08
The quality of medical treatment at NHS hospitals 09
Being able to choose a time to go into hospital 10
b)
Being able to avoid having to wait for treatment
Are there any other reasons, not on the card,
why you would consider taking out private
health insurance yourself? Yes
11
(26 1)
c)
No 2 Q.34
IF YES (CODE 1 AT b)
c)	 What are those reasons?	 PROBE FULLY;	 RECORD VERBATIM
302
34a)
17
SECTION C2: COMPANY COVER (CONTD): ALL CODE 1 AT Q31a)
C.ol./
Code
Skip
to
(262\
1
2
b)
Q.35
Are there any reasons why you would not
take out private health insurance?	 Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a) 
b) What are those reasons?
RECORD FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM
Q.35
35a) As an alternative to paying for a private health
insurance policy each year, would you ever consider just
paying for private medical care if and when you needed it?
(263)
Yes
No
1J
2 b)
b)
Don't know/It depends
Why do you say that?
	 PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM
3
SECTION
p 22
303
(264)
1
2
3
4
5
Did you consider taking out the
policy to cover ... READ OUT ...
(266-711
01 "s
02
03
b)
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
Col./
Code
Ski p
to
18
SECTION C3
/1;i i.L QTI;(57 WHO SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED PHI (CODE 1 AT Q.24c OR CODE 1 
AT 
36. When did you first consider taking out
a health insurance policy?
CODE ONE ONLY Within the last year
1 year, less than 3 years
3 years, less than 5 years
5 years, less than 10 years
More than 10 years ago
37. (265)
1 }
2
3
4
yourself only,
yourself and your partner,
or yourself, your partner and children?
Other PLEASE STATE
Q.38
38a)
SHOW CARD E
Listed on this card are factors which may or may
not have been important when you've considered
private health insurance? Which three factors
have bectn most important to you?
CODE THE THREE	 The state of your own health at the time
THAT APPLY
The expected health of yourself,
your partner or your children in the future
Having a choice of hospital
Having a choice of consultant
The comforts of private hospitals
The possibility of getting more information
abour your treatment in the private sector
The quality of medical treatment in the private sector
The quality of medical treatment at NHS hospitals
Being able to choose a convenient time to go into hospital
Being able to avoid a wait for treatment
The health of your partner and/or
children at the time
304
19
Col./
Code
Skip
to
b)
Question 38 contd.
(272)Have there been any other reasons, not listed on the card, whyyou've been considering private health insurance?
Yes 1 c)
No Q.39
IF YES (CODE 1 At b)
c) What are those reasons?
PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM.
Why haven't you taken out a policy
at the present time?
PROBE FULLY. RECORD VERBATIM
39.
Q.40
305
20 Col./
Code
Skip
to
40a) Do you think it is likely that you will (2731
take out a policy in the future?	 .	 Yes -	 1 b)
No 2 Q.41
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
b)	 Once you've taken out the policy, for
how long do you think you would keep it?
PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM.
41a) As an alternative to paying for a private health •
insurance policy each year would you ever consider
just paying for private medical care if and when
you needed it?
	
Yes
(274)
1
No 2 b)
b)
Don't know/It depends
Why do you say that?
	 PROBE FULLY.	 "RECORD VERBATIM.
3
SECTION
: p.22
306
42.
21
SECTION C4
ALL THOSE WHO HAVE NOT CONSIDERED PHI (CODE 2 At Q.24 c
 OR AT Q.25) 
Why is it that you haven't seriously considered taking
out private health insurance? PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM
Col./
Code
Skip
to
(275)
43a) Do you think you might consider taking out a
policy in the future?	 Yes 1 b)
No 2 Q.44
IF YES (CODE 1 At a)
b)	 When do you think this would be?
PROBE FULLY; RECORD VERBATIM.
c)	 Why would you consider taking out a policy then?
PROBE FULLY (if not covered at b); RECORD VERBATIM
44a) You've said you (currently) would not consider taking out a private
health insurance policy for which you paid an annual premium.
(276)
Would you ever consider just paying for private medical
care if and when you needed it?	 Yes 1
No 2 b)
b)
It depends/DK
Why do you say that/	 PROBE FULLY . RECORD VERBATIM
SECTION
D:p.22
307
SHOW CARD F
ASK ALL 
SECTION D 1
(277)
1
2
3
8
b)
c)
Q.47
(270)
1
2
(279)
2
3
4
5
Q.48
- 22 -
Col./
Code
Skip
to
Which of the views on this card comes closest.to
your own views about private medical treatment
in hospitals?
Private medical treatment in all hospitals should be abolished
Private medical treatment should be allowed in private hospitals
but not in National Health Service hospitals
Private medical treatment should be allowed in both private
and National Health Service hospitals
(Don't know)
Finally, a few questions about you and your household.
In whose name is this accommodation owned or rented?
Respondent and/or spouse
Other person
IF 'RESPONDENT OR SPOUSE' (CODE 1 AT a) 
b) Do you own or rent this accommodation?
45.
46a).
IF OTHER PERSON 
c) Does (responsible person) own
or rent it?
Other (SPECIFY)
Owned (include buying)
Rented - Local Authority
- Housing Association
- Private landlord
(280)
SPARE
CARD 03
47. How old were you when you left school?
NB. INCLUDE SCHOOL OR SIXTH FORM
COLLEGE NOT ANY FURTHER OR
HIGHER EDUCATION.
(307-08)
(Never went to school) 	 01
CODE AGE IN YEARS
308
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
48a)
-23 -
Do you have any qualification obtained either
at school or after leaving school?
Yes
No
IF YES (CODE 1 AT a)
Col./
Code
Skip
to
f3 091
2
b)
Q.49
SHOW CARD G
b) Which of the qualifications on this card is the
highest qualification you have obtained. '310-311
ICODE ONE ONLY I	 CSE
'0' Level/School Certificate or Matriculation/
Scottish SCE/SUPE/SLC Lower or ordinary
City and Guilds/ONC/OND/BTEC/
Certificate of Sixth Year Studies
'A' or 'S' Level .-
Higher School Certificate/
Scottish SCE/SUPE/SLC Higher
HNC/HND/Dip HE
Professional/Teaching/Nursing qualification
without a degree/University Certificate or Diploma
Univeristy or CNAA degree
Masters/Doctorate/Postgraduate professional qualification
(eg. CQSW,PCCE);
(OTHER HOT LISTED
49a)
ASK ALL
present time are you in paid work
In work (including government schemes)
312-131
01
02
C3
04
05
06
07
08
09j
10
11
Q.50
Q.53
Can I just check, at the
or doing something else?
Full	 . (30+ hours)
PROBE AS NECESSARY
CODE ONE ONLY
time	 employee
Part-time (less than 30 hours) employee
Full-time self employed (30+ hours)
Part-time (less than 30 hrs) self-employed
Not in work
PLEASE SPECIFY
Waiting to start, obtained job
Looking for work
Long term sickness
Full-time student
Wholly retired
Keeping house
Doing something else
50.
IF IN WORK (CODES 01-04 AT Q.49)
(314)
1
'2
3
Q.51
11-25
Approximately how many people are employed
at your place or work?	 25-100
100 or more
309
- 24 -
IF IN WORK (CODES 01-04 AT Q.49a)
Cold	 Skip
Code	 to
(3ft-is)
1
51. How many hours do you
week, including any
work on average each
overtime you may do?	 CODE HOURS
IF 'IN WORK' CODES 01-04 AT Q.49a) (317)
52. If you were unable to work because of
illness, after what time would your
income/earnings be affected?
Less than 1 week 1
CODE ONE ONLY
1 week, less than 3 weeks 2
3 weeks, less than 4 weeks 3
4 weeks, less than 3 months 4 Q.53
3 months less than 6 months
6 months or more 6
(Don't know) 8
Never/not at all
ASK ALL
SHOW CARD H
53a) Finally, which of the amounts on this card comes closest to your
personal total gross income - I mean income from all sources before 018-ts)
tax and other deductions? 	 Just say which code number in the middle
applies.	 .
CODE
HOUSEWIVES WITH
NO INCOME OF THEIR
ENTER OR CODE:
None
OWN SHOULD BE CODED
96
AS NONE Refused 97
Don't know 98
IF HAS SPOUSE/PARTNER
And which of the amounts on this card comes closest to you and your
spouse/partner's total joint gross income - again income from all (320-21)
sources before tax and other deductions. \
CODE
ENTER OR CODE:
None 96
Refused 97
Don't know 98	 END
02i_eo)
TIME AT END OF INTERVIEW 1 nil
LENGTH OF INTERVIEW i	 1	 1	 MINS.
INTERVIEWER NAME
INTERVIEWER NO.
310
P.932
	
CARD A	 Q.9
Admitted in an emergency
Less than 1 month
1 month, less than 3 months
3 months, less than 6 months
6 months, less than 1 year
I year, less than 2 years
2 years or more
P.932	 CARD B
OPTION A 	 OPTION B
• Wait for treatment	 • Get treatment as soon as
you like
• May or may not get definite 	 • Can choose a date that suits
date for admission	 you
• Pay nothing	 • Pay a sum of money.(Cannot use
private health insurance)
FOR BOTH OPTIONS 
• Treatment the same
• Hospital the same
311
OPTION A OPTION B 
No definite date of admission:
wait 3-5 months
Pay: your household income
for one week.
P.932	 CARD D	 Q.23
P.932	 CARD C
EXAMPLE
Yourself
Your partner
Yourself and your partner jointly
Your own employer (or partner's employer)
pays part, you (or your partner) pay part
Your own employer (or partner's employer)
pays all
Other person
312
Option B
Pay £200
Option B
Pay £200
Option B
Pay £400
Option B
Pay £400
Stated Preference Cards: White Set
1. Option A	 Option B
No definite date of	 Pay £100
admission
Wait 3 - 5 months
2. Option A	 Option B
No definite date of	 Pay £100
admission
Wait 5 - 7 months
3. Option A	 Option B
Definite date of 	 Pay £100
admission
Wait exactly 12 months.
4. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 4 months
5. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 5 - 7 months
6. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 3 - 5 months
7. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 6 months
313
Option B
Pay £770
Option B
Pay £75
Option B
Pay £160
Option B
Pay £530
8.	 Option A	 'Option B
No definite date of	 Pay £400
admission
Wait 11 - 13 months
9. Option A	 Option B
Definite date of
	 Pay £800
admission
Wait exactly 4 months
10. Option A	 Option B
Definite date of	 Pay £50
admission
Wait exactly 6 months
11. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 10 - 12 months
12. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 1 - 3 months
13. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 5 months
14. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 8 months
Option B
Pay £150
Option B
Pay £150
Option B
Pay £300
Option B
Pay £300
Stated Preference Cards: Pink Set
1. Option A	 Option B
No definite date of.	 Pay £75
admission
Wait 2 - 4 months
2. Option A	 Option B
No definite date of	 Pay £75
admission
Wait 4 - 6 months
3. Option A
	 Option B
Definite date of	 Pay £75-
admission
Wait exactly 9 months
4. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 3 months
5. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 4 - 6 months
6. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 2 - 4 months
7. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 5 months
8.	 Option A	 Option B
No definite date of
	
Pay £300
admission
Wait 8 - 10 months
9. Option A	 Option B
Definite date of	 Pay £800
admission
Wait exactly 4 months
10. Option A	 Option B
Definite date of 	 Pay £50
admission
Wait exactly 6 months
11. Option A
No definite date of
admission	 -
Wait 10 - 12 months
12. Option A
No definite date of
admission
Wait 5 - 7 months
13. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 4 months
14. Option A
Definite date of
admission
Wait exactly 12 months
Option B
Pay £770
Option B
Pay £600
Option B
Pay £160
Option B
Pay £480
P.932
	
CARD E 
1. The state of your own health at the time
2. The health of your partner and/or children at the time
3. The expected health of yourself, your partner or your
children in the future
4. Having a choice of hospital
5. Having a choice of consultant
6. The comforts of private hospitals
7. The possibility of getting more information about your
treatment in the private sector
8. The quality of medical treatment at private hospitals
9. The quality of medical treatment at NHS hospitals
10. Being able to choose a convenient time to go into hospital
11. Being able to avoid having to wait' for treatment
P.932	 Q.45
CARD F 
Private medical treatment in all hospitals should be abolished
Private medical treatment should be allowed in private hospitals
but not in National Health Service hospitals
Private medical treatment should be allowed in both private
and National Health Service hospitals
31 7
P.932	 CARD G	 Q.48
CSE
'0' Level/Scottish SCE,SUPE,SMIxower/School Certificate
City and Guilds
ONC/OND/BTEC
'A' or 'S' Level/Scottish SCE,SUPE,SLC Higher/
Higher School Certificate
HNC/HND/Dip HE
professional ,nursing or teaching qualification
without a degree
University Certificate or Diploma
University or CNAA degree
Masters
Doctorate
Postgraduate professional qualification
P.932	 CARD H	 Q.53
WEEKLY
	
Code
	 ANNUAL
Under £50
	
04	 Under £2,500
£50 - £74
	
08	 £2,500 - £3,899
£75 - £99
	
01	 £3,900 - £5,199
£100 - £149
	
07	 £5,200 - £7,799
£150 - £199
	
02	 £7,800 - £10,399
£200 - £249
	
03	 £10,400 - £12,999
£250 - £349
	
06	 £13,000 - £18,199
£350 - £449
	
05	 £18,200 - £23,399.
£450 - £599	 10	 £23,400 - £31,199
£600 or over
	 09	 £31,200 or over
318
